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INTRODUCTION

The taking of a bribe or gratuity, should be punished with as
severe penalties as the defrauding of the State.
- William Penn'
If all statesmen shared this ideology, there would be no need for
this article. However, a glance at current business journals and news
agencies shows the great necessity to address global corrupt practices in
today's transnational business environment. 2 No matter what label you
* Adjunct Professor St. Thomas University School of Law, B.S., 1990, University of
Missouri at St. Louis; Juris Doctor, 1993, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center; Candidate for LL.M., 1995, University of Miami School of Law.
1. WILLIAM PENN, SOME FRUITS OF SOLITUDE, INREFLECTIONS AND MAXIMS 76 (Intro.
by Edmond Goss, Folcroft Library ed. 1976).

2. See Chris Blackhurst, Civil Servant Who Enjoyed Life of Luxury on Proceeds of
Corruption, INDEPENDENT (London), May 27, 1994, at 2 (3d ed.) (stating British official took

"backhanders from foreign firms in return for dishing out tens of millions of pounds in orders");
Svenska Dagbladet, Kockums Smutskastas, SKAANSKA DAGBLADET (Malmoe, Sweden), Apr. 26,
1994, at 27 (stating Swedish company tried to bribe officials in the Pakistani foreign ministry);

Peter K. Semler, U.S. Firms Shift Strategy, Push for Anti-Corruption Law Abroad, J. COM.
(Bangkok, Thailand), Apr. 18, 1994, at 8a (reporting of kickbacks paid by British companies to
vlalaysian officials); A Series of Alleged Corruption Scandals, ECONOMIST INTELLEGENCE
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use, pot-de-vin, unto amarillo, schmiergeld, mordida, esca, or grease
payment, there is no disputing that today's global business market is
riddled with corruption. All too often these "accommodating" payments
target public officials in order to secure favorable treatment in
transnational business matters.' As international trade and investment
increases, the need for an international foreign corrupt practices treaty
becomes more apparent.
This article will first evaluate past domestic and international
attempts at combating transnational bribery of public officials by
businesses.
Next, the author will identify and describe the current
international efforts in combating bribery of foreign officials. The third
segment of this paper will identify why it is in the world community's best
interest to adopt a multilateral treaty to fight these "accommodating"
payments. The author will then propose a draft of such a treaty that would
be completely different from the past failed efforts. Critical thought on
why this treaty should not emulate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) will be put forth. Finally, avenues will be identified which will
facilitate the ultimate ratification of this draft by the international
community.

II. ANALYZING PAST INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO COMBAT
CORRUPT PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS

Bribes and kickbacks have gone hand-in-hand with human
commerce since the birth of mankind.'
In the global market place,
"Corruption is common because the rusty machinery of international
business calls out for lubrication." 5 In fact, "greasing" of public officials

UNIT, COUNTRY REP. (New York), Oct. 18, 1993, available in Westlaw, Bus-Int'l Database
(stating that a Turkish political party was questioned regarding irregularities of money payments
from General Dynamics Corporation of the United States); The Government Says It Will Clean
Out Corruption, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REP. (New York), Feb. 15, 1993,
available in Westlaw, Bus-Int'l Database (alleging that Botswana Housing Administration is
accepting bribes from foreign contractors).
3.

L. Cutler & D. Drory, TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CODE ON ILLICIT PAYMENTS, IN

EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: MULTINATIONAL CODES

AND CORPORATE CONDUCT 34-35 (Seymour J. Rubin & Gary C. Hufbauer eds., 1984).
4.

See RAMSEY MACMULLEN, CORRUPTION AND THE DECLINE OF ROME (1978); JOHN T.

NOONAN, BRIBES 839 (1994); John Impert, A Programfor Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct and Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
1009 (1993).
5. Clean, Not Laundered, 327 ECONOMIST 78 (1993) (reporting that former World Bank
leader, Peter Eigen, speaks out on the appalling rate of bribery and extortion in international
commerce and economic development).
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is seen as a way of life in many societies.6 Switzerland has only recently
considered the revocation of a long standing law that allowed businesses a
tax deduction on payments of overseas bribes.' Although there is a
widespread acceptance of some forms of commercial "accommodation"
payments, both the United States and the international community have
made several attempts to curtail ongoing corrupt payments to public
officials.
Nearly every nation has made it a crime to bribe or attempt to
bribe its state officials.' The United States is the only nation that currently
has domestic laws in place to outlaw bribery of foreign public officials. 9
The FCPA ° is America's main weapon in fighting illicit payments to public
officials overseas. The Watergate investigation's exposure of huge secret
corporate slush funds, used to finance bribery of foreign officials, acted as
the catalyst for the formation of the FCPA." The FCPA was an attempt to
halt the perceived erosion of corporate America's integrity." The
American legislature seized the initiative and passed the FCPA provisions
in 1977 assuming that a universal treaty was probable, impending, or at
6.

See

RICHARD

SCHAFFER

ET

AL.,

INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS

LAW

AND

ITS

ENVIRONMENT 416-19 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the cross cultural acceptance of bribery of foreign
public officials in the nations of Italy, Germany, France, Japan, and Argentina); SEYMOUR J.
RUBIN & GARY C. HUFBAUER, EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND

INVESTMENT 38 (1984); Steve Levine, Survey of Azerbaijan: Oil and Bribery Lubricate The
Wheels, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 2; Susan Hayward, Pact May Inhibit Corruption, J.
COM., Oct. 8, 1993, at 4A; Milan Ruzicka, Bribery Mars Business Relations in Eastern Europe,
J. COM., Sept. 1, 1993, at IA.

7. Switzerland: Bribes May Soon Become Nondeductible, CROSSBORDER MONITOR, Mar.
16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Busint File; see also RUBIN & HURBAUER, supra
note 6, at 39 (Germany likewise had been granting tax deductions for these payments.).
8. See NOONAN, supra note 4, at 702; Louise R. Driscoll, The Illegality of Bribery: Its
Roots, Essence and Universality, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 13-38 (1984); Judson Wambold,

ProhibitingForeign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 231, 235 (1977).

9. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct to Include a PrivateRight of
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185 (1994); RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 39; E. Ernest

Goldstein, European Views of United States Anti-Bribery and Anti-Boycott Legislation, 1 N.W.J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 363, 364 (1979) (stating that every major European nation prohibits bribery of

its officials). But see Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on
Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979) (Sweden has attempted to enforce criminal
legislation that is considered similar to America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.).
10.

15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff, 78m (1991).

11. Arthur Aronoff, Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 789
P.L.I. 799 (1992); Raymond Dowd, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1988
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 946, 948 (1991);
Wallace Timmeny, An Overview of the FCPA, 9 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 235 (1982).

12.

S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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the very least reasonably attainable in the near future.'3 However, after
being amended in 1988 to clarify its language, the FCPA remains a

unilateral approach against foreign corruption.
The purpose of the FCPA is to deter a wide variety of activities
which are deemed "corrupt." As amended, the FCPA includes accounting
measures,
anti-bribery provisions," affirmative defenses, 6 and an
advisory opinion process." Enforcement of this Act is the responsibility
of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Attorney
General. Violators of the Act could face stiff monetary fines and possible
prison terms. 8 The FCPA is only one of the many possible legislative
enactments that could be used to curtail illicit payments by United States
business to foreign public officials. 9 The FCPA has been hailed as the

13. Hirschorn, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrowed, Significantly Clarified, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 2, 1988, at 16; Franklin Gevurtz, Using the Anti-Trust Laws to Combat Overseas
Bribery by Foreign Companies:A Step to Even the Odds in InternationalTrade, 27 VA. J. INT'L
L. 211 (1987). ("When Congress enacted the FCPA, it hoped that multilateral treaties would
follow under which other trading nations would pledge to join in prohibiting corrupt acts
committed by their own nationals."); S. RES. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 36,
108 (1975); S.REP. No. 486, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986); 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2010 at
27 (Jan. 1978) (statement of President Carter) ("The FCPA can only be successful in combating
bribery and extortion if other countries and businesses themselves take comparable action," the
President presumes other countries would follow.).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 1991) (provisions which require United States businesses to
keep a running record of their internal financial activities so as to allow the government, among
other things, to accurately investigate alleged foreign corrupt payments).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (West 1991) (outlawing "payments" to foreign
officials or foreign political parties and provides the "knowingly" standard).
16. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(b), (c), 78dd-2(b), (c) (West 1991) (providing for the "routine
governmental action" exception and affirmative defenses that include a "lawful" payment in light
of foreign governments laws and the affirmative defense that such payments were "directly
related to promotion, demonstration or explanation of the products or services; or the execution
or performance of a contract with a foreign contract with a agency thereof").
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(e), 78dd-2(f) (West 1991) (establishing a review procedure in
which specific inquiries by issuers can be analyzed in light of the FCPA prohibited acts sections);
see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.18(j-k) (1991) (providing the details of the review procedure and
normally requires a thirty day response time by the Department of Justice).
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West 1991) (Fining could reach up to $2,000,000.00 and prison
terms as long as 5 years.).
19. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 37 (The Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the
International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 indirectly help limit the
occurrence of United States bribes targeted at overseas officials.); Aronoff, supra note 11
(Antitrust and RICO Laws may be basis to combat international illicit payments by United States
businesses.); 134 CONG. REC. H183 & H2117 (1988) (Conference Committee rejecting Senate's
exclusivity provisions of the FCPA and thus leaving the door open for concurrent prosecution
under wire and mail fraud statutes).
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"harshest, most comprehensive effort" to combat corrupt payments to
foreign public officials."0
The 1988 Amendments were seen by most as the United States'
attempt at "damage control." American law makers were criticized by
their constituents for passing an act that had a chilling affect on United
States businesses and exports. 1 The 1988 amendments were an attempt to
increase the competitiveness of United States business and to provide a
level playing field in the international market place.22
To date, the FCPA still suffers from many problems. The Act is
still considered vague by many in the legal and international business
community, and thus its enforcement is always an issue.2" In light of the
20.

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 219,

221 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
21. Laura Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done with the Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1987); S. REP. No. 486, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1986): The Committee recognizes the continuing need for international agreements
outlawing bribery in the international marketplace. The unilateral position currently taken by the
United States in terms of anti-bribery legislation, while laudable, constitutes a serious
disadvantage to U.S. commerce. The Committee recognizes that bribery warps appropriate trade
patterns and distorts the market as an efficient allocator of resources, but it believes that the most
useful approach to this problem is a multilateral one. The Committee bill would enhance U.S.
efforts to achieve such international agreement by presenting a statute that effectively curbs
bribery without imposing unnecessary trade disincentives. Recognizing this need, the bill calls
for renewed efforts, both on multilateral and bilateral levels, to achieve international agreement
on the prohibition of bribery. Id. See also, 131 CONG. REC. 32,763, 32,778 (daily ed. Nov.
20, 1985) (statements that the 1977 FCPA's unclear language inhibited exports); Judith Roberts,
Revision of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct by the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill: Will it Reduce the
Compliance Burdens and Anticompetitive Impact? 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 491, 494-956 (1989).
But see 131 CONG. REC. S15,959 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985) (supporting the proposition that the
FCPA was not truly hampering United States exporters in the global marketplace); Judith
Roberts, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 429-30 (1982) (asserting that the FCPA is not a detriment to
United States trade).
22. 134 CONG. REC. S2589-90 (daily ed. March 18, 1988). Senator Heinz participating in
the debate for the passage of the Trade Act stated:
Now, however, as we continue work on major trade legislation, the issues of the
FCPA and improving the trading position of American businesses increasingly focuses
on both our ability to improve export performance and the various measures already in
place to ensure a level playing field for all competitors. The burden of the U.S. trade
deficit has enormous negative effects on the American economy, and it is clear that we
have to do a better job of clearing away obstacles to export performance
improvements, including ambiguities in the FCPA that discourage our exporters.
23. ALAN SWAN & JOHN MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 263-73, 277-84 (Doc. Supp. 1991)

(interpretation problems of the FCPA Accounting & Bribery Provisions); Pines, supra note 9, at
195 ("Despite amendments in 1988, the FCPA is still plagued with problems that hinder its
purpose. Without clearly defined terms and requirements, the FCPA proves ineffective in
providing guidance for U.S. corporations.").
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recent world events it has become more apparent that American companies
are being locked out of today's global market place due to the FCPA
constraints." ' "Ineffective" and "slow" are the words used to describe the
formal review process which could disclose sensitive information to the
general public and business competitors.2
The FCPA's major flaw
however, is its unilateral character which limits its effectiveness in the
world community.
On the international front, "accommodation" payments have been
publicly criticized by multinational organizations, but privately ignored at
the individual state level.
In 1972, the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) announced a set of rules to govern international
26
transactions which were called "Guidelines for International Investment. ,,
These guidelines, aimed at eliminating foreign bribes, were so
controversial that the ICC members began to split their ranks.7 By 1977,
two camps emerged in the ICC. Some wanted to follow the United States
lead and adopt provisions similar to the FCPA. However, the majority of

24. See OperationalIssues: Coping with Corruption in the CIS, BUS. E. EUR., June 7,
1993, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Bueeur File (stating foreign firms must be prepared to
offer monetary incentives to Russian officials if they are to do business in the area); James
Morgan, Corruption Without Sin, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, at 16 (asserting that to be
competitive in India you must be willing to accept that bribery is a way of life in the business
community); Continued Official U.S. Pressure Called Key to Winning Kuwait Reconstruction
Contracts, 8 INT'L TRADE REP. 472 (1991) (stating that United States companies are at a
disadvantage in the bidding process because the Middle East business environment favors bribes
by foreign countries to secure contracts); Aftermath of Gulf War: Shaping Longer-Term Stability
Major Task, GLOB. FIN. MKTS., Mar. 11, 1991 (stating United States businesses are
"handcuffed" by national laws when competing for contracts in Kuwait). See generally Peter
Semler, U.S. Companies Find Corruption a Competitor, J. COM., Apr. 18, 1994, at 8a (stating
that one United States company recently lost as much as $1.3 billion dollars in a two week period
because it refused to pay grease payments for contracts).
25. SCHAFFER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423:
The procedure has the initial disadvantage of subjecting the transaction to the scrutiny
of the public at large, including the U.S. firm's competitors. These competitors may
be attracted to the situation and propose a more attractive relationship . .

.

. [The]

delay [of the review period] is not very satisfactory in most business transactions.
While the parties await a response, market conditions may change so as to make the
deal less attractive or entirely unattractive for one of the parties.
Id. See also Katherine M. Albright & Grace Hon, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 30 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 773 (1993) (stating that the relatively ineffective review process, resulted in only
one firm seeking an advisory opinion in the entire year of 1991).
26.

INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

(ICC),

Guidelines for International

Investment (1972).
27. JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS: SETTING
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATORS 90 (1985).
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the members refused to "follow the American banner on the crusade
against international bribery. "I8
In 1977, the ICC Counsel passed a collection of nonbinding rules
of behavior to condemn bribery in the international market place.2 9 The
language used in these rules is broad enough so as to appease most ICC
members. One of these basic, generalized rules was phrased, "No one
may demand or accept a bribe."" Other basic rules address "kickbacks"
and "off the books" secret accounts.3 ' The ICC Counsel did, however,
strongly advise the world community to formulate a treaty addressing
overseas bribery. 3 These self-regulating rules, lacking in enforcement
powers and non-binding on businesses, have generally failed to curtail
"accommodation" payments to public officials by foreign companies.
Another non-binding code was announced by the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1976. 33 These
guidelines address multinational enterprises operating in OECD member
countries.3" General anti-bribery provisions found in sections 7 & 8 direct
businesses to:
7. Not render and they should not be solicited or expected
to render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or
indirect, to any public servant or holder of public office.
8. Unless legally permissible, not make contributions to
candidates for public office or to political parties or other
political organizations."
However, this code proved to be ineffective in preventing international
illicit payments.36
28.

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra

note 20, at 228.
29. Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions, ICC Pub. No. 315, (1977), reprinted
in 17 I.L.M. 417 (1978).
30. Id. at 420.
31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 418.

33. Declarationon InternationalInvestment andMultinational Enterprises (21st June 1976)
Annex to the Declaration of 21st June 1976 by Governments of the OECD Member Countries on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967.
34. DR. R. BLANPAIN, THE BADGER
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 38 (1977).

35.

CASE

AND THE

OECD

GUIDELINES

FOR

Id.

36. Cynthia D. Wallace, InternationalCodes and Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises:
Update and Selected Issues, 17 INT'L LAW. 435, 441 (1983):
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The United Nations has also attempted to regulate international
corrupt payments. On December 15, 1975, the U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution condemning illicit payments by multinational
corporations." This resolution states that the General Assembly:
1. Condemns all corrupt practices, including bribery, by
transnational and other corporations, their intermediaries
and others involved, in violation of the laws and
regulations of host countries;...
3. Calls upon botl] home and host governments to take,
within their respective national jurisdictions, all necessary
measures which they deem appropriate, including
legislative measures to prevent such corrupt practices, and
to take consequent measures against the violators;
4. Calls upon governments to collect information on such
corrupt practices, as well as on measures taken against
such practices, and to exchange information bilaterally
and, as appropriate, multilaterally... ;
5. Calls upon home governments to cooperate with
governments of the host countries to prevent such corrupt
practices, including bribery, and to prosecute, within their
national jurisdictions, those who engage in such acts; . . .
Other than in the United States, this proclamation was bold on words but
weak in implementation. No other state, besides the United States, has
implemented Section 5 to criminalize this form of corruption. Little, if
any cooperation, requested in sections 4 and 5 has been put forth by U.N.

[The] Declaration, which, along with some member-state "considerations and
understandings" prefacing the Guidelines, is not legally binding by virtue of the OECD
treaty itself, but could be considered to be so in any aspect in which it expresses in

convenient and systematic form some existing rule of general international law, or
could become so by incorporation into a treaty duly ratified by OECD member states;

and . . . the Guidelines, which are expressly stated within their own framework to be
"not legally enforceable ..
Id.
37. Measures Against Corrupt Practices of Transnationaland Other Corporations, Their
Intermediaries and Others Involved, G.A. Res. 3514, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3514 (1975), reprinted
in 15 I.L.M. 180 (1976).
38.

Id. at 510.
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member nations. History has revealed that this was just another legislative
code of conduct enforced only in "never-never land." 39
An impressive attempt to forge a multilateral treaty against foreign
corrupt payments came before the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). On May 18, 1979, the U.N. Committee on an
International Agreement on Illicit Payments transmitted a proposed treaty
to ECOSOC." Article I of this draft treaty outlaws and criminalizes:
(a) The offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift
or other advantage by any natural person, on his own
behalf or on behalf of any enterprise or any other person
whether juridical or natural, to or for the benefit of a
public official as undue consideration for performing or
refraining from the performance of his duties in connection
with an international commercial transaction.
(b) The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving,
directly or indirectly, by a public official of any payment,
gift or other advantage, as undue consideration for
performing or refraining from the performance of his
duties in connection with an international commercial
transaction.'
Article II defines terms such as "Public Official," "International
Commercial Transaction," and "Intermediary" with more definite terms
than any multinational agreement against corrupt practices has before."2
Other provisions require accounting procedures43 and extradition of alleged
offenders." This draft, penal in nature, was heavily supported by the
This
United States, but was never adopted by the United Nations. '

39.

Timothy W. Stanley, InternationalCodes of Conduct for MNC'S: A Skeptical View of

the Process, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (1981).
40. U.N. ECOSOC E/1979/104, May 25, 1979, 2d Reg. Sess., Agenda Item 9; "Report of
the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments on its First and Second

Sessions" (E/1979/104).
41.

Id. art. 1 Sec.(1).

42. Id. art. 2(a), (b), (c).
43. Id. art. 6.
44. Id. art. 11 (1). "The offenses treferred to in Article 1] shall be deemed to be included
as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting
States undertake to include said offence as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them." Id.
45. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38; Thomas H. Reynolds, Clouds of Codes: The
New InternationalEconomic Order Through Codes of Conduct: A Survey, 75 LAW. LIB. J. 315,
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proposed treaty, like all other previous multilateral attempts to outlaw or
condemn international "accommodation" payments, failed to effectively
prevent multinational corporation's corrupt practices.
Recently, the world has seen a flurry of activity by international
organizations determined to stamp out foreign bribery of public officials.
On May 4, 1993, a new organization called Transparency International
met for two days in Berlin for its inaugural conference. ' This nonprofit
organization is dedicated to preventing international kickbacks, bribes, and
corruption. Its goal is to assure that state officials around the globe will
behave in a more "transparent" and honest fashion when considering
international contracts--hence the name Transparency International"7 Its
financial support comes from United States multinational corporations and
European aid agencies."8
Transparency International is a voluntary group that mirrors the
tactics and structure of Amnesty International. 9
Transparency
International seeks to bring corruption out of the shadows in hopes that
such exposure will cause public opinion to demand an end to international
bribery. To effectively fight bribery, Transparency International intends
to introduce legislation similar to the FCPA in all OECD countries,"
request chairmen to annually sign pledges against corruption,5 and to work
towards universal accounting procedures that would disclose overseas
payments."
Slowly, this organization intends to establish "Islands of
342-43 (1982) (stating ECOSOC attempts are bogged down by the United States attempt to
impose morality and business ethics on the international community).
46. Clean Not Laundered, supra note 5.
47. InternationalGroup Fights Corruption, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS NEWS SERVICE
(New York), Nov. 30, 1993, at 130, available in LEXIS, World Library, Tetnws File.
48.

Id. at 136; Karen Pennar, A New Globo-Cop For Crooks In High Places, BUS. WEEK,

Dec. 6, 1993, at 136 (asserting financial support is coming from U.S. companies like Boeing and
General Electric).
49. David C. Scott, Organization Aims to Shed Light on Shady Deals Worldwide,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1994, at 6 ("[l]n the same way that Amnesty

International exposes human rights abuses, T.I. is a newly formed, Berlin-based organization
dedicated to exposing the misuse of public power for personal profit."); Tom Heneghan, Fight
Bribery Like Drugs, Aids--Anti-Corruption Group, REUTERS-BERLIN, May 5, 1993, available in

LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File (stating that T.I. is attempting to bring together companies
and countries that agree to crack down on corruption); Michael Holman, New Group Targets the
Roots of Corruption, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at 4.
50. George Moody-Stuart, Questions of Bribery, LONDON TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File; Michael Holman, supra note 49 (stating T.I.
will also help strengthen rules and systems for international procurement bidding to help end

corruption).
51.

Id.

52.

Id.
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Integrity"53 and branch out to other targeted countries' using quid pro quo
tactics.55
One thing is certain, this "coalition against corruption" has
Transparency
developed an impressive membership roster. 6
and
quid
pro strategy
International's exposure tactics, public indignation,
will likely obtain more tangible results than all of the past multilateral
efforts combined. It seems clear that any anti-bribery treaty must have
Transparency International's active endorsement and support if such an
agreement stands a chance at ratification.
The OECD has decided to reanalyze and take collective action
against bribery of public officials by transnational corporations. On
December 9, 1993, the United States presented proposals to the OECD's
"Working Party on Illicit Payments" that would make international
corporate bribery a crime.57 Transparency International has further
pressured the OECD to revisit the issue.58 Negotiations went on for over
eighteen months as fears of United States extraterritorial attempts of
expanding the FCPA divided OECD ranks.59 Britain, Japan, Germany,
53. Michael Holman, Ecuador Shows Lead in InternationalAnti-Corruption Drive, FIN.
TIMES, May 6, 1993, at 4 (stating Ecuador will be the first "Island of Integrity" as T.I. begins
its work to clean up that government).
54. Berlin Based Company Wants to Fight Corruption, REUTERS, May 31, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Reuter File (T.I. will be setting up branches in Southern Africa to
compliment their work already in Benin and Ecuador.).
55. Michael Holman, supra note 49:
What may help make the code effective is the quid pro quo tactic T.I. will employ.
Initially there may be only a few countries where business and government abide by
our code, a few "islands of integrity," as Mr. Eigen puts it [T.I. director]. The
campaign will therefore focus at the start on five or six governments in developing
countries and Eastern Europe who are prepared to support the code. These
governments--some have already had discussions with T.l.--will restrict tendering for
state contracts to corporations who have themselves signed the pledge. "We expect
these leading countries will create a momentum by their example" says Mr. Eigen.
Id.
56. Pennar, supra note 48, at 136, (Former World Bank officials and anti-corruption
experts, are among T.I.'s founders and directors.); Holman, supra note 49 (Behind the project,
nearly two years in gestation, is a group of hard-headed veterans of aid, commerce and
development, eminent in their own fields, and with experience spanning the developing world.).
57. Stella Dawson, U.S. Spearheads Effort to Ban Bribes in OECD, J. CoM., Dec. 6,
1993, at 3.
58. Rosie Waterhouse, War Declared on Corruption, INDEPENDENT, June 7, 1994, at 7;
Rosie Waterhouse, The Good Business Guide to Bribery, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 27, 1994, at 10.
59. Tara Patel, OECD Reaches Compromise on Pact to Rid Governments of Corruption, J.
COM., May 2, 1994, at 3A; George Graham, OECD to Discuss Policy Against Bribery, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at 6 (Although criminalization raises complex questions about the
extraterritorial reach of national laws, specific measures have been proposed to ensure that bribes
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and France have all refused to allow the formation of a binding criminal
agreement against corrupt payments.' Britain lead the coalition to block
the United States attempts to secure a multinational agreement against
foreign corrupt bribery since many English economists see bribe offerings
as "good business."6
Although the final agreement had not been released to the general
public at the time of writing this work,' it will fall short of criminalizing
international bribery. The guidelines are intended to be a series of
proposals that member nations can adopt.' The codes are to encourage the
review of domestic criminal, civil, and administrative regulations and to
take steps in combating bribery.' The code also encourages international

cooperation and information exchange between member nations.65 This
new agreement basically allows OECD members to pick and choose
whatever steps they deem necessary to fight bribery in international

commercial transactions.'

Once again, the Unites States attempts to

criminalize transnational bribery were soundly rejected by the international

community.
The United States is again attempting to create a multinational

agreement to fight corrupt payments in international business transactions.
The United States government has decided to push the new World Trade
Organization for laws paralleling the FCPA.67 President Clinton addressed
paid by companies are not treated as tax-deductible business expenses.); George Graham, OECD
Meets in Effort to Fight Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at 5. Other OECD members are
concerned of U.S. attempts to force criminal laws onto other nations. Id.
60. Rosie Waterhouse, A Slap on the Backhanders: Trading Nations Are Finally Trying to
Crack Down on Official Bribery, INDEPENDENT, May 24, 1994, at 16; Rosie Waterhouse,
Britain Spurns U.S. Over Bribes, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 3, 1994, at 4; Rosie Waterhouse, The
Sleazy State: Britain Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 16, 1994,
at 3.
61. Bribes 'Can Be Good Business', DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 31, 1993, at 4, available in
Westlaw, Int-News Database.
62. This paper is based on research available before June 12, 1994. The 1994 OECD
declaration was expected to be widely available within a month after its late June or July signing.
63. OECD Recommendation on Measures For Fighting Corruption in International
Business Transactions, AGENCE EUROPE, June 4, 1994, available in Westlaw, Int-News
Database.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. George Graham, U.S. Seeks OECD Foreign Bribes Ban: Many Countries Wary of
Extending Laws Beyond Their Own Frontiers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1993, at 3 ("U.S. senior
official said the OECD working group's recommendations amounted to a shopping list from
which countries could pick one or two measures ....").
67. GATT: United States Will Urge Other Countries to Adopt Anti-Bribery Rules in New
WTO, INT'L TRADE REP., Mar. 16, 1994, at 11. (Mickey Kanter is quoted as saying: "There is
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international bribery at Miami's Summit of Americas held in December of
1994.1 Transparency International has lobbied the Clinton Administration
for just such an agenda.' It is unlikely these new attempts will secure a
multilateral agreement. Since the United States continues to demand
international criminalization of transnational bribery, it will leave the
negotiation table empty handed and its attempts will again be branded as
"extraterritorial."
One can learn from past and present attempts at adopting a legally
A future code based on the FCPA's
binding anti-corruption code.
"criminalization" will be stigmatized as American "moral imperialism"
However, codes without some enforcement
and ultimately fail.
Finally, to
mechanism will be legally non-binding and ineffective.
effectively define a "bribe", one must evaluate each individual nation's
customs.
An analysis of past attempts to construct a universal code reveals
two general camps that emerge in the negotiation phases. These distinct
theoretical groups seem to counter each other's attempts and eventually
stifle any multinational enterprise (MNE) code.
One is known as the "maximalist position", and favors
legally binding, internationally enforceable rules of
conduct for MNEs. This position is adhered to generally
by the international trade union movement and developing
nations. The other is the so-called "minimalist position",
and promotes the notion of voluntary rather than legally
This position is predictably
enforceable guidelines.
advocated by the international business community and
generally by highly capital-intensive industrialized
nations. I
With the exception of the United States, this division seems to be
true as to a country's alignment concerning both recent OECD negotiations
and acceptance of Transparency International. America and developing
no reason we shouldn't . ..insist [that] our trading partners adhere to the same standards we
have been adhering to for years. It is not fair for American business to adhere to standards that
are proper and that should be adhered to around the world and others don't ..

.

. We are going

to insist on that . . .because we see trade as a two-way street--comparability, mutuality of
obligation and were going to continue on that path."). See also Aaron Schildhaus, Stop the
Business Bribery Game, J. COM., Apr. 21, 1994, at 5.
68. Michael Holman & Stephen Fidler, Corruption Drive on Cards: American Leaders
Urged to Give Priority to Crusade, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 5.
69. Scott, supra note 49.
70. Wallace, supra note 36.
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countries are pushing for an international agreement with strong antibribery language. However, nations like Japan and Britain want only
another general proclamation and a non-binding declaration.
In between these two poles is a "zebra" position composed of both
binding and non-binding rules containing words like "should" or "shall." 7 '
Realistically, a proposed international treaty against illicit payments must
satisfy both "Minimalists" and "Maximalists" and fall within the "zebra"
zone to have a chance at ratification. Furthermore, a proposed treaty must
avoid imposing criminal sanctions which led to the demise of its
predecessors." Enforcement of treaty provisions must come from nongovernment entities since state officials tend to adopt broad statements of
policy but never truly act on them. Finally, any treaty must respect
principles of sovereignty if such an agreement is to be ratified.73
III.

THE NEED FOR A MULTINATIONAL TREATY TO COMBAT
INTERNATIONAL FOREIGN CORRUPT PAYMENTS

Transnational illicit payments to foreign public officials demand
the world community's attention. Nations have a compelling interest to
prevent the bribery of their own officials. Such prevention can be
effective only through international cooperation.
The United States'
interest in passing such a multilateral treaty is apparent considering that the
FCPA remains the only unilateral approach. An analysis of these foreign
payments shows that other nations have a vested interest in following
America's lead.
These illicit payments undermine the values which democratic
nations are founded upon. Illicit transnational payments to public officials
improperly influence and precipitate decisions potentially to the best
interests of the citizens of the host nation. " Once a bribe is accepted, the
public official is susceptible to blackmail tactics. Bribes aimed at political
parties conceptually undermine both the democratic process and diminish

71. Id.
72. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 343. States have rejected American moral imperialism
and generally have not been "particularly disposed to assist the United States out of problems of
its own making" (referring to the FCPA which put U.S. companies at a disadvantage]. Id.
73. Id. (A certain amount of caution must be exercised in attempting to appraise what are
properly national functions and what are more suitably international functions in regulating the
MNE, since the multinational enterprise has been perceived as a political as well as an economic
phenomenon, and legal "answers" and categorizations cannot be expected to eliminate all the
political repercussions stemming form MNE activity.)
74. Berlin Based Company Wants To Fight Corruption, REUTERS, May 31, 1994 available
inLEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File (contending that bribery distorts decision making).
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the hope that the government will be impartial and represent the interests
of its citizens.7"
Bribery causes political instability and interferes with foreign
policy. Bribery by foreign business entities have contributed to the fall of
governments in Japan, Bolivia, Honduras, the Cook Islands, Italy, and the
Netherlands.76 A nation's ability to conduct effective foreign policy is
compromised when its national corporation's corrupt practices are
exposed." A recent transnational bribery incident involving English firms
and the government of Malaysia has caused a breakdown between the two
nations on foreign investment and trade levels." Such a breakdown could
have been prevented if an international agreement was in place. Foreign
corrupt payments also produce waste and distort prices in host countries.
The foreign official who is under the influence of a bribe, may make
decisions that are detrimental to the country's economy.79 Bribery induces
public officials to favor foreign firms which offer accommodating
payments even though such contract awards will ultimately distort
consumer prices.80 Transparency International's interim chairman has
explained:

75. Arthur Leathley & Jonathan Prynn, Labor Deputy Denounces 'Odor of Corruption',
LONDON TIMES, June 23, 1993 (Labor trade and industry spokesman is quoted as saying:
"Britain has no right to interfere in the elections of foreign countries. Foreigners have no right
to interfere in the elections of Britain. Party of the foreign millionaire was not likely to
understand the pressures on pensioners at home."); U.S. to Propose Steps Against Bribing
Foreign Officials, Kyodo News, Dec. 2, 1993, available in Westlaw, Japanecon Database
(stating that "bribery seriously undermines the very democratic institutions the OECD seeks to
promote").
76. Pines, supra note 9, at 205; See also Raymond J. Dowd, Civil Rico Misread: The
Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 946, 947. Revelations of United States bribery of foreign officials overseas in mid1970's caused the resignation of many important foreign officials in Japan, Italy, and the
Netherlands. Id.
77. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40. Dowd, supra note 76.
passed to prevent this vary same interference with foreign policy.

The FCPA was

78. Malaysia Bans British Firms Over Corruption Allegations, Kyodo News, Feb. 25,
1994, available in Westlaw, Japanecon Database.
79. The Political Scene: Corruption is Spreading, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, June
1, 1993 available in Westlaw, Bus-Intl database (reporting that Mozambique politicians sell off
land cheaply to foreign investors who are bribing the decision makers); Heneghan, supra note 49
(claiming foreign illicit payments are robbing the third world of needed resources).
80. Waterhouse, supra note 58. Bribery and corrupt practices distort decision-making.
Contracts may be over-priced and therefore the country over-charged, as the contract is inflated
by as much as 20 percent to accommodate the bribe. Id. Bribes may lead to the selection of
incompetent or unscrupulous suppliers and deliberate cost-cutting. Id. The availability of "backhandlers" may also encourage countries to buy goods and services that are unsuitable for or
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The damages to third world economies...goes
beyond the fact that the wrong supplier or contractor might
be chosen. When a government is persuaded-that is
bribed-that it needs aircraft or a food processing plant
which are unnecessary or unjustified, not only is there a
loss of scarce foreign exchange resources.
Those
resources will have been deprived from worthwhile
projects. 8 '
In other words, international accommodating payments promote
inefficiency and waste.
Vital world trade and investment is also a victim of bribery.
Foreign illicit payments can produce a "backlash" against the country of
origin and international business generally."8" As a result, protectionists
and isolationists ultimately gain credibility and acceptance from the local
population."
All nations have an interest in fighting bribery, but why the need
for a multilateral agreement? Applying the FCPA extraterritorially will
offend other sovereigns and ultimately create more problems."
Multinational corporations by their very nature span numerous sovereigns.
They can possess more political and economic clout than some
governments. International bribes come from entities located outside the
host country. As a result, such acts of bribery are likely beyond the
jurisdiction of the host country's law. For a country to effectively fight the
bribery of its public officials, some international tool is needed to punish
outside bribery attempts.
Therefore, "[i]t is necessary to have
international measures that match the international dimensions of this
surplus to their needs.

Id. See also, Yuri Lopatin, OECD Urges Step-Up of Action Against

Corruption in Trade, Tass, June 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Tass File.

81. Holman, supra note 49.
82. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40.
83.

Id.

84. DIETER LANGE & GARY BORN, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
LAWS 3 (ICC 1987) states:

I. Extraterritoriality creates considerable commercial and legal uncertainty,
particularly where unpredictable applications of national competition and securities
laws are involved. This uncertainty discourages international businesses from engaging
in productive trade and investment .... 2. The overall impact of the extraterritorial

application of national laws is to discourage or prevent useful economic activity in the
from of international investment, and to reduce the profitability of existing investment.
This distortion of market processes, caused by extraterritoriality, reduces productive
economic activity and the employment opportunities and income that would flow form
such activity.
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problem." 85 A multinational treaty is the only way to effectively deter
foreign corrupt practices."
In light of the past attempts to form an international agreement and
the need for a multinational approach, this author proposes a solution to
the problem of corrupt overseas payments.87 This work proposes a
mechanism of enforcement based on private causes of action rather than
making accommodation payments a crime, an approach that has doomed
earlier agreements. This work also uses the tools of disclosure and
exposure to deter possible offenders. Finally, the proposed treaty respects
each individual nation's political and cultural customs regarding
accommodating payments. As a result, this unique draft has a better
chance at ratification and deterrence than previous multinational
agreements.
The preamble of this proposed treaty sets forth recitals and the
ultimate goal to be achieved. The recitals are necessary to establish why
transnational bribery is detrimental to individual nations and the world
community as a whole. The recitals conclude by stating that only
multilateral cooperation can eliminate these illicit payments. The purpose
of the strong condemnation language in the resolution clause is to reflect
the world community's intention to completely eliminate this form of
corruption."8 These statements are modeled after language adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly.89
Identifiable terms are essential to the treaty if it is to be functional.
Therefore, Article I sets forth concise definitions of terms used throughout
the treaty which would otherwise impede its effectiveness. The definition
of the term "corrupt payment" is taken in light of the host country's laws.
Likewise, local laws concerning the definition of the word "illegal" are
paramount when a corrupt payment is alleged to have occurred.
References to local laws are an effort to respect the world's diverse

85. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 40.
86. United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations: Information paper on the
negotiations to Complete the Code on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C. 10/1983/S/2
of Jan. 4, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 177 (1993) sec. 3. See also ICC Guidelines, supra note

26 (introductory comments stating that "Complementary and mutually reinforcing action by both
governments and the business community is essential.").
87. See infra pp. 31-39. Proposed Treaty on the Prevention of Illicit Payments (using
language adopted from existing domestic and international documents).
88. A. A. Fatouros, On the Implementation of International Codes of Conduct: An
Analysis of Future Experience, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 941, 943, 947 (1981) (explaining that states

seem to define a code of conduct as a legal instrument embodying a set of principles and rules
that limit the behavior of international actors).
89.

G.A. Res. 3514, supra note 37.
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cultures and legal systems when it comes to defining bribery.
By
acknowledging individual local laws and avoiding a universal definition of
these terms, this treaty guards the notions of sovereignty and increases its
chances of ratification.'
Article I defines the term "intermediary" and "international
commercial transaction" in a manner that is parallel to ECOSOC's
proposed treaty. 9 ' The definition of the term "knowingly" is similar to the
definition of the term "scienter" in the FCPA, and encompasses the "knew
or should of known standard" that is essential to avoiding the defense of
ignorance. The "reason to know" standard of the 1977 FCPA has not
been adopted because it was perceived by many American businessmen
and legal advisors as too vague and confusing . The definition of the term
"offended private party" is an attempt to limit the number of parties who
may bring an action by imposing a standing requirement. The term
"payment" is broadly defined to include any pecuniary gain or social
advantage that realistically could influence the decision of a public official.
Language from both ECOSOC's proposed treaty93 and the FCPA help to
broadly define the term "public official" so that it includes almost any
governmental decision maker. Finally, the definition of "suspect private
party" allows all transnational corporations to fall under this treaty even
though their home country may not be a signatory to it. By holding all
international commercial entities accountable, this treaty will be a true
deterrence from the common practice of commercial bribery.
Article II is an attempt to clearly define what activities will not be
tolerated. Article II sets forth specific conduct which is more succinct than
the vague wording of the ICC guidelines and OECD general
pronouncements.'
This article therefore clearly puts forth standards of
conduct that individual entities can realistically be held accountable to.
Article II establishes enforceable criteria, and targets corrupt payments or
90. Chelminski, Pots of Wine, SAT. REV., July 9, 1977, at 14; SCHAFFER, supra note 6,

at 416-19 (discussing cultural differences as to what is "illegal" or "accepted" in the context of
bribery).
91. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, at 3.
92. Gary M. Elder & Mark S. Sableman, Negligence is Not Corruption: The Scienter
Requirement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1981)

(addressing the uncertainty of the original FCPA scienter requirement); see also SWAN &
MURPHY, supra note 23, at 263-73.

93. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, at 3.
94.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1), 2(h)(2) (West 1991).

95.

Compare G.A. Res. 3514, supra note 37 (ambiguosly stating condemned behavior and

what should be done by home government in response to said behavior) with U.N. ECOSOC,
supra note 40, art. 1, sec. 1 (enumerating behavior in violation of proposed treaty).
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offers thereof to political parties and to public officials." Since most
nations criminalize bribery of their public officials, this treaty should be
limited to multinational commercial transactions and not domestic bribery.
Accordingly, article II concludes with a limiting phrase restricting this
agreement to international commercial transactions.
Article III sets forth affirmative defenses and further limits the
scope and applicability of this agreement. It adopts the logical and often
used defenses found in the FCPA. 9 Section (a) of this article also honors
an individual nation's laws and the general notions of sovereignty. Section
(a) and other provisions which defer to national laws, neutralize any
charges of extraterritoriality. Such charges have consistently been brought
up in OECD discussions and have ultimately derailed negotiations on the
formation of an international anti-bribery treaty.98
Section (d) of Article III expands available affirmative defenses
even further. A "good faith" defense is created so that an administrative
board has the flexibility to decide each case in light of the particular facts
and circumstances surrounding a transaction. Furthermore, a reliance
defense based on an advisory opinion is available to possible respondents.
This defense will promote the use of the advisory opinion process
established in Article VIII, and can offer clear advice to avoid possible
bribery scenarios. A similar process is utilized in the FCPA. 9
Article IV is a necessary provision in this draft. This Article
requires accounting procedures which are essential to realistically detecting
alleged illicit payments. This Article encourages states to supplement their
current accounting procedures by adopting bookkeeping standards
promulgated by the Article VII Committee. Forcing signatory countries to
adopt Committee accounting standards would be seen as an attempt to
abrogate a sovereign's rule making authority and would be rejected by
most states. However, these disclosure requirements may prevent future
bribes." ° Therefore, each individual state should be allowed to decide
96. See U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40, art. 6 (modeled after 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(2), -(2)(a)(1)-(2) (1988)).

97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b)-(c), 78dd-2(b)-(c) (1988).
98. Patel, supra note 59; see Reynolds, supra note 45.
99. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f) (West 1991) (opinions of the Attorney General).
100. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 42-43. This approach [disclosure] involves the
public reporting of foreign payments. The underlying idea is, as Justice Brandeis said:
The simplicity of these requirements
[T]hat sunlight is the best disinfectant ....
makes them relatively easy to enforce. No question about intent, or reasonable
knowledge that a bribe would be paid to a foreign official, will arise. The minimum
thresholds would eliminate any need to report the relatively innocuous "grease"
payments. These disclosures could be made annually and with a significant time delay
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whether it will adopt the Committee accounting procedures, so long as
their procedures are sufficient to track corrupt payments.
Article V's purpose is to place the international business
community on notice of this treaty. This Article is an attempt to inform all
international business contractors that a treaty is in existence and they
should be aware of its provisions. Like Article IV, this part uses the
phrase "under penalty of law." This is merely an enforcement mechanism
to encourage international business contractors to circulate this clause in
their agreements. Each signatory country will directly determine and
enforce this phrase within its territory.
However, the failure of a
sovereign to do so may result in Article II (a)(iii) arbitration.
The present tax deductions of illicit payments should cease if the
international community is serious about combating these bribes."'t Article
VI encourages signatories to disallow tax deductions for illicit payments.
This Article may now be more warmly received since many States have
recently questioned or abandoned their legislation which allows these
deductions. '" Without Article VI, the laws of signatories, which
encourage overseas bribery, would circumvent this draft's recitals and
resolutions.
The use of the word "should" in Article VI is an attempt to cater
to "Minimalists." 3 However, the presence of Article VI appeases
"Maximalists" as well. If a signatory country wishes to preserve its
present bribery tax deduction laws, its multilateral companies will be more
inclined to offer bribes. As a result, businesses in these countries are more
likely to be "suspect private parties" in this treaty's review process. After
several adverse Article XII Certifications are filed against a country's
multinational corporations, that nation will be economically pressured to
repeal its tax deduction regulations. The economic benefit of these
after the year-end, in order to protect a corporation's legitimate interest in the secrecy
of ongoing negotiations ..

.

. If known in advance that embarrassing payments would

have to be disclosed, most such payments would not be solicited or made. In this
modest way, we might achieve an international regime to ensure that foreign bribery is
finally halted.
Id.
101. Id. at 38-39 (noting states "have endorsed high-level policy statements against corrupt
payments," but foreign countries' tax deduction for bribes show an inherent legitimization
problem).
102. Switzerland: Bribes May Soon Become Nondeductible, supra note 7; Patel, supra note
59, at 3A.

103. Wallace, supra note 36, at 443. This phrase makes Article VI nonbinding and
satisfies minimalists since they believe: "Any code of conduct for transnational corporations
should not be binding, since the diversity of national situations makes it impossible to apply
uniform rules to all countries." Id.
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deductions to a country would be offset by the loss of international
business. Therefore, this Article is also an attempt to find middle ground
between both camps and increase the chances of ratification.
The Corrupt Practices Committee is one of the two regulatory
bodies created by this draft. The administration of this treaty is left to the
Corrupt Practices Committee and the Corrupt Practices Commission since
past experience has revealed that states lack the necessary attitude to fight
overseas corrupt payments."' Article VII establishes the Corrupt Practices
Committee with the responsibility for the treaty's smooth operation.
Sections (a), (b), and (d) establish the membership of this Committee.
The membership compensation assures neutrality and gives signatory
countries a chance to participate in the rule making process in order to
protect their sovereign rights.
Article VII (a)(iii) arbitration is one of the various powers and
responsibilities the Corrupt Practices Committee will receive. "In-house"
disputes between members should be settled in arbitration to lessen the
chance of a mutual recession of the agreement. Another important
provision in Article VII is the Committee's ability to create supportive
subcommittees.
These inferior bodies will aid in administering the
Committee's various functions.
Sections (a)(iv) and (g) set up a
mechanism of checks and balances between the treaty's regulatory bodies.
An advisory opinion process, similar to the FCPA's, is also
provided by this draft agreement. Article VIII requires that all requests
must originate by possible "offending private parties" or signatory
countries.
This Article further limits the review procedure to
nonhypothetical situations.
All of these committee advisory opinions
should logically be privately heard to avoid public disclosure of
surrounding facts. This is to safeguard international business leads and
promote the use of this process. Article VIII requires a mandatory
fourteen day response period which is aimed at avoiding the problems of
delay that have discredited the FCPA.0"
The second body created by the proposed treaty, the Corrupt
Practices Commission, is established by Article IX. This would be
considered the judicial body of the treaty since its main function is to hear
disputes concerning possible corrupt practices. This body is a combination
of nationals from various signatory countries.
Sections (a) and (b)
structures this body to allow all member states some participation in the
judicial review process. Section (b) ensures that a "suspect private party"
104. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38-39 (claiming many countries seem
unreliable and uninterested in fighting these illicit payments).

105.

Albright & Hon, supra note 25.
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from a signatory country will not be judged by a commission composed
entirely of foreigners. By allowing at least one fellow national to
participate in the complaint process, "suspect private parties" may feel that
proceedings will be more equitable.
One of the more controversial provisions of this treaty is found in
Article IX (a)(ii). This subsection gives the Corrupt Practices Commission
international discovery powers. In light of the fact that a multinational
agreement was necessary to facilitate international discovery,'" this
subsection is somewhat controversial.
However, this provision is
necessary to facilitate the investigatory stage of any proceeding. These
discovery powers would only be possessed by the Commission and not the
individual private parties. Article XV (a) would protect sovereignty rights
since each nation is only obligated to assist in discovery to the degree their
national laws allow.
Article X's nature is one of limitation. It restricts the right to file a
complaint to certain entities and provides for a statute of limitations. To
prevent the filing of frivolous complaints by private parties, Article X
provides for the award of attorney's fees if the Corrupt Practices
Commission finds that a complaint was not filed in good faith. Article X
is one of the unique factors which distinguishes the proposed treaty from
its predecessors. This Article provides for a private cause of action, which
may be a more effective means at controlling corrupt payments. 7 As a
result, nations would not be responsible for coming forth with allegations;
rather independent private entities would pursue their claims.
The most controversial provision is located in Article XI. Article
XI provides a confidential complaint procedure to guard internationally
sensitive business documents. Section (b) sets forth the standard of proof
in these proceedings. Since bribery is shielded in the "shadows" of
commercial trade, its very nature is one of secrecy and underhandedness.
As a result, evidence is hard to obtain. Therefore, an evidentiary standard
of "more likely than not" is the most appropriate standard of proof for
plaintiffs to meet. More stringent standards would be impossible to prove.
"Suspect private parties" are in a better position to prove the
nonoccurrence of a bribe since they were supposedly in union with the
governmental authorities they allegedly bribed. This standard is fair since

106. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Hague Evidence Convention, June 1, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
107. Pines, supra note 9, at 191 (claiming that a cause of action in the FCPA would
significantly improve enforcement of the Act); RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 38-39
(claiming that many countries seem unreliable and uninterested in fighting these illicit payments).

1995]

Muffler

"suspect private parties" can more easily account for all their
expenditures.
Article XI section (c) is another controversial provision. This
section creates a presumption of guilt if one party refuses to take part in
the complaint process. This vital provision will encourage participation in
the judicial process and help facilitate the facts surrounding transnational
commercial activities. However, some signatory countries may find this
provision offensive to local constitutional laws or rules of evidence. This
section could be interpreted as infringing on one's right against self
incrimination. Furthermore, many countries would perceive this as a
violation of the presumption of innocence that all suspects should be
afforded.
However, this provision is not as controversial as potential critics
would suggest for two reasons. First, Article XV limits the applicability of
Article XI (c) since it provides for the respect of laws of contracting
nations. Second, this treaty is not criminal in nature and only establishes
civil causes of action. Criminal liability will only attach if the "suspect
private party's" home state has adopted legislation similar to the FCPA.
Article XI concludes with provisions that concern the disposition
of a claim. Subsection (d)(i) provides that if a corrupt payment is not
discovered, the Committee will seal the proceeding's records to protect
confidential business.'0 8 This subsection also empowers the Committee the
option of awarding attorney's fees. Subsection (d)(ii) orders the release of
all documents to both parties if a claim is certified (i.e. a corrupt payment
is discovered). This provision is targeted at supplying the "offended
private party" with necessary documentation to facilitate a civil suit which
may be filed pursuant to Article XII (c).
Article XII (a) mandates that the Corrupt Practices Committee
announce its findings to the general public. This essential provision is a
method of punishing transnational businesses that participate in corrupt
practices, and it also deters future businesses from offering bribes to public
officials. An international business does not want to be stigmatized as a
corrupt and bribing entity because public opinion of that business would
become unfavorable resulting in a backlash against that company's goods
and services. Therefore, the tactic of exposing and announcing the
corruption to the world would be an effective deterrent and punishment
even without criminal sanctions attaching.
This tactic is used by

108. This provision is to avoid one of the draw backs of the FCPA's advisory opinion
process. See SCHAFFER, supra note 6, at 423 (stating that the FCPA review process has the
potential to disclose information to international competitors and thus is not often used).
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Transparency International to counter world corrupt payments and may be
more effective then any fine or penalty.'
Under Article XII (b), all signatory countries agree to refrain from
doing business with "suspect private parties" who are determined to have
bribed a public official. This provision's detrimental to multinational
corporations that bribe public officials because they could lose a substantial
amount of transnational contracts. Section (c) allows an "offended private
Although section (d)
party" to file a lawsuit in its home country.
encourages signatory countries to honor the foreign judgments for
collection purposes, it still preserves a country's right to question such
foreign judgments." 0
International criminalization of transnational bribery of public
officials would be ideal from the American standpoint. However, past
attempts by the United States to secure such provisions have doomed
multilateral negotiations and have been labeled as "American
Imperialism.""' Therefore, Article XIII only encourages countries to
adopt penal laws to counter overseas bribery by their nationals. However,
with or without these penal laws, this treaty's effectiveness is based on a
civil recourse that will eventually make bribery economically cost
inefficient.
Article XV (a) protects a contracting nation's sovereignty by
preventing the proposed treaty from contradicting its laws. This provision
preserves a nation's sovereignty and reduces the need for reservations
which ultimately would be filed to protect national laws. It is also
important to provide financial support for the bodies created by this treaty.
Therefore, section XV (a) secures funds for the Commission and
Committee by requiring all signatories to provide assistance for the
"general operation of this treaty."
Articles XIV and XVI are procedural items. Article XIV is
created so that member states can monitor each other's compliance. This
is a common and necessary provision in many treaties."' Article XIV
becomes a necessary provision because the actions of states have often
contradicted their publicly stated policies regarding overseas bribery.
109.

Scott, supra note 49, at 6.

110. Sec. (d) is modeled after Article 54 of the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (Mar. 18, 1965), reprinted in
4 I.L.M. 532 (1965).
111.

Reynolds, supra note 45, at 343.

112. Kenneth Abbott, Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993) (stating that

clauses providing mechanisms of monitoring promote trust among signatory parties and dispel
many wrongful accusations).
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Article XVI delays the commencement of responsibilities under this treaty
until there is a sufficient number of contracting nations."' This practical
provision is modeled after
a suggested change to the Economic and Social
4
Council's draft treaty."
This purposed treaty is unique but controversial. Formation of a
treaty is a ritual of stages."' The purpose of this work is to provide the
first step in this diplomatic process. Its other purpose is to promote critical
thought on this issue.
Proposing a treaty that contains some very
controversial provisions will surely touch the nerves of many international
legal practitioners. However, this draft is not so controversial as to be
unattainable. Its provisions are targeted to preserve the sovereignty of
individual nations, and it appeases both Maximalist and Minimalist
theorists. This treaty is feasible and it can be ratified by enough nations to
effectively deter illicit payments in the global market place. The key is to
secure its acceptance by the world community.
V. STRATEGIES TO SECURE SIGNATORIES
The ratification of this treaty, like many other international
documents, will be a slow tedious process. There are various ways to
secure the world community's acceptance. Unfortunately, acceptance of
this treaty will not occur quickly, and it will be accompanied by
considerable debate. However, once enough signatories are mustered,
world opinion will most likely force the remaining countries to enter into
the treaty. Their failure to sign this treaty may result in a "Sleazy State"
stigmatization. 6
The vital ingredient in the ratification process is the willingness of
the United States to compromise. Congress must realize that it will not
succeed in cloning the FCPA into an international treaty."" The United
States should embrace this treaty because of its unprecedented potential at
curtailing corrupt payments. Even though the language and penalties are

113. Bonnie Jenkins, The Role of the Attorney in the Treaty Making Process, 6 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 29 (1993) (stating that such provisional application clauses are not uncommon and
serve a useful and necessary purpose).
114. U.N. ECOSOC, supra note 40. Notes accompanying the draft discuss the addition of
an "Article 13" which contains provisions on entry into force. Id.
115. Kenneth Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation Form a Negotiator's Perspective, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1988) (stating that the process of treaty formation includes text
presentation, issue identification and issue resolution).
116. Waterhouse, The Sleazy State: Britain Resisting Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials,
supra note 60, at 3.
117. Repeated past attempts have failed. See id. at 10-20.
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inferior to the FCPA, the United States should compromise and push for
its international acceptance. Once the acceptance of the treaty by the
United States is attained, the first step in the ratification process will be
complete.
Once the United States supports this draft, America's economic
and political power can be a valuable tool in facilitating the adoption of
this treaty by the world community. The United States' foreign policy
must reflect its firm commitment to fight foreign corrupt practices. Now
that the cold war is over, America can be more flexible with its foreign
policy and aid. As a result, the United States could restrict its foreign aid
to signatories of this draft. This policy would greatly increase the number
of parties to this agreement. The United States could place this draft on
the "bargaining table" during the next round of General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade negotiation sessions. This would start dialogue on the
topic and publicly expose those countries who are reluctant to fight
bribery. The United States could also condition future bilateral friendship,
commerce, and navigation treaties on the prerequisite that its partner be a
signatory to this treaty.
Directing the public's attention to certain transactions or
governmental actors is a vital tool in securing this treaty's acceptance." 8
Therefore, Transparency International is an essential group that can help to
secure ratification of this treaty. Transparency International's unique
status as an independent organization allows it to confront and expose
foreign corruption without jeopardizing "political relations".
Transparency International could use its tactics to target certain
key countries and indirectly force them to become signatories.
For
example, Transparency International could promote a public campaign
designed to expose English officials who take bribes." 9 A powerful media
campaign uncovering graft in the English government would likely enrage
English citizens and force local politicians to address the issue.2 0
Eventually, the issue would become detrimental to any English politician
who disfavors the signing of such a treaty. Once England becomes a
signatory, another country is targeted and a "snowball" affect will
eventually occur.
118. This is an effective tactic used by T.I. through its Directors who write letters to local
press agencies. See e.g., Implications of British Overseas Aid, TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, TTimes File (letter written by Jeremy Pope, Managing. Director of
T.I.); Questions of Bribery, TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, TTimes
File) (letter written by George Moody-Stuart Chairmen of T.I. in the United Kingdom).
119. England is used for illustrative purposes only.
English Officials are necessarily corrupt.
120.

The author does not suggest that

The FCPA was born out of the same public outrage. See Timmeny, supra note 11.
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Introducing this draft as a protocol or a supplemental document to
an existing treaty may help facilitate its acceptance. There are currently
treaties in place that this agreement could logically supplement.' 2 ' The
strategy is to target an existing treaty that is logically related to this
agreement.
This draft would become an extension of the already
established goals of operational treaties and thus cast it in a less radical
light.
Despite its inadequate attempts to date, the OECD is still a vital
actor in the adoption of this treaty.
The majority of multinational
corporations can be found within the territory of OECD member
nations.'
Furthermore, the bulk of international commerce comes from
nations in the OECD.'
Any treaty receiving the blessing of the OECD
will significantly affect international foreign corrupt practices. Therefore,
Transparency International and the United States should concentrate on
pressuring individual OECD members to become signatories.
A
combination of diplomatic maneuvering and political pressure arising from
the discontent of the public, can result in the world community's leaders
embracing this treaty.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Transnational bribery has been an issue before the world
community for a generation now. Prior multinational attempts at reducing
these illicit payments have been ineffective. The United States continued
demands for the international "criminalization" will again be labeled as
"moral imperialism" and will be met by considerable opposition from
other nations. Cloning a treaty after the FCPA is not the answer to this
problem. The proposed multilateral agreement has the potential of both
controlling overseas accommodation payments and receiving the
international community's acceptance.
New organizations and a new
world order makes the timing right for this proposed draft to be submitted
to world leaders. As a result, this operational, effective, and ratifiable
agreement could be the first real multinational deterrent to foreign
corruption.

121. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between State and Nationals of
Other States, 17 U.S.T. 1270, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, done at Seoul S. Korea, Oct. 11, 1985, reprinted in
24 I.L.M. 1598 (1985).
122. RUBIN & HUFBAUER, supra note 6, at 42; OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, Report by the Secretary-General,Annex 4 at 99 (1977) reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 969
(1976) note item #2.
123. LANGE & BORN, supra note 84, at 52.

PROPOSED TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CORRUPT PAYMENTS
WHEREAS international commercial transactions have become
more common and increasingly facilitated by corrupt payments to public
officials;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments are socially undesirable;
WHEREAS acceptance of these corrupt payments erode the public's
confidence in their state's leadership;
WHEREAS several governments have become politically unstable
due to the exposure of these ongoing corrupt payments;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments increasingly cause international
incidents and strain relations between nations;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments are detrimental to a nation's
ability to secure goods and services at an economically efficient and fair
price;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments deprive legitimate entities from
securing international commercial contracts;
WHEREAS such corrupt payments originate from transnational
corporations and can only be eliminated through multinational cooperation;
WE ARE RESOLVED to condemn and eliminate all corrupt practices
of bribery of a public official by transnational corporations, their
intermediaries, and others involved in violation of the laws and regulations
of Host Countries.
ARTICLE I
For the purpose of this Agreement:
(a) "Commission" means the Corrupt Practices Commission created by
Article IX.
(b) "Committee" means the Corrupt Practices Committee created by
Article VII.
(c) "Corrupt Payment" shall be defined by the host state's internal laws
concerning illegal payments, bribes, or gratuities to governmental
entities at the time of the alleged act taken in account all host state
rulings, codes, regulations, cases, or written opinions construing or
creating these internal laws.
(d) "Host State" means the sovereign territory in which the alleged
recipient or benefactor of a corrupt payment holds a "public official"
position.
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"Home State" means the sovereign territory in which the Offended
Private Party is incorporated or, if the Offended Private Party is a
natural person, means his or her domiciliary State.
(f) "Illegal" shall be defined by the Host State's internal criminal or
penal laws concerning illicit payments to public officials taken in
account with all Host State rulings, codes, regulations, cases, or
written opinions construing or creating these internal laws.
(g) "Intermediary" means any enterprise or any other person, whether
juridical or natural, who negotiates with or otherwise deals with a
public official on behalf of any other enterprise or any other person,
whether juridical or natural, in connection with an international
commercial transaction;
(h) "International commercial transaction" means any sale, contract, or
any other business transaction, actual or proposed, with a national,
regional, local government, any authority or agency referred to in
paragraph (1) of this article. International commercial transaction
also refers to any business transaction involving an application for
governmental approval of a sale, contract, or any other business
transaction, actual or proposed, relating to the supply or purchase of
goods, services, capital, or technology emanating, wholly or
substantially, from a State or States other than the one in which those
goods, services, capital, or technology are to be delivered or
rendered. It also means any application for or acquisition of
proprietary interest or production rights from a government by a
foreign national or enterprise;
(i)
"Knowingly" (with respect to conduct) means being aware that such
a person, intermediary, agent, subsidiary, or any entity is engaging
in conduct in violation of this Agreement or that such circumstances
exist that should reasonably place a party on notice that a result is
substantially certain to occur, or has occurred, from conduct in
violation of this Agreement.
(j)
"Offended Private Party" means aggrieved private person or legal
corporate entity which, through loss of a possible contract, is
damaged by a corrupt payment. The Offended Private Party must
have been a legitimate business competitor to the Suspect Private
Party and in direct competition with the Suspect Private Party in
securing a contract involving an international commercial
transaction.
(k) "Payment" means the delivery of any item or intangible of value.
(1) "Public official" means any person, whether appointed or elected,
whether permanently or temporary:
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(ii)

(in)

Who, at the national, regional or local level holds a
legislative, administrative, judicial or military office or
who holds such an office in an international
intergovernmental organization; or
Who, in performing a public function is an employee of
an international intergovernmental organization or of a
government or of a public or governmental authority or
agency or who otherwise performs a public function;

"Suspect Private Party" means any person or legal corporate entity
which is suspected of violating this Agreement by knowingly
making, offering, or allowing another on their behalf to make or
offer a corrupt payment.
A Suspect Private Party does not
necessarily have to be a domiciliary of a signatory country.

ARTICLE II
It is a violation of this Agreement to knowingly offer, promise, or
give, directly or indirectly, or through an intermediary, any corrupt
payment to:
(a) a public official or intermediary for the purposes of influencing any
act or decision of such public official in his official capacity, or
induce such public official to do, or omit to do, any illegal act in
violation of the lawful duty of such public official; or
(b) a public official or intermediary in an attempt to induce a public
official to influence a foreign government or instrumentality thereof
to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality; or
(c)
any political party or official thereof or any candidate for political
office for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of such
party, official, or candidate in their official capacity, or induce such
party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of
the lawful duty of such party, official, or candidate in connection
with an international commercial transaction.
ARTICLE III
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under this Agreement
that:
(a) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was
made, was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the
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foreign officiil's or candidate's political party, party official, or
country; or
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value, was a
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, party, public
official, or candidate and was directly related to:
(i)
(ii)

(c)

(d)
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the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of
'products or services; or
the execution or performance of a contract with a
foreign government or agency thereof; or

the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value was to
facilitate or expedite payment to a public official, political party, or
party official, and the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure
the performance of a routine governmental action by the public
official, political party, or party official, and such payment is not in
violation of Host State's internal laws; or
the Suspected Private Party was acting in good faith or in accordance
with an advisory opinion rendered pursuant to Article VIII of this
Agreement.
ARTICLE IV

Each signatory country shall ensure that enterprises or other
juridical persons established in its territory maintain, under penalty of law,
accurate records of payments made by them to an intermediary, or
received by them as an intermediary, in connection with an international
commercial transaction. Each signatory country agrees to consider for
adoption all accounting procedures promulgated by the Committee. All
transnational payments over $10,000.00 to public officials or political
parties should be disclosed to the Committee on an annual basis.
ARTICLE V
Each signatory country shall require, under penalty of law, that
enterprises or other juridical persons established in its territory include the
following clause in all transnational commercial transaction contracts:
"One or more of the parties to this transnational commercial
transaction is bound by the Treaty on the Prevention of International
Corrupt Payments. Both parties are aware of the existence and details of
said treaty. A contracting party, of this contract, from a signatory country
verifies that no corrupt payments were offered or delivered in violation of
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this treaty. Any contracting party, of this contract, from a signatory
country must keep accurate accounting records pursuant to Article IV of
said treaty and is encouraged to solicit advisory opinions on questionable
transactions pursuant to Article VIII of said treaty."

ARTICLE VI
Each signatory country should refrain from permitting tax
deductions on expenditures that are determined to be "corrupt payments."
ARTICLE VII
(a)

This Agreement establishes the Corrupt Practices Committee
composed of fifteen (15) representatives from signatory countries
who will be known as Counselors. The Counselors shall meet
routinely and:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)

(iv)

promulgate accounting rules that are intended to prevent
and disclose corrupt payments in international
commercial transactions; and
render advisory opinions pursuant to Article VIII of this
Agreement; and
arbitrate all disputes between signatory countries
concerning the interpretation of and enforcement of this
Agreement; and
formulate and amend the procedural rules of the Corrupt
Practices Commission.

The Counselors shall be elected by signatory countries every three
(3) years serving staggered terms of three years. The candidates for
this committee shall possess excellent credentials. Each signatory
country is limited to having only one (1) national on this regulatory
board at any given time.
(c) The Committee shall formulate rules of procedure concerning its
responsibilities.
(d) All Committee Counselors shall be neutral, impartial decision
makers and be of the highest moral character.
(e) The Committee shall work closely with all nations and regional
organizations to combat corrupt payments in international
commercial transactions.
(f)
The Committee shall create, coordinate and administer all necessary
support staff and committees as it deems necessary to carry out its
obligations under this treaty.
(b)
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The Committee shall hear petitions to recuse a member of the
Corrupt Practices Commission, and replace a commissioner if
necessary.
ARTICLE VIII

All signatory countries persons, companies, or corporate entities
may request an advisory opinion concerning a questionable situation that
may, or may not, be a corrupt payment. Hypothetical situations will not
be considered by the Committee. All requests must be filed by possible
offending private parties or signatory governments and be supported by all
the facts sufficient for the Committee to render a reliable advisory opinion.
Upon receiving a valid advisory opinion request the Committee shall:
(a)
Immediately analyze the provided facts; request more information
from the filing party if necessary; and render an opinion within
fourteen (14) days; and
(b) Not disclose the identities of any of the parties involved or the facts
surrounding the advisory opinion unless an Offended Private Party
raises the affirmative defense of relying on an advisory opinion
pursuant to this section and in defense of corruption complaint filed
pursuant to Article X of this Agreement.
ARTICLE IX
(a)

This Agreement establishes the Corrupt Practices Commission
composed of seven (7) Commissioners from signatory countries
elected by signatory countries, with individual tenure of five years,
serving in staggered terms. All Commissioners should be neutral,
impartial decision makers possessing the highest moral character.
No two Commissioners shall be from the same signatory country.
The Commission shall have the power to:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)

hear all complaints filed pursuant to Article X of this
Agreement; and
to discover all documents, depose witnesses, and audit
accounting records kept pursuant to Article IV of this
agreement; and
interpret Host Country laws on corrupt payments; and
certify a cause in which it believes a corrupt payment
has taken place in violation of this treaty; and
award attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party; and
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(b)

request a bond be posted by an alleged Offended Private
Party to assure that an innocent Suspect Private Party
can recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

A Suspect Private Party can demand the replacement of one of the
Commissioners which will be replaced with a Commissioner from
the Suspect Private Party's domiciliary State if:
(i)
(ii)

There are presently no Commissioners sharing the same
nationality of the Suspect Private Party; and
The Suspect Private Party is from a signatory country.
ARTICLE X

An Offended Private Party of a signatory country has the right to
file a complaint with the Commission alleging a corrupt payment was
made or offered in an international commercial transaction. Both the
Offended Private Party and Suspect Private Party have the right to notice,
opportunity to be heard, and ability to produce evidence on their behalf.
A complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged corrupt payment
and be based on good faith. If the Commission finds that a complaint was
not filed in good faith, then the Suspect Private Party may be awarded
attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the complaining Offended Private
Party.
ARTICLE XI
(a)

The Commission's complaint procedure shall consist of:
(i)
(ii)

Notifying all parties concerned in the complaint; and
Confidential investigation of the entire circumstances
surrounding the alleged corrupt payment; and
(iii) Collecting evidence through subpoenas and depositions
to render a fair decision;
(b)
(c)
(d)

The Commission must establish, by competent evidence, that more
likely than not, a corrupt payment occurred.
A presumption of a corrupt payment arises if the Suspect Private
Party refuses to honor a Commission's discovery request or refuses
to take part in these proceedings.
If the Commission finds that:
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a corrupt payment has not occurred, the proceedings
shall be closed and all documents shall be sealed. The
alleged Offended Private Party may be ordered to pay
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by the
Suspect Private Party.
a corrupt payment has occurred, the cause will be
"Certified" and all records and documents will be turned
over to the both the Offended Private Party and the
Suspect Private Party.
ARTICLE XII

Upon certification of a cause:
(a)
The Commission shall release a public statement that describes its
findings and conclusions.
(b) Signatory countries shall bar the Suspect Private Party from doing
business within its territory for a period of Ten (10) years; and
(c)
The Offended Private Party has the right to sue, under a contract
interference tort theory, if one is available in his/its Home State and
if that Home State is a signatory to this Agreement.
(d) All signatory countries agree to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments of fellow signatory countries in civil/private causes of
action described in subsection (c) of this Article. This section shall
not be interpreted in denying a signatory country the right to refuse
enforcement of foreign judgments if such refusal is consistent with
local laws, standing treaties and/or international legal principles.
ARTICLE XIII
Signatory countries are encouraged to pass local legislation
criminalizing corrupt payments in international commercial transactions.
However in no way is this Agreement to be interpreted to:
(a)
require a signatory country to adopt criminal legislation concerning
international commercial transactions; or
(b) exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with the
national law of a signatory country.
ARTICLE XIV
Contracting States shall inform each other upon request of
measures taken in the implementation of this Agreement.
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ARTICLE XV

(a)

(b)

(c)

Contracting States shall afford one another, the Committee and
Commission the greatest possible measure of assistance in
connection with investigations and proceedings brought pursuant to
this Agreement, as far as permitted under their national laws, and all
Contracting States shall provide assistance in the general operation
of this treaty.
Contracting States shall, upon mutual agreement, enter into
negotiations towards the conclusion of bilateral agreements with each
other to facilitate the provision of mutual assistance in accordance
with this article.
The provisions of this article shall not affect obligations under any
other treaty, bilateral or multilateral, which governs or will govern,
in whole or in part, mutual assistance in legal matters.
ARTICLE XVI

This Agreement shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date
of deposit of the Twenty-second (22nd) instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

American law schools use appellate court decisions to teach the
implementation and progression of the law. Typically, the first case in a
series will stand for the proposition that a plaintiff is entitled to a certain
right. A later case demonstrates that a subsequent plaintiff is also entitled
to the right. After a number of cases are presented, the student is expected
to understand the law, policy, doctrine or test that applies to situations
revolving around the right. When a court veers in a new direction, this
method results in the appearance that the court inexplicably did a doctrinal
about-face. For example, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin' and U.S. v. Darby,2

* Juris Doctor, 1992, University of Iowa College of Law; L.L.M., 1994, University of Iowa
College of Law.
I
1. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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cases marking the end of the Lochner3 era, appear illogically decided when
measured only by the precepts of stare decisis.
Judges, however, do not operate in a case book world. They
operate in a world with politicians, citizens and their interest groups, the
media, economic upheavals, wars, and myriad other extra-judicial factors.
Studying a legal doctrine or trend in its historical context may provide a
less myopic view of the law's progression, demystifying seemingly
irrational decisions. When one understands President Franklin Roosevelt's
"Court packing plan," the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB and Darby
are more comprehensible. A discussion of the Court packing plan is often
included in constitutional law case books as an illustration of outside
influences on the judicial process;' however, it is one of only a few
historical explanations contained in most case books.
This paper analyzes the historical settings of several significant
cases in which plaintiffs asked the courts to apply the U.N. Charter,
casting these cases in a new light. It has frequently been argued that U.S.
courts have been at best ambivalent about utilizing international treaties in
U.S. courts.5 Judges often have invoked the political question doctrine,
which allows them to remove themselves from involvement in an

international issue.6 Another method of avoiding treaty application in U.S.
courts is the doctrine of non-self-execution, which requires enabling
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). During the Lochner era, the Supreme
Court frequently applied substantive due process to invalidate regulations that were aimed at
redressing societal inequalities. For example, Lochner struck down a New York law aimed at
limiting the number of hours that bakery employees could work. The Lochner Court held that
the "right to make a contract ... [was] part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th
Amendment." Id. at 53. By the 1930's, this reasoning was used to find several of Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal provisions unconstitutional. Roosevelt responded with a plan to reform
the Supreme Court that would have allowed him to appoint six new Justices to the Court.
Although the plan was never enacted, the Court responded by upholding several New Deal
regulations, beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4. See, e.g., PAUL A. FREUND ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER
PROBLEMS, 260-62 (4th ed. 1977); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ch. 8 (1 lth ed.
1985); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS

98-100 (7th ed. 1991). For other examples of historical analysis of Supreme Court decisions, see
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980); Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 91
STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, IntegratingInternationalHuman Rights Law into Domestic
Law-U.S. Experience, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 37 (1981).
6. The political question doctrine holds that when an issue is textually dedicated by the
Constitution to a political branch of the government, lacks standards by which the judiciary can
resolve it, requires an initial policy determination, or if decided by a court could cause
embarrassment to the U.S. government in its foreign relations, it should be found to be
nonjusticiable. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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legislation for a treaty to apply domestically. These doctrines have
produced a line of cases that overwhelmingly-but not exclusively-reject the
application of treaties (especially human rights treaties) in U.S. courts.'
Yet placing these cases in a historical setting and viewing them with an eye
on events surrounding the decisions shows that U.S. courts are becoming
more willing to consider and apply human rights treaties.
A. Background
Even before the emergence of the modem Nation-State system in
the 17th century, States have concluded treaties with one another. 9 For
most of that time, treaties dealt with matters arising between States in their
sovereign capacity; rarely has a treaty dealt with issues that applied to
individuals within a State. 10 Only recently have States begun to make
international agreements that relate to the treatment of nationals within
their own borders.' I
In the past, treaties were generally enforced by the use of
sanctions. If one State violated its treaty with another State, the latter State
would apply sanctions-diplomatic, economic or military reprisals. For the
most part, the threat of reprisals kept States from violating their treaty
obligations. With the formation of the League of Nations after World War
I, the world community began exploring human rights as a new subject
matter for treaties and created new enforcement mechanisms with the
League itself and the Permanent Court of International Justice. Although
the League eventually dissolved, it provided a foundation for the formation
of the United Nations. The Permanent Court of International Justice
evolved into the current International Court of Justice (ICJ). States

7. When a treaty is non-self-executing, it cannot be applied to individuals in U.S. courts
without further enabling legislation. In other words, a non-self-executing treaty will bind the
U.S. in its relations with other nations, but not in its relations with its own citizens. See JOHN
H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES, IN THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 141, 148-56
(Frances G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).

8. See infra note 20.
9.
10.

J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (9th ed. 1984).
MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1988).

11. See STARKE, supra note 9, at 14. See also Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua
v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that government officials may be held
responsible for certain egregious violations of their own citizens' rights but nonetheless holding
that this "expanded law of nations" does not (1) include, as a principle of jus cogens, protection
of citizens from harms resulting from their own government's contravention of an International
Court of Justice decision; and (2) alter the domestic law principle that congressional enactments
cannot violate, but only supersede, prior inconsistent treaties or customary norms of international
law).
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continue to make treaties on sovereign issues, but the human rights of their
citizens have increasingly become a subject for international agreements.
A treaty provides the most authoritative method of ascertaining and
defining a precept of international law. As a matter of international law, a
treaty is any written agreement between two States, regardless of what title
it is given.'2 Under U.S. law, however, an international agreement
becomes a treaty only after it has been signed by the President and ratified

by the Senate.' 3 Article VI of the Constitution makes treaties "the supreme
law of the land"; Article 111(2) places jurisdiction for cases "arising under"
treaties with the federal courts.'" Since the Statute of the ICJ gave that
body jurisdiction only over matters arising between States-and since a State
submits to the ICJ's jurisdiction only voluntarily' 5 -domestic courts are left
to enforce treaties that deal with individual rights.

B. Scope
The U.N. Charter is a duly signed and ratified treaty of the United
States. Because the United States has ratified only one other international
human rights treaty 7 and because innumerable cases containing the phrase
"human rights" or similar phrases are outside the scope of international
6

12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(l)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
2.
13. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl.
14. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl.1, art. VI, cl.2.
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, arts. 34, 35, 36, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993.
16. The Vienna Convention obligates a State to "refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty" which a State has signed, but not yet ratified. Vienna
Convention, supra note 12, art. 18. Therefore, under the Convention, a signed, unratified treaty
still has a somewhat binding effect on a State. However, the U.S. Constitution recognizes a
"treaty" only after it is ratified by the Senate and signed by the President. The U.N. CHARTER
is a treaty under U.S. law.

See BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD

ORDER (Bums Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
17. The United States has signed several international human rights treaties, but ratified
only one. Among the treaties signed, but not ritified, by the U.S. are: the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on
Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. The U.S. ratified (with reservations) the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1988, 37 years after its entry into force. See BASIC
DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (Burns Weston et al. eds., 2d ed.

1990).
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law," this paper focuses on the application of the human rights provisions
of the U.N. Charter in U.S. courts.
The doctrine of non-self-execution has had a significant impact on
attempts to employ the U.N. Charter in U.S. courts. The doctrine of nonself-execution, a domestic law concept, determines whether a ratified

treaty is directly incorporated into U.S. law or whether it requires further
legislation to make it applicable within the United States. 9 The human

rights provisions of the U.N. Charter have been found non-self-executing
and therefore do not apply within the United States in the absence of
further legislative implementation.20 The political question doctrine, as
developed in Baker v. Carr," also limits application of the Charter and

other treaties in U.S. courts.
In spite of these restrictions on the use of treaty law, over 250
cases make reference to the U.N. Charter; seven cases in particular
provide parallel and contrasting applications of the human rights precepts
of the Charter in U.S. courts. Oyama v. Californian and Sei Fujii v. State23

were challenges to the California Alien Land Law." ' These two cases,
decided in 1948 and 1952, represent the minority's initial commitment to
the application of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter, this

commitment was severely curtailed by the doctrine of self-execution. In
the 1980s, Fildrtigav. Pefia-Irala and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic"
resulted in a "one step forward, two steps back" application of the
Charter. The Tel-Oren retreat was halted by Forti v. Suarez-Mason.' In
1991 and 1992, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, and United States v.
18. For a thorough study of court opinions containing human rights terms, see Jordan J.
Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an
Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 543 (1989).
19. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 148-56.
20. See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985); FiIfrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Hitai v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 466 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Sei Fujii
v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Ct.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
CAL. CODE § 261 (Deering 1943).
Filtrtiga v. Pefia Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 774.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S.
2986 (1992) (mem.).
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Alvarez-Machain29 arose from incidents involving alleged violations of an
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, resulting in
divergent holdings which heartened, then disappointed, proponents of
international human rights. These cases, viewed in isolation, represent at
best a vacillating commitment by the courts to the Charter. However, the
historical context of the formation of the United Nations and domestic
political concerns reveals Oyama to be the first step toward greater
acceptance by the courts of the principles of the U.N. Charter.
Courts often refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
when discussing the U.N. Charter. The human rights provisions of the
Charter and the Universal Declaration may be used interchangeably. 3'
Although the Universal Declaration is a non-binding expression of the
U.N. General Assembly, it is regarded as authoritative in interpreting the
human rights provisions of the Charter.
C. The Creation of the United Nations
The U.N. Charter was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945.32
The rise of Nazism, the deaths of millions of ethnic minorities in World
War II, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the war all contributed
to the formation of the United Nations.33 While the Charter supported
human rights ideals, it retained the principle of a State's sovereignty over
its own citizens and a balance of power that favored the Allies-China,
France, the USSR, Great Britain, and the United States. 34 Nonetheless, for
those who lived through the horrors of World War II, the Charter provided
hope that a State would never again have free rein over the treatment of its
own citizens. The United States was at the forefront in arguing to include
protection of individual rights in the U.N. Charter.3"
29. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).

31. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Contemporary Human Rights Law, in LES
DROIT DE L'HOMME:

UNIVERSALrrE ET RENOUVEAU 1789-1989, at 107, 111 (Guy

Braibant & Gerard Marcou eds., 1990) (stating that "the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ... may be said to have become an authentic interpretation of the U.N. Charter").
32.

THOMAS HOVET, JR. & ERICA HOVET, THE UNITED NATIONS: 1941-1979, at 1

(1979).
33.

See THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1 (G.R. Bunting & M.J. Lee eds.,

1964).
34.

U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1, 2, 26, 55.

35. See EVAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 31-32 (1982);
FEHRENBACH, THIS KIND OF PEACE 77 (1966).

T.R.
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In 1948, without a dissenting vote, the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,36
largely authored by Eleanor Roosevelt. Upon its passage, she said, "[tihis
must be taken as testimony of our common aspiration first voiced in the
Charter of the United Nations to lift men [sic] everywhere to a higher
standard of life and to a greater enjoyment of freedom'""' Although the
United States was actively involved in the promulgation of international
human rights standards, the question addressed here is whether the United
States has championed these rights in its own courts.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER IN U.S. COURTS

A. 1948 - 1980
1. The Doctrine of Non-Self-Execution
The earliest mention of the U.N. Charter by the U.S. Supreme
38
Court occurred in Oyama v. California.
Oyama arose under the
California Alien Land Law, which made it illegal for aliens who were
ineligible for naturalization to own, occupy, lease or transfer agricultural
land in California. It also required any land acquired in contravention of
the law to escheat to the state. Under U.S. naturalization laws in force at
the time, the Alien Land Law applied only to East Asian aliens.39 Kajiro
Oyama, ineligible for citizenship because of his Japanese birth, purchased
agricultural land in California and had the deeds executed to his minor
son, Fred, who was a U.S. citizen by virtue of his birth in California. In
1942, the Oyamas, along with all persons of Japanese descent, were
forcibly removed from California and sent to an interment camp. In 1944,
when Fred was sixteen years old and still interred outside of California,
the state filed a petition to declare an escheat on Fred's land as deeded to
him with the intention of violating the Alien Land Law. The trial court
ordered the land to revert to the state and the California Supreme Court

36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 30.
37. Eleanor Roosevelt, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly, in 19 DEP'T
ST. BULL., 1948, at 751, quoted in AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN 1988 (1988).
38. 332 U.S. at 633.
39. Id. at 647 (Black, J., concurring). Federal immigration law permitted only "whites
and Negroes" to become naturalized citizens. See ROBERT A. DIVINE, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 22 (1972). The California Alien Land Law forbade
ineligible aliens from owning land in California. Therefore, the law worked only to exclude
aliens of Oriental ancestry from owning land.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California
upheld the ruling.4°
Supreme Court in 1947."' The opinion of the Court, written by Chief
Justice Vinson, found that Fred had been discriminated against solely on
the basis of his Japanese ancestry. The Court found a conflict between a
state's right to determine land use policy and the right of a U.S. citizen to
own land anywhere in the country, holding that under the Supremacy
Clause, the state right gave way to the federal interest. The Court took
issue with the California court's presumption that the transfer of the land to
Fred was suspect. If the Oyamas had not been Japanese, the transfer
would have been presumed a gift. Because the Court did not reach the
issue of whether the Alien Land Law violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the statute itself remained in force.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred in the
decision, although he would have struck down the Alien Land Law on
equal protection grounds.42 In addition, he noted the international
implications of such a law. "[W]e have recently pledged ourselves to
cooperate with the United Nations to 'promote ... human rights ... for all

without distinction as to race .... ' How can this nation be faithful to this
international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership ... on account

of race are permitted to be enforced?""3 Justice Murphy, joined by Justice
Rutledge, also concurred in the Court's decision, noting that the Alien
Land Law's "inconsistency with the Charter, which has been duly ratified
and adopted by the United States, is but one more reason why the statute
must be condemned.""
The U.N. Charter, then, had an auspicious beginning in the
Supreme Court. Four justices would have applied the Charter to invalidate
California's Alien Land Law. Justices Murphy and Rutledge advocated
striking down the Land Law because it violated human rights provisions of
the Charter, as well as equal protection. Justices Black and Douglas also
noted the United States' commitment to the U.N. Charter as a reason (in
addition to equal protection and conflict with federal laws) to invalidate the
Alien Land Law. Neither concurring opinion mentioned the doctrine of
non-self-execution.

People v. Oyama, 173 P.2d 794 (Cal. 1946).
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 633.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring). For an in-depth discussion of the Oyama and Sei
40.
41.
42.
43.

Fujii decisions see Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States
Civil Rights Litigation: 1946 -1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 917-31 (1984).
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The seminal case applying the doctrine of non-self-execution to the
U.N. Charter was heard in 1952. Sei Fujii v. State45 arose under the
California Alien Land Law that was at issue in Oyama. As in Oyama,
California had reclaimed land purchased by a Japanese national. Sei Fujii
challenged the Alien Land Law under the U.N. Charter and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The California Supreme Court found that the Alien Land
Law was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as arbitrary
discrimination against a non-citizen. However, the court also found that
the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter were not self-executing
and therefore did not override local laws. The court held that the human
rights provisions of the U.N. Charter "[s]tate general purposes and
objectives of the United Nations Organization and do not purport to
impose legal obligations on the individual member nations or to create
rights in private persons." The court's reading of the Charter led it to
conclude that "it is plain that it was contemplated that future legislative
action by the several nations would be required to accomplish the declared
objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these provisions were
intended to become rules of law for the courts of this country . ...
1
Although Sei Fujii v. State was never appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
this reasoning has been adopted consistently by U.S. courts-including the
U.S. Supreme Court-since Sei Fuji was decided."' Yet four years earlier in
Oyama, four justices of the Supreme Court would have applied the
Charter's human rights provisions to overturn the law that was eventually
overturned in Sei Fujii, without calling for further legislation to implement
the Charter. What happened in those four years to change judicial
attitudes toward the Charter?

2. Anti-Communism and States' Rights
Judges, although in theory insulated from the political process, are
nonetheless influenced by public opinion. Judicial decisions are based not
only on logic, but "the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, [and] institutions of public policy. " '8 In the 1950s,
politicians, educators and other commentators decried the United Nations
as a communist tool to implement world domination. After the decision in
Oyama, one journalist noted that "what four justices of the Supreme Court

45.

242 P.2d at 617.

46. Id. at 620-21.

47. See, e.g., Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
48.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1881) quoted in J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY

MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 43 (1961).
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say in one case, five may say in another . . . . [leading to] revolutionary
consequences in our internal affairs. For example, it would be impossible
to remove Communists from government offices . . . . " One allegation
of communist infiltration of the United Nations involved Alger Hiss, who
organized the San Francisco meeting that produced the U.N. Charter and
was later accused of being a Communist spy.'
This concern led the
Senate Judiciary Committee to hold hearings on U.S. citizens who were
employees of the United Nations and suspected of being Communists. 5'
Supposed Communist dominance of the United Nations was summed up by
William Fleming, who contended that "[t]he United States delegation [to
the U.N.] has, unfortunately, not realized that the struggle against
communism is a global one ....
it is waged.. .everywhere, including the
Council chambers of the United Nations
Not only was the United Nations viewed as an agent of world
communism, but its creation fueled the concern of states' rights supporters
about using international agreements to dismantle discriminatory laws in
Southern states.53 Indeed, the two issues were often joined: charges of
Communist ties were leveled at civil rights organizations working for
desegregation in the South. s' The concern that international agreements
would adversely impact states' rights predated the formation of the United

49. CHELSY MANLY, THE U.N. RECORD: TEN FATEFUL YEARS FOR AMERICA 185
(1955). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "[e]veryone has the right of
equal access to public service in his [sic] country." Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 30, art. 21(2).
50. Hiss was a career diplomat who was an advisor to President Roosevelt at the Yalta
Conference and then was given responsibility for organizing the U.N. Conference on
International Organization in San Francisco in 1945. Representatives of fifty nations
attended the conference which resulted in the signing of the U.N. Charter. See Hovet,
supra note 32. In 1950, after being named by Whittaker Chambers as a communist agent,
Hiss was imprisoned for four years on charges of perjury. In 1992, General Dmitri
Volkogonov announced that the files of the former Soviet Union contained no evidence that
Hiss had ever been recruited. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frank, Stalin Biographer Offers Latest
Twist in Hiss Case, No Evidence Diplomat Collaborated with Soviets, WASH. POST, Oct.

31, 1992, at A3.
51. Activities of United States Citizens Employed by the United Nations, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. through
83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1952-1954).
52. William Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 37
A.B.A.J. 816, 860 (Nov. 1951).
53.

See, e.g., L.K. HYDE, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 173

(1960).
54. See ANNE BRADEN, HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
SEGREGATION (n.d.); see also Dudziak, supra note 4, at 75.
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Nations,55 arising when Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland.56 Dictum in this opinion indicated
that the federal government could legally ratify a treaty that could take
away rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Although
Missouri v. Holland arose under a treaty dealing with migratory birds, it
was seen to have a sweeping impact on the powers reserved to the states.
One commentator argued that "[t]his language [in Missouri v. Holland] can
really mean nothing more nor less than that an act of Congress,
concededly in contravention of... [a] constitutional prohibition, may be
rendered valid by enactment pursuant to a treaty on the subject ....
Formation of the United Nations heightened the concern that
federal action over traditionally local issues would expand. If held to the
standards of international human rights agreements, a U.S. state might be
"compelled to forego its right to deal with its own social problems in
accordance with its own judgment."58 To safeguard states' rights, Senator
John Bricker of Ohio proposed amending the Constitution so that no treaty
could be applied domestically without specific implementing legislation.59
In other words, the Bricker Amendment would have foreclosed the
possibility of self-executing treaties. When the Senate voted on the
amendment in 1954, it fell one vote short of the two-thirds necessary to
amend the Constitution.6
During this period, the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education.61 This case, although it did not analyze the application of
international agreements to segregation issues, reinforced the fears of
Southern states' rights advocates of federal government interference in
essentially state decisions. While civil rights battles were being fought in

55. See, e.g., Christopher Steskal, Creating Space for Racial Difference: The Case for
African-American Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 193 (1992); see generally
JOHN M. SPIVACKJ, RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1990).
56. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (documenting Justice Holmes' observation
that: "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States").

57. Eberhard P. Deutsch, The Treaty Making Clause: Decisionfor the People of America,
37 A.B.A. J. 659, 662 (1951).

58.

Fleming, supra note 52, at 817.

59. ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFERD A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 558 (7th ed. 1990).
60. THOMAS FRANCK & MICHAEL GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 256 (1987).
61.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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the courts, culminating in the Brown decision, African-Americans also
petitioned the United Nations for relief for segregation and related issues. 2
Although the United Nations did not support the civil rights movement, the
U.N. Charter, with its human rights clauses, was perceived as a vehicle
for abrogating states' rights in racial issues,63 just as the treaty in Holland
invalidated Missouri's laws regarding migratory birds."
3. Validating the Doctrine of Non-Self-Execution
Between 1947 and 1956, the make-up of the Supreme Court
changed. Justice Murphy, whose concurrence in Oyama cited the U.N.
Charter, and Justice Rutledge, who joined that concurrence, were both off
the Court by 1949. They were replaced by Justices Tom Clark and
Sherman Minton. In 1953, Earl Warren, who was perceived at the time as
a "mildly liberal Republican," was named Chief Justice.'
The
appointment of Warren, along with Clark, Minton, and John Harlan in
1955, represented an attempt to move the Court in a direction more
amenable to "legislative discretion, state police power, and society's
concern for stability, security, and continuity."'
All of these factors
diminished the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for the U.N. Charter."
Indeed, the self-execution of the Charter had never been the majority
view, although it was supported by a strong minority.
In 1955, the Court, demonstrating this lack of enthusiasm for the
Charter, denied certiorari for Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park
Cemetery,' letting stand the Iowa Supreme Court's finding that the U.N.
Charter was irrelevant to state law. In 1965, the Court of Appeals for the

62. See Dudziak, supra note 4, at 93-98.
63.

KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 59, at 582.

64. 252 U.S. at 435.
65.

KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 59, at 569.

66. Id. at 568.
67. See Oyama, 332 U.S. 633; Lockwood, supra note 44; Sei Fujii 242 P.2d 617.
68.

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880, aff'd per curiam, cert.

dismissed, 349 U.S. 70, 80 (1955). The case arose when a cemetery in Sioux City, Iowa,
refused to bury Plaintiff's husband, a Winnebago Indian. Id. The contract for the sale of
the cemetery plot stated, "burial privileges accrue only to members of the Caucasian race."
The trial court found the clause was not void, but was unenforceable as a violation of both
the Iowa and U.S. Constitutions.

Id. However, the cemetery, could rely on the clause as a

defense and such reliance would not constitute state action.

Id. The trial court further

found the U.N. Charter was irrelevant to the issue. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed and

the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and the decision was affirmed by an evenly
divided Court. Id. A re-hearing was granted but the decision was vacated and certiorari
was dismissed as improvidently granted. Id.
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Second Circuit was presented with a petition to review a determination of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in Hitai v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service.' Thirteen years after the human rights
provisions of the U.N. Charter were found to be non-self-executing in Sei
Fujii by the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petitioner's claim that the INS's refusal to adjust his immigration status
violated Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. The court noted in two sentences
that, according to Sei Fujii, the U.N. Charter could not serve to overturn a
domestic law. After Hitai, the Charter was infrequently invoked by
petitioners. When it was presented as a basis for determination, the courts
maintained the Sei Fufii rule."

B. The 1980s
1. Customary International Law
Under the doctrine of stare decisis the courts continued to treat the
U.N. Charter as non-self-executing, but starting in 1980 the Charter began
to take on a role in the courts which had origins in a line of cases from the
beginning of the twentieth century. In 1900, the Supreme Court decided
the case of The Paquete Habana.' When war broke out with Spain in
1898, U.S. ships captured two fishing vessels sailing out of Havana under
the Spanish flag. The case arose over the issue of the condemnation of the
vessels and their cargoes as prizes of war. Because the Constitution
commits "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the federal
courts' and because U.S. admiralty law derives from international law, the
Court was accustomed to applying international law in admiralty cases.'
The importance of The Paquete Habana to U.S. law is the Court's
statement that "[i]nternational law is part of our law." ' ' The Court also
recognized the sources of international law, including the "customs and

69. Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965).
70. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 617. See Hiati, 343 F.2d at 466. See also Richard B. Lillich,
The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing InternationalHuman Rights Law, 74 AM. Soc'Y
OF INT'L LAW PROC. 20, 21 (1980).

71. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
73. 175 U.S. at 700.
74. Id.
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usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, ... the works of
jurists and commentators.""'
The Supreme Court recognized that customary international lawlaw not codified in a treaty, but existing because of its recognition by
nations, jurists or commentators-is part of U.S. law. In recent years,
courts sympathetic to the human rights goals of the United Nations have
used the Charter as evidence of individual human rights generally. Other
sources, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or laws of
individual nations, provide the specific content of individual human rights.
Customary international law is by its nature more difficult to
ascertain than law codified in a treaty. However, its advantage in U.S.
courts over treaty law is that the doctrine of non-self-execution does not
apply.76 This advantage crystallized in cases brought by plaintiffs invoking
the U.N. Charter as evidence of the existence of individual human rights.
These cases show a change in the Charter's role from a treaty specifically
applicable in isolated situations to an expression of the existence of general
human rights for individuals.
2. The Charter and Individual Rights
Almost thirty years after Sei Fujii, Fildrtigav. Pefia-lrala' offered
a court an opportunity to utilize the U.N. Charter's human rights
provisions more meaningfully than they had been in U.S. courts since
Oyama. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found in Fildrtiga that the
plaintiffs had suffered a violation of their human rights as guaranteed by
international law. The violation occurred in Paraguay in 1976 when
Joelito Filrtiga was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by Americo PefiaIrala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion. Joelito's death was in
retaliation for his father's vocal and long-standing opposition to President
Alfredo Stroessner, who had been in power in Paraguay since 1954. After
Joelito was tortured and killed in Pefia-Irala's home, his sister, Dolly, was
taken to the home and shown the body of her dead brother. Joelito's
father, Dr. Joel Fildrtiga, began a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts
against Pefia-Irala and the Asuncion police. Fildrtiga's attorney, who was

75. Id. As further support for these sources of international law, the Statute of the
International Court of Justice lists "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists"
among its sources of international law. The Statute of the International Court of Justice,
supra note 15, art. 38.
76. Jordan J. Paust, Litigating Human Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 HouS.
J. INT'L L. 81, 139 (1981).
77. Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 879-80.
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later unjustly disbarred, was taken to police headquarters, chained to a
wall and threatened with death.78 During the criminal proceeding, which
was still pending in 1980, the police produced a witness, Hugo Duarte,
who claimed to have killed Joelito after finding him with Duarte's wife.
This crime of passion was not punishable under Paraguayan law." In any
event, independent autopsies did not bear out this version of Joelito's
death.' 0
In 1978, Dr. Fildrtiga, his daughter Dolly, and Americo Pefia-Irala
were all in the United States. When Dolly learned of Pefia-Irala's

presence in the United States, she reported him to the INS and he was
arrested for remaining beyond the term of his visitor's visa. The Fildrtigas
then filed a civil suit against Pefia-Irala in federal district court, alleging
causes of action that arose under wrongful death statutes, the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Declaration

Against Torture, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man.
The district court dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional
grounds. 8' On appeal to the Second Circuit, however, Judge Irving

Kaufman found that torture violated customary international human rights
law and that U.S. courts had jurisdiction over the case under the Alien
Tort Act. 2 Unfortunately, because of the original dismissal, the Fildrtigas
were unable to delay the deportation of Pefia-Irala and he was allowed to
leave the country. 3
In applying the U.N. Charter to this case, Judge Kaufman noted:
While [the human rights provisions of the Charter have]
been held not to be wholly self executing, this observation
alone does not end our inquiry. For although there is no
universal agreement as to the precise extent of the "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the
Charter, there is at present no dissent from the view that
the guarantees include, at a bare minimum, the right to be
free from torture. This prohibition has become part of

78.

Richard P. Claude, The Case of Joelito Fildrtigaand the Clinic of Hope, 5 HuM. RTS.

Q. 275, 285 (1983).
79. Id. at 284.
80. Id. at 285.
81.

Fildrtiga,630 F.2d at 879-80.

82. Alien's Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.
83.

630 F.2d at 880.
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customary international law, as evidenced and defined by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ...
Judge Kaufman's approach to the U.N. Charter was unique in several
respects. First, he noted that the Charter was not "wholly self-executing"
(emphasis added). In past cases, courts had dismissed the human rights
provisions of the Charter as entirely non-self-executing. Second, he found
that the lack of self-execution in itself did not foreclose the possibility of
reliance on the Charter. Rather, Judge Kaufman utilized the Charter to lay
the foundation that human rights guarantees exist in international law, then
consulted other sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to determine the extent of these rights. Judge Kaufman's approach,
therefore, layered international obligations one on top of the other to arrive
at the international norm of freedom from torture.
Judge Kaufman noted a lack of agreement on the "precise extent"
of the human rights norms that are guaranteed by the Charter. The
Charter was consulted not to show the content of a specific human right,
but rather that the inclusion of "human rights and fundamental freedoms"
in the Charter demonstrated the presence of human rights under
international law. Judge Kaufman went on to examine other U.N.
declarations characterized as "specify[ing] with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter," noting that a
"[d]eclaration creates an expectation of adherence."85 Judge Kaufman also
examined the domestic law of various nations as a means determining
international norms, observing that the United States and Paraguay, as well
as at least fifty-three other nations, explicitly outlawed torture in their
constitutions.' The significance of the Fildrtiga court's analysis to U.S.
domestic law was that the U.N. Charter was judicially held to be a
guarantee of human rights that may be applied to an individual in the U.S.
courts. Judge Kaufman thus restored the Charter, whose human rights
provisions had been deemed too vague to be self-executing. Clearly,
further action was needed to list and define the specific rights that are
guaranteed under international law, but Judge Kaufman's analysis allowed
measures other than domestic legislation to demonstrate the execution of a
treaty. The Paquete Habana clearly stated that international law is part of
U.S. law. Judge Kaufman used international customary law discerned
from U.N. documents, treaties, domestic laws, and the writings of scholars

84. Id. at 881-82.
85. Id. at 883.
86. Id. at 884.
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to define the extent of the rights in the Charter and provide the necessary
"legislation" to execute those provisions.
The court's decision in Fildrtiga was seen as a milestone by
international human rights lawyers who had previously been frustrated in
their attempts to apply international human rights law in U.S. courts.87 But
hopes that were raised by Fildrtiga were dashed four years later by TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic.8 The story behind Tel-Oren was as
horrendous as the factual backdrop of Fildrtiga. In 1978, thirteen
members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) landed by boat in
Israel89 and seized two civilian buses, a taxi, and a private car, taking the
passengers hostage. The passengers were tortured and eventually twentytwo adults and twelve children were killed. Eighty-seven people were
seriously injured. The suit was brought by survivors and next-of-kin of
those murdered, mostly Israeli citizens. The defendants included the PLO
and the Libyan Arab Republic. It was alleged that Libya trained the
terrorists and financed the operation.
The District court dismissed the suit as lacking subject matter
jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit upheld the dismissal with three concurring
opinions. Many saw this dismissal as a retreat from the principles set forth
in Fildrtiga. However, only Judge Bork explicitly denounced the Fildrtiga
court's reasoning. His disagreement was based largely on the question of
whether the Alien Tort Act' created a cause of action or simply provided
for jurisdiction. Judge Bork found the Alien Tort Act was a jurisdictional
statute only and went on to opine that no individual cause of action arose
under the U.N. Charter (or the other treaties cited) because of the doctrine
of non-self-execution. He further noted that the Alien Tort Act, drafted in
1789, must be read in light of the international law recognized at that time.
Judge Robb did not explicitly disagree with the Fildrtigacourt, but found
that terrorism as a crime is not clearly defined in international law.
Asserting that the executive branch should more appropriately declare the
U.S. position on the crime of terrorism, he found the case nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine. 9 Judge Edwards, however, agreed
with "the legal principles established in Fildrtiga,"' although he found a
lack of consensus in the international community that terrorism committed
87. See, e.g., Claude, supra note 78.
88. 726 F.2d at 775-827.
89. The Tel-Oren court did not address the evidence, if any, that proved the participation
of the PLO in this attack. Id. at 775.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
91.

For a definition of the political question doctrine, see supra note 6.

92.

Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.
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by a non-State actor (the PLO) was a violation of international law. (Libya
was only accused of financing and training the terrorists, not of
participating in the event.)
In spite of the decisions in Tel-Oren, the U.N. Charter is still seen
as a source of international human rights law in U.S. courts. Although the
Charter is not universally accepted by jurists, the reasoning of the
Charter's most vociferous opponent in Tel-Oren is not widely accepted.
Judge Bork found the U.N. Charter non-self-executing and further claimed
that the Alien Tort Act, enacted in 1789, gave jurisdiction only if the
claimed violation would also have been an international law violation
recognized in 1789. Judge Bork consulted Blackstone and found three
possible offenses against the law of nations: violations of safe conduct,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."
As Judge
Edwards pointed out, this construction ignored the precedent established in
The Paquete Habana, for applying international law as it exists "at the
present day."'
On its surface, Tel-Oren appeared to cut against the
Fildrtigaprinciples. However, the factual differences in the cases as well
as the dissimilarity of the torts claimed (torture and terrorism) make the
two cases easily distinguishable. Certainly Fildrtiga, which has been
questioned by subsequent courts, does not necessarily establish precedent.
Nonetheless, one recent case in particular indicates that the Fildrtiga
doctrine is still good law.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
decided Forti v. Suarez-Mason" on October 6, 1987, three years after the
Tel-Oren court cast doubt on the Fildrtiga principles. Once again, the
facts of the case tell a disturbing tale. In the late 1970s, in Argentina, both
left-wing and right-wing extremists waged a war of terrorism against.
suspected subversives. In response to this "dirty war," President Peron
declared a state of siege in 1975 and gave the military the responsibility for
suppressing terrorism. Suarez-Mason was Commander of the First Army
Corps. In 1976, the Army ousted Peron and took control of the country.
The state of siege continued, and between 1976 and 1979 an estimated
12,000 people disappeared at the hands of the military. In 1984, Raul
Alfonsin was elected President of Argentina and the government began
investigating human rights abuses, bringing criminal charges against
offenders. Suarez-Mason was one of those charged, but he fled the

93. Id. at 813.
94. The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 717.
95. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1531.
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country. In 1987, he was arrested in California and while awaiting
extradition was served with the complaint in this case.'
The petition was filed by Alfredo Forti and Debora Benchoan.
The complaint was based on activities that took place in the area of
Argentina commanded by Suarez-Mason. On February 18, 1977, military
officials seized Alfredo along with his mother and four brothers. Although
no charges were ever filed against them, the five brothers were held in
detention for six days, before being released-blindfolded-on a street in
Buenos Aires.
Their mother was not released and in 1987 her
whereabouts were still unknown. An Argentine court held the First Army
Corps, commanded by Suarez-Mason, responsible for the seizure of 'the
Forti brothers and the disappearance of their mother. '
The second petitioner, Debora Benchoam, was sixteen when she
and her seventeen year old brother were taken from their home by the
military in 1977. Debora was held by the authorities for more than four
years. While imprisoned, she was blindfolded, handcuffed, and deprived
of food and clothing; one of her guards attempted to rape her. As a result
of international and domestic pressure, she was finally granted the "right
of option" which allowed her to leave Argentina. The body of Debora's
brother was returned to his family the day after his abduction. He had
been severely beaten and died of bullet wounds. Both plaintiffs accused
Suarez-Mason of torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, summary
execution, causing disappearance, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.0
The Forti court found that the Alien Tort Act provided jurisdiction
in the case, following the reasoning of the Fildrtiga court and Judge
Edwards in Tel-Oren. The court noted this analysis is the "better reasoned
and more consistent with principles of international law. There appears to
be a growing consensus that § 1350 provides a cause of action for certain
'international common law torts.'""
The court found that the
"proscription [against official torture] is universal, obligatory and
definable." The court also found causes of action for prolonged arbitrary
detention and summary execution, but could find no international
consensus on prohibitions against causing disappearance or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment."® Conspicuously absent from the court's analysis

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1536.
Id. at 1537.
Id.
Id. at 1539.
Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-43.
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is any mention of the U.N. Charter. Perhaps the court's silence meant that
the Charter was so clearly understood to guarantee individual human rights
that it need not even be argued."'
C. The 1990s
The trend of relying on the U.N. Charter to provide statements of
the basic, underlying principles of international law as they relate to
individuals has continued. In U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, ° the court was
required to interpret an extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico.' 3 Since a legal document was available, the court did not need to
perform an exhaustive search for customary principles of international law.
Verdugo-Urquidez had been abducted in Mexico by Mexican citizens
working on behalf of the U.S. government. He was brought to the United
States and tried and convicted in the murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agent in Mexico. He appealed his conviction on the ground that the
United States had violated their treaty obligations with Mexico and
therefore could not exercise jurisdiction over him. The Court of Appeals
overturned his conviction."° The U.S. government argued that since the
extradition treaty did not specifically forbid abductions, their actions did
not violate the treaty. In rejecting this argument, the court turned to the
U.N. Charter as proof that the "territorial integrity of a sovereign nation
may not be breached by force." '0 While territorial integrity is not usually
thought of as an individual right, in this instance it provided the rationale
for proving that the extradition treaty and hence Verdugo-Urquidez's
individual rights had been violated.
In 1992, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide this issue in
U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain."' Under the same extradition treaty and in
response to the same murder in Mexico, the U.S sponsored the abduction
of another Mexican national. The Supreme Court found, contrary to the
Verdugo-Urquidez court, that the United States had not violated the

101.

In a recent case dealing with the international laws of the sea, the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit noted, "the relative paucity of cases litigating this customary rule of
international law underscores the longstanding nature of this aspect of freedom of the high
seas." Amerada Hess v. Argentina, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 428
(1989), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1374, 1378 (1987).
102. 939 F.2d at 1341.

103. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
104. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at1341.
105. Id. at 1352.
106. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2188.
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extradition treaty because the treaty did not specifically prohibit the
abductions."7 The Court noted that the defendant raised the issue that the
U.N. Charter should inform the interpretation of the extradition treaty.
However, the Court did not reach the issue of sovereign territorial
integrity, a State claim, noting instead that Alvarez-Machain did not claim
that the U.N. Charter provided him any individual rights in this context."°
The Court examined closely the language and purposes of the extradition
treaty itself, and concluded that the determination of a treaty violation was
better left to the diplomatic offices of the two governments.
Although the majority in Alvarez-Machain glossed over the issue
of territorial integrity presented by the U.N. Charter, the three dissenting
Justices were not so dismissive. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, mentioned the U.N. Charter only once in his
dissent, in a footnote. However, that footnote was one of at least five
references in the dissent to the doctrine of sovereign territorial integrity."
Just as the Forti court's failure to mention the Charter may be construed as
a sign of its acceptance, the relegation of the Charter to a footnote in this
dissent may also indicate acceptance of the Charter's authority. Justice
Stevens found no need even to argue whether the Charter provided an
authoritative statement of the principle of territorial sovereignty.
III.

CONCLUSION

The context of Alvarez-Machain is similar to Sei Fujii and TelOren. All of these cases followed precedents (Oyama, Fildrtiga, and
Verdugo-Urquidez) that were milestones in incorporating international law
via the U.N. Charter into U.S. domestic law. On the surface, all three of
the subsequent cases appear to restrict the application of the U.N. Charter
outlined by the precedents. Sei Fufii, with its long-unquestioned doctrine
of non-self-execution, especially operated to restrict the application of the
Charter principles to individual rights in the United States However, the
historical context proves these cases to be less damaging to applying the
Charter than they first appeared. It is premature to assess the impairment
to applying Charter principles caused by Alvarez-Machain, as it was
decided just two years ago. The earlier decisions, however, as evidenced
by Forti, convey that the U.N. Charter is not merely a "moral commitment

107. Id. at 2193.
108. Id. at 2196.
109. Id. at 2198, 2199, 2201, 2202, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of foremost importance,"
but a document that "guarantee[s] [human
rights and fundamental freedoms] to all .... "'"
In 1952, the Supreme Court of California was influenced by
political concerns to back away from the commitment to the United
Nations expressed by four Justices of the Supreme Court in Oyama. But
over the last four decades, the Court has slowly regained its commitment
to the United Nations and to the U.N. Charter as an authoritative
document. What is the context of this renewal? The changing government
and public opinion toward the United Nations may be traced back to the
late 1960s. As the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace noted,
in 1968, "[i]t cannot be doubted that the provisions of the Charter and the
continuous worldwide debate about their implementation have brought a
change in the moral and political climate .... "2 In 1977, speaking before
the U.N. General Assembly, President Jimmy Carter said that "no member
of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely
its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to
review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in
any part of the world.""'
President Carter renewed the drive for the
United States to ratify the major human rights treaties, although this was
4
not accomplished during his presidency."
In 1979, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District
requested an amicus curiae brief from the U.S. Department of Justice in
the Fildrtiga case. The Department of Justice, with the input of the
Department of State, delineated the U.S. position in regard to the U.N.
Charter. The brief noted that the Charter "imposed on U.N. members a
general obligation to promote 'universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms .
"I
5.... The brief went on to
state that "in nations such as the United States where international law is
part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human rights are in
6
certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts.""

110.

Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 517, 622.

111.

Fildirtiga, 630 F.2d at 881.

112. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1968).
113. Cyrus Vance, Law Day Speech on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, reprinted in
THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 300 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2d ed. 1989).
114.

See supra note 17.

115. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Fildrtiga v. Pehia-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 591 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
116. Id. at 603.
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The Reagan and Bush administrations have also participated in the
legitimation of the United Nations and the Charter. Under the Reagan
Administration in 1988, the Senate ratified the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the first human
rights treaty ratified by the United States since the U.N. Charter."' In a
very different context which may have called into question U.S. allegiance
to human rights per se but reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the United
Nations, President Bush chose to work within the framework of
the U.N.
8
Iraq."1
against
intervention
military
Security Council in pursuing
The expansion of the U.S. commitment to the United Nations and
the Charter may be too recent to forecast a change in international law.
The presidential campaign and election of Bill Clinton in 1992 reveal
growing discontent in the United States with concern over foreign
affairs." 9 However, since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, U.S.
acceptance of the U.N. Charter has increased, although that growth has
not been without its waning periods. While the U.S. public is weary with
government preoccupation with foreign matters, the safeguarding of
human rights for all individuals, as expressed by the U.N. Charter,
appears to be firmly entrenched in the U.S. court system. The next few
years may not see a burgeoning of the human rights recognized by the
courts, but it appears unlikely that the courts will retreat from the Charter
and its dictates.
While fears of communism and diminution of states' rights hobbled
the U.N. Charter in U.S. courts in the past, another concern is raised
today. With increasing respect for the diversity among cultures, the
question of the appropriateness of a U.S. court ruling on matters pertaining
to foreign nationals and foreign governments arises. Fears of paternalism
by the United States are not unfounded. However, the application of the
U.N. Charter in U.S. courts also presents opportunities that were not
available in the past. Although the cases discussed herein dealt only with
foreign nationals, the growing acceptance of customary international
human rights law as evidenced by the U.N. Charter may provide relief for

117. See supra note 17.

See also Reagan Oks Genocide Treaty, ST. LOUIS POST

DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1988, at lB.
118. See, e.g., Mark Potts, Crisis in the Gulf: Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 1990, at Al; Elaine Scioline, Peace Keeping in a New Era: The Super Powers Act
in Harmony, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1990, at A13.
119. See, e.g., Michael Kranish, Little Political Gain Seen for Bush at G-7 Summit,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 1992, at A9; Leslie H. Gelb, They Agree to Disagree, Bush
Creates a Fake Fightto Avoid a Real One, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 31, 1992, at IlA.
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U.S. citizens in the future.
As noted above,'" African-Americans
attempted to solicit the help of the United Nations in the struggle for
desegregation.
Similarly, Native American tribes have filed formal
complaints with the U.N. Human Rights Commission relating to issues of
self-determination and property rights. Although the United Nations has
taken no action on these petitions,' the U.S. courts may soon determine
such claims by U.S. citizens based on international law. The closest a
U.S. court has come to taking this type of action was in RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson.'22 Rodriguez-Fernandez was not a U.S. citizen,
but a Cuban seeking refugee status. While in Cuba, he had been convicted
of burglary and theft. Based on these convictions, the I.N.S. ordered him
deported, but Cuba would not accept him. He was held in a federal
penitentiary, pending his acceptance by Cuba. He filed a writ of habeas
corpus, on the grounds that his indefinite detention violated the
Constitution and international human rights law. The district court found
that Rodriguez-Fernandez, as an excludable alien, could not claim
Constitutional protection, but that his detention violated customary
international human rights norms. On appeal, he was ordered released as a
matter of domestic law."' The court of appeals did not as obviously
acknowledge the claim as based on international law, but nonetheless noted
24
that their decision was consistent with international law. '
As a matter of international law, domestic courts have long been
seen as an appropriate enforcement mechanism. Indeed, "[g]iven the
dearth of truly effective human rights fora, national courts are the primary
guarantors of the rights of man [sic]." Certain violations of international
law are universal offenses, to be tried by a State even when they occur
outside its territory. Piracy and genocide are such offenses;' 2 the Fildrtiga
opinion adds torture to this list. The lack of international fora make this
use of national courts necessary. "The cause of international law and
justice demands application of international law by national courts."27 The
reliance on the U.N. Charter and customary norms of international law by
U.S. courts in recent decades expresses the evolution of international law
120. See Dudzian, supra note 4, at 93-98.
121.

ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1286-87 (3d ed. 1991).

122. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
123. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 1390.
125. Lillich, supra note 31, at 116.
126. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 421.

127. Josef Rohlik, Filrtiga v. Pefia-Irala: International Justice in a Modem American
Court?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325, 332 (1981).
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and the importance of U.S. compliance with such law. The potential for
chauvinistic application of human rights norms certainly exists, but the
understanding that international law applies within the borders of the
United State is a decidedly non-paternalistic stance. While application can
be problematic and approaches are not universal, the United States is a
member of the world community and as such is subject to international
law. This historical analysis of the U.N. Charter and the U.S. courts
denotes an increasing awareness of the obligations and duties of the United
States as a member of the world community.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: THE NEED FOR
GLOBAL HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION
The world has become a "global village" in which the "medium is
A business engaged in international trade uses its
the message."'
trademark' as the medium to convey its message. As the medium of the

1. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE, AN INVENTORY OF
EFFECTS (1967); see also Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global ProductDistribution--

Beyond the Distribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 839 (1994) (describing the
globalization of business as a growing linkage among the world's economies created by three
interrelated business phenomena: 1) world as global village, 2) multinational/global enterprise,
and 3) global products); Ministerial Decisions and Declarations, Declaration on the Contribution
of the WTO to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1249.
2. A "trademark" falls within the legal concept of "intellectual property." This Article
discusses only trademark rights and not other intellectual property forms such as copyright and
related rights, patents, trade secret, industrial designs, and layout designs of integrated circuits.
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof--(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide
intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register
established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Further, section 1127 of the United States Code describes a "mark" as
"any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark." Id. A "service mark"
"identiflies] and distinguish[es] the services of one person, including a unique service, from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown." Id. A
"collective mark" indicates a trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative, an
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message, the trademark becomes a valuable business asset which must be
protected from unfair competition and deceptive trade practices, including
counterfeit products and dilution.' However, international trademark
protection does not come easy because the global village lacks the
Even if counsel possesses
framework to provide such protection.
knowledge and experience in both international trade and trademark law,'
international trademark protection may be evasive.
This Article demonstrates the need to rethink and reshape
international trademark protection for the global village rather than
maintaining a status quo controlled by territoriality. The doctrine of
territoriality recognizes that a trademark has a separate existence in each
sovereign territory where registered or legally recognized as a mark.5 This
means modern "trademark rights exist in each country solely according to
that country's statutory scheme. "6 Thus, international trademark protection
must be sought in each country where a business intends to use its

association, or other collective group or organization. Id. A "certification mark" demonstrates the
use by persons other than its owner "to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of
manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person's goods or services or that the
work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other
organization."
Id.
In this article, trademark includes service mark, collective mark, and
certification mark.
3. In the United States, the modem trademark establishes not only the origin and quality of
the goods or products but also a marketing device. Reddy Communications v. Environment
Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936, 944 (D.D.C. 1979). "Businesses rely on trademarks to
establish reputation, distinguish competitor's products, advertise, and market goods . . . as
businesses expand beyond national borders, trademarks help to efficiently open markets and gain
consumer recognition of products or services." Minde G. Browning, International Trademark
Law: A Pathfinder and Selected Bibliography, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 339-40
(1994). In addition, "trademark law prohibits product imitators from passing off their goods as
those of another." Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Moreover, "[ilnadequate
Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991).
protection of intellectual property undermines the goal of free trade because it leads to trade
distortions." Id. at 277 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successfil Case of Regional
Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 817, 820 (1993) (finding piracy distorts trade
much the same as official trade barriers).
4. Yelpaala, supra note 1, at 840 (explaining that the global market demands international
counsel possess greater knowledge of related subject matter to handle more complex and
innovative transactions).
5.

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §

29.01(1) (3d ed. 1992).
6. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Ingenohl
v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927).
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trademark.7
However, statutory schemes differ in procedure and
substance, which makes obtaining such protection complicated and beyond
the financial resources of many businesses engaged in international trade.8
Further, even when a country offers trademark rights, it may enforce those

rights inadequately or ignore enforcement entirely, 9 which, unfortunately,
vitiates a country's offer.'"
During the past year, international negotiators took a giant leap
towards international trademark protection for the global village when they
completed The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 94)" and The Trademark Law Treaty (TLT).'" Although

7. Rodolpho Sandoval & Chung-Pok Leung, A Comparative Analysis of Intellectual
PropertyLaw in the United States and Mexico, and the Free Trade Agreement, 17 MD. J. INT'L
L. & TRADE 145, 146 (1993).
8. Gabriel M. Frayne, History and Analysis of TRT: Background, 63 TRADEMARK REP.
422 (1973).
To register, the international businessman is forced to meet different procedural and
substantive requirements in every country, to complete a bewildering variety of different
forms in different languages, to cope with different and sometimes unintelligible systems
of classifications of goods, to submit electro-types and prints differing in size and number,
and to pay disparate official fees in a plethora of currencies. After registration has been
obtained, its assignment, licensing or renewal is again subject to differences in national
treatment. Perhaps most painful of all, the international businessman's inability to cope
directly with all these differences compels him to retain, in each country in which he
desires protection, trademark attorneys or agents to do the necessary, against payment, of
course, of a reasonable professional fee for the unravelling of the mysteries of national
law.
Id. See also Tara K. Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27
GEO. WASH. J.INT'L L. & EcON. 327, 342 (1993-1994).
9. See, e.g., Leaffer, supra note 3, at 274-75 (describing the schism between developed
and developing countries in attitudes toward trademark enforcement); Giunta & Shang, supra
note 8, at 328. In addition, the United States uses the common law system which relies on case
precedent, but many countries (i.e., most of Central America, South America, and Western
Europe) rely on the civil law system which grounds itself in the codified law and, generally,
ignores case precedent. See Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 152-53. Moreover, civil law
does not provide injunctive relief or other pre-trial remedies, unlike our common law system.
Id.
10. Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda Samuels, The Changing Landscape of International
TrademarkLaw, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 433, 434 (1993).
11. The Final Act of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round) and
Introductory Note, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 94]. Other documents annexed
thereto are reproduced also in volume 33, I.L.M.: Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, id. at 1143; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, and The Uruguay
Round Protocol GATT 1994, included under Agreements on Trade in Goods, id. at 1154;
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Including Counterfeit Goods, id. at
1197; Agreement on Trade in Services, id. at 1168; Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement on Disputes, id. at 1226; and various Ministerial Decisions and
Declarations, id. at 1248. See infra pp. 92-96.
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these two agreements leave some problems unresolved, they demonstrate
the global village's desire to provide a basic multilateral framework for
international trademark protection. In addition, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) has been negotiating bilateral and regional trade
agreements which reinforce and even strengthen the international
trademark protection provided in GATT 94. "
This Article advocates the expansion of these endeavors to create
adequate protection for the international trademark. The author argues
that this expansion cannot occur until international negotiators view the
world as the global village it has become. Protectionists must be deserted,
and the doctrine of territoriality must be reshaped, or even abandoned, in
favor of expansion which strengthens the global village.
The author further argues that global harmonization of national
laws to acquire trademark rights and centralization of trademark filings
and registrations must occur, because such harmonization and
centralization create the foundation for international trademark protection
Given the lack of substantial opposition to
in a global village.
centralization and the current availability of computer technology, a
centralized system for international trademark filing and registration could
exist today, but negotiators have failed to put in place such a system. This
failure will continue until the negotiators embrace the global village and
initiate global harmonization.
Furthermore, the needs of both the developed and developing
countries must be considered. When initiating global harmonization, the
developed countries take the position that the trademark owner possesses a
property right in the trademark, and the developing countries take the
position that all their citizens need access to information for their
economies to grow.' 4 The developing countries confront "two often
conflicting challenges. First, they must enter and participate in the global
Second, they must structure
marketplace on a substantive basis.
meaningful legal regimes which legitimize their participation."" While the
trademark laws in many developed countries are well-established, such
laws are still evolving in most developing countries. 6
In addition, trademark laws among the developed countries may
differ, and even directly conflict. For example, to file a trademark, the
12. Trademark Law Treaty and Regulations Under the Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27,
1994, TLT/DC/53 WIPO [hereinafter TLT]; see infra pp. 92-96.

13. See 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (1994); Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 147-48.
14. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 8, at 328-33.
15.

Id.

16.

Sandoval & Leung, supra note 7, at 147.
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United States requires use of, or a bona fide intent to use, a trademark in
commerce,' 7 but other countries do not require use or even an intent to
use. However, this Article's purpose is not to enumerate those conflicts
but rather to advocate international trademark protection through global
harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization of trademark
filing and registration.
Thus, this Article focuses only on global
harmonization and centralization, and it does not discuss the enforcement
of trademark laws or other problems of domestic and international
trademark protection.
Part One surveys international agreements containing trademark
rights and obligations. It further analyzes the failure of these agreements
to protect trademarks in the global village. At best, they provide a
minimum standard for international trademark protection. Generally, they
do not address global harmonization of national trademark laws. This
failure prevents the establishment of a viable centralized trademark filing
and registration system, even if these international agreements address
centralization.
Part Two proposes that multilateral, regional, and bilateral
agreements provide the medium for global harmonization and
centralization. Section One of Part Two recommends that the Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property" be the primary initiator of
global harmonization and centralization. Section Two of Part Two further
recommends that regional and bilateral agreements strengthen and
reinforce a Council for TRIPS' initiative for global harmonization and
centralization.
Finally, this Article concludes, optimistically, that a
Council for TRIPS' initiative supported with regional and bilateral
agreements can provide adequate trademark protection in the global
village.

II.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT
TRADEMARKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

This section delineates, in historical order, the principal
international agreements' 9 which contain trademark rights and obligations.
In addition, it demonstrates the lack of international trademark protection

17. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(b) (1994).
18. GATT 94 establishes the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods. See infra pp. 92, 97-100.
19. These agreements, which include treaties and conventions, may be multilateral,
regional, bilateral, or bipartite.
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because none of these agreements provide both harmonization of national
trademarks laws and centralization of trademark filing and registration.
A. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883, as revised and amended (ParisConvention)
In 1883, the Paris Convention established intellectual property
rights and obligations in an international agreement, resulting in the first
multilateral agreement addressing trademarks. 2" Prior to this time, a few
bilateral treaties, some involving the United States, and at least sixty-nine
bipartite treaties offered some form of trademark protection to foreigners. 2
Although the Paris Convention addresses trademarks and other marks,
patents, utility models, and industrial designs, this Article examines only
the rights and obligations relating to trademarks.
The Paris Convention provides trademark protection based on
national treatment, priority rights, and registration.22 National treatment
prohibits a country from providing less favorable trademark treatment to
foreigners than to its citizens, but no requirement of reciprocal treatment
exists.23 The Paris Convention further prohibits any signatory from

20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883, Mar. 20, 1883, 25
Stat. 1372, T.S. No. 379, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 53 Stat. 1748, 21 U.S.T.
1630 (entered into force on Apr. 26, 1970) [hereinafter Paris Convention]. In 1979, an
amendment was adopted, but it addressed only administrative matters and not any procedural or
substantive matters of trademark protection.
On March 20, 1883, eleven countries signed the original convention, the Convention of the
Union of Paris, and the United States became a signatory in 1887. Today, the Paris Convention
has 103 members, but not all signatories have signed the same version. Generally, the most
recent version signed by all nations in question constitutes the applicable version unless, when
ratifying or acceding, a nation excluded certain articles of that version. John B. Pegram,
Trademark Law Revision: Section 44, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 151 (1988).

The later versions tried to preserve the original numbering of the articles. Beginning with
the Washington Conference, any new provisions which did not fit into the old article was inserted
as a new article having French ordinal suffixes bis, ter, quinter, quinquies, sexies, and septies.
See id. at 154.
21. Pegram, supra note 20, at 153-54 (explaining historical background of trademark
protection prior to Paris Convention).
22. Paris Convention, supra note 20.
23. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 2. The Paris Convention defines national
treatment.
[T]he Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of
[trademarks], enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their
respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice
to the rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have
the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement
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requiring domicile or establishment in its country to obtain trademark
protection.24 National treatment for trademark protection existed prior to
the Paris Convention25 and has continued as the basis for most international
agreements offering trademark protection. The Paris Convention has been
criticized because of its use of national treatment which allows a country to
avoid providing trademark proiection for foreigners if it does not provide
trademark protection for its citizens. 6
However, the Paris Convention initiated the right of priority,
which creates a nationally-based priority filing date. 7 The filing date of a
duly filed trademark application in one of the Union countries can be

claimed as a right of priority at any time within six months in
corresponding applications in other Union countries.' The domestic laws
of each country determine the conditions for the filing and registration of a
trademark.29 The Paris Convention does not provide for centralized filing
or registration. Thus, a trademark owner must file and register in each
country where protection is desired"' unless another agreement exists
which provides for centralization of filing and registration.'

of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with.
Id.
The Union consists of the Paris Convention signatories and exists for the protection of
industrial property, including trademark protection. Id. art. 1.
24. Id. art. 2.
25. See Pegram, supra note 20, at 154.
26. See Monique L. Cordray, GA7T v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
121, 123 (1994).
27. See Pegram, supra note 20, at 155 (explaining no prior bilateral treaty contained right
of priority).
28. See id.; Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4.
29. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 6. Article 6 provides: (1) a trademark
registration application by a national of a Union country in any Union country "may not be
refused, nor may a registration be invalidated, on the ground that filing, registration, or renewal
has not been affected in the country of origin," and (2) "[a] mark duly registered in a country of
the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the
Union, including the country of origin." Id.
30. See Browning, supra note 3, at 342 (explaining that the Paris Convention "does not
provide trademark protection across Paris Union members' borders").
31. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 19. "[The countries of the Union reserve the
right to make separately between themselves special agreements for the protection of industrial
property, in so far as these agreements do not contravene the provisions of this Convention." Id.
This allows additional agreements without violating the international agreement principle of
specialty.
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Although the Paris Convention sets some minimum standards for
national trademark laws in Union countries,32 no serious discussion
regarding harmonization of national trademark laws has occurred among
Union countries. Since the global village did not exist in 1883 and was
only in its infancy during the Stockholm Convention in 1967, the lack of
such discussion during those times can be understood. However, the
global village does exist today," but the International Bureau, and the
World Intellectual Property Organization" have been unwilling to seriously
discuss global harmonization of national trademark laws. This has resulted
in failed attempts to create a global centralized trademark filing and
registration system.3 Such failure supports the author's argument that
global centralization of trademark filing and registration will not be viable
without global harmonization of national trademark laws.
B. Madrid Agreement Concerning the InternationalRegistration of
Marks of 1891, as revised and amended (MadridAgreement)
In 1891, some of the Paris Union countries established the Madrid
Agreement to create a uniform system for the international filing and
The Madrid Agreement allows its member
registration of trademarks.'
countries38 to "secure protection [in all Madrid Union countries] for their
32. Paris Convention, supra note 20, arts. 6-11 (enumerating specific rights and
obligations of trademarks and other marks). This Article's purpose is not to enumerate such
rights and obligations in any international agreement, but rather to determine if global
harmonization of national trademark laws, and centralization of trademark filing and registration
occurred, and if not, whether such harmonization and centralization should occur.
33.

See Yelpaala, supra note 1.

34. The Paris Convention established the International
Convention. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 15.

Bureau

to administer

the

35. The International Bureau was incorporated into the World Intellectual Property
Organization when it took over the administration of the Paris Convention and the Madrid
Unions. See infra pp. 79-80.
36.

See infra pp. 76-78, 81-84.

37. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement]. The Madrid Agreement has been revised the
following six times since it was signed on April 14, 1891: at Brussels in 1900, Washington in
1911, The Hague in 1925, London in 1934, Nice in 1957 (most substantive changes), Stockholm
in 1967, and amended on October 2, 1979. The Assembly of the Madrid Union and the
Committee of Directors of National Industrial Property Offices of the Madrid Union met at
Geneva in joint extraordinary sessions from April 18 to 22, 1988, and unanimously adopted the
Regulations to the Madrid Agreement. See Regulations of Apr. 22, 1988, The Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, 1 BASIC DOCS. INT'L ECON. L.
(CCH) 781 (1994).
38. "The countries to which this Agreement applies constitute a Special Union for the
international registration of marks." Madrid Agreement, supra note 37, art. 1(1) [hereinafter
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[trademarks], registered in the country of origin, by filing the said
[trademarks] at the International Bureau39 . . . .through the intermediary
of the Office of the said country of origin."'
This extends the Paris
Convention's territoriality principal by allowing individual national
registrations in the Madrid Union if the trademark applicant procedurally
followed the Madrid Agreement and its Regulations, and the individual
countries, where registrations are sought, approve the application based on
their individual national laws.4' Without such approval, the registrations
by themselves confer no substantive rights because such rights flow only
from the national laws where the applicant sought registration. 2 Thus,
filing a trademark registration application with the International Bureau
offers a single location to apply for trademark registration in multiple
Madrid Union countries, but extends no substantive rights unless and until
the individual national trademark offices recognize the trademark
registration as valid under their national laws. 3
Although general support existed in the United States for a
centralized trademark filing and registration system, the United States did not
join the Madrid Agreement. The United States' rejection was based on
numerous objections. First, the Madrid Agreement requires the filing of a
trademark application based on perfection of a home country or basic

Madrid Union]. Almost forty countries, including the Russian Federation, China, and most of
Europe currently belong to the Madrid Union, but the United States is not a member. See
Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 441-42. However, if a United States corporation owns a

subsidiary domiciled in any Madrid Union country, then it may obtain registration under the
Madrid Agreement in the name of that subsidiary. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 36, art.
1(2)(3).

39. See Paris Convention, supra note 20 The International Bureau was incorporated into
the WIPO when it took over the administration of the Paris Convention and the Madrid Unions.
See infra pp. 79-80.

40.

Madrid Agreement, supra note 37, art. 1(2).

41. See Browning, supra note 3, at 342-43 (describing the method of filing and
registration); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 442-43 (enumerating the Madrid
Agreement's specific articles pertaining to filing and registration); Joseph Greenwald & Charles
Levy, Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Introduction, 1

B.D.I.E.L. 759 (1994) (explaining not only filing and registration procedure, but also Madrid
Agreement facilitates trademark filing in different countries by allowing applicant to file one
application, in one language, and to pay one set of fees to seek protection in multiple
jurisdictions); Roger E. Schecter, FacilitatingTrademark RegistrationAbroad: The Implications
of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 419 (1991)

(finding Madrid Agreement provides efficient, economical means to obtain simultaneous
trademark protection in numerous foreign countries and explaining procedure).
42. Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 442.
43. See Browning, supra note 3, at 343 (citing INT'L TRADEMARK ASs'N, MADRID
PROTOCOL: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (1993)).
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registration requirement." This disadvantages the United States trademark
applicant because registration takes longer in the United States than in most
countries. ' Next, the Madrid Agreement requires a twelve month time limit
for refusing to register a trademark registration. ' This time limit is too short
because examination of a trademark in the United States involves a lengthy
process."" For the United States to complete its examination within twelve
months would require giving Madrid Union Application priority over
domestic applications which would cause a longer pendency for domestic
applications.'" The Madrid Agreement also requires the inclusion of a
central attack provision which requires the trademark protection resulting
from the Madrid registration to cease completely if within five years from
the date of such registration, the home country registration is successfully
attacked, in whole or in part.49 This is considered to be unfair to the United
States trademark owners because the United States has many more grounds
for attacking registration than most other countries.' Next, the Madrid
Agreement lacks a use or bona fide intent to use requirement for filing or
registration. 5 This disadvantages the United States which requires use or
intent to use for registering a trademark.' The Madrid Agreement also lacks
a standard description for classifying goods and services in trademark
registrations.53 The Madrid Agreement increases the likelihood of increased
dead wood (abandoned trademarks) on the national registry.'
Thus, since the Madrid Agreement conflicted with aspects of United
States trademark law and did not harmonize national trademark laws, its
centralized filing and registration system could not be accepted by the Untied
States. However, regardless of the shortcomings of the Madrid Agreement,
support was not lost for a centralized trademark filing and registration
system."

44. See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.
45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.
48.

Id.
Id.

49.

See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

See Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 443-44.

55. See Anthony R. DeSimone, In Support of TRT, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 492 (1973);
infra pp. 77-78, 81-86.
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C. Pan American Convention of 1929, as revised, including the
General Inter-American Convention for the Protection of
Trademarks (PanAmerican Convention)
The Pan American Convention of 1929, as revised, consists of two
separate parts: a Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
and a Protocol on Inter-American Registration of Trade Marks.' This
Convention was the first attempt in the Western Hemisphere to harmonize
national trademark laws and provide a centralized filing and registration
system. Although the Convention provides for national treatment and a
centralized filing and registration system, it does not strengthen the Paris
Convention nor the Madrid Agreement. However, it does show the desire
for cooperation among countries located in the same region even before
the world had become a global village.
Fourteen nations of the Western Hemisphere, including the United
States, but not Canada, are parties to at least one of the conventions. The
United States is a member of the Pan American Convention, but it
renounced the Protocol in the mid-1940s. The Bureau administering the
Convention, the Inter-American Trade Mark Bureau, was located in
Havana, Cuba, but it has closed."' Compared to the Paris Convention,58
this Convention never acquired any significance. Now, with GATT 94
and other recent regional developments, this Convention becomes
irrelevant.59
D. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of
Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of
Marks of 1957, as revised (Nice Agreement)
The Nice Agreement"
constitutes an international trademark
classification agreement compatible with the global village.
When
registering a trademark, most countries require the applicant to describe
the goods and services to be protected. However, such description may be
problematic because trademark classification systems in various countries
56. General Inter-American Convention for Trade-Mark and Commercial Protection, Feb.
20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 124 L.N.T.S. 357.
57. See Browning, supra note 3, at 356.
58. Id.
59. See infra pp. 100-102.
60. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification for Goods and Services for
the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 23 U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 45,
revised, at Geneva on May 13, 1977, (entered into force on Feb. 6, 1979) [hereinafter Nice
Agreement].
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differ in the particularity of their description requirements. Thus, the
62
International Bureau6' established the International Classification system,
creating specific descriptive classes for filing an international application.
If, at any time, the International Classification system needs to be changed
or revised, the Committee of Experts may make such changes or
revisions. 63
The Nice Agreement exemplifies an agreement which embraces
the global village, but it merely addresses the issue of descriptive
classification of trademarks. The Nice Agreement is procedural in nature;
it does not address any substantive trademark issues. No rights or
obligations flow from any classification designation in the Nice
Agreement.' However, it does facilitate trademark searching which may
help to prevent trademark confusion and infringement.'
E. Convention Establishing the

World

Intellectual Property

Organizationof 1967, as revised (WIPO)
The WIPO has attempted to govern international intellectual
property matters since it entered into force in 1970. The expressed
objectives of the WPO are "to promote the protection of intellectual
property throughout the world through cooperation among States and,
where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international
organization," and "to ensure administrative cooperation among the
Unions. "67

61. See Paris Convention, supra note 20. The International Bureau was incorporated into
the world Intellectual Property Organization when it took over the administration of the Paris
Convention and the madrid Unions. See infra pp. 79-80.
62. Nice Agreement, supra note 60, art. 1(1). Although Article I requires the use of the
International Classification system, Article 2(2) allows each member country to "reserve[] the
right to use the classification either as a principal or as a subsidiary system." Id. art. 2(2). The
author contends that this reservation causes no substantial problems so long as the International
Classification system is used.
63. Id. art. 3(3).
64.

Id. art. 2(1).

65. See Browning, supra note 3, at 354.
66. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21, U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Apr. 26, 1970) [hereinafter WIPO].
More than 400 delegates and observers attended this Conference including the United States who,
prior to the Convention, had reviewed the questions and proposals of private organizations and,
at the Convention, submitted numerous proposals of which many were adopted. Jeremiah D.
McAuliffe, Prospects for Improved Protection of Trademarks in International Trade, 61
TRADEMARK REP. 82, 83 (1971).
67.

WIPO, supra note 67, art. 3.
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The WIPO succeeded the International Bureau for the Protection of
Intellectual Property which the Paris Convention created.' In 1974, the
WIPO became a specialized agency of the United Nations with its
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. It has a General Assembly, a
representative body consisting of delegates from each of its 116 member
states, which appoints its Director General. '
Currently, the WIPO administers seventeen multilateral and
regional agreements, such as the Paris Convention, the Madrid
Agreement, and the Nice Agreement.7 Within its committee structure,
two groups focus on international trademark law:
the Permanent
Committee on Industrial Property Information ad hoc Working Group on
Trademark Information (PCIPI/TI) and the Committee of Experts on the
Harmonization of Laws for the Protection of Marks (CEHLPM). The
PCIPI/TI explores trademark information collection and storage including
trademark search systems, examination methods, application numbering
systems, and classifications. The CEHLPM examines harmonization of
the trademark laws and recently developed a trademark administration
treaty to facilitate worldwide trademark filing7 called the TLT.72
At its inception, some WIPO convention delegates thought "[the
WIPO's] existence [would] affect trademark rights at least in the same of
affording a better structured and administrated vehicle through which our
trademark interests [could] be identified and debated."" However, by
1987, the United States General Accounting Office, Division of National
Security and International Affairs (GAO) concluded that although the
WIPO constitutes the foremost multilateral intellectual property forum, the
government had made only limited progress towards strengthening
international intellectual property rights and obligations through the
WIPO. 7' The GAO further concluded that this limited progress was due to
the United States government actively opposing the efforts of developing
countries to weaken existing international standards for trademark

68. See Paris Convention, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Browning, supra
note 3, at 341.

69. See Cordray, supra note 26, at 122 n.1.
70. d. at 122 n.2.
71. See Browning, supra note 3, at 352.
72. TLT, supra note 12; see infra pp. 92-96.
73. See McAuliffe, supra note 66.
74. Id. at 124 n.8. Dissatisfied with the WIPO's lack of progress in protecting and
enforcing intellectual property rights, the United States, in 1986, shifted its efforts from the
WIPO to the GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations. Id. at 121.
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protection."3
While agreeing with the GAO's conclusion, the author
continues to argue that international trademark protection will remain
inadequate until both the developed and developing countries view the
world as a global village and begin serious efforts toward harmonizing
national trademark laws.
F. Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty, 1973 (TRT)
The TRT76 resulted from the WIPO's failure to negotiate a revision
to the Madrid Agreement acceptable to the countries, including the United
States, which refused to accede to the Madrid Agreement" but wanted to
participate in an international filing and registration system. 8 When the
negotiations deadlocked, the WIPO asked the United States for a solution,
and the United States responded by proposing the TRT.79
The TRT created a compromise between those countries
establishing ownership based on registration without priority of trademark
use and those requiring priority of trademark use. It eliminated the
Madrid Agreement's requirement of home registration and eliminated the
United States' priority of trademark use requirement in favor of a
declaration of intention to use. In addition, it allowed a minimum of three
years with a discretionary extension to five years or more before
trademark use becomes mandatory. It also permitted national law to bar
an infringement action until after actual trademark use occurred within its
borders.80
However, the international trademark community views the TRT
as a failure. Although over fifty countries participated in the Vienna
diplomatic conference, the TRT was ratified only by the five Paris Union
75.

Id.

76. The full tect of the Vienna Trademark Registration Treaty format is reprinted in the
back of the TRADEMARK REP. (Nov.-Dec. 1993) [hereinafter TRT].
See Introductory
Memorandum to the July 20, 1972 Draft of the TRT, WIPO document TRT/DC/3, (July 30,
1972); Implementation of the Recommendations of the May 1972 TRT Committee of Experts,
WIPO document TRT/DC/4, Aug. 15, 1972.
The TRT went to the Vienna diplomatic conference on May 12, 1973.

Although the United

States signed it on June 12, 1973, it never ratified the TRT due to the TRT's inherent conflict
with its trademark law (both the Lanham Act and common law). See Browning, supra note 3, at
346.
77.

See infra pp. 82-83.

78.

The use of registration in the TRT's title constitutes a misnomer because the TRT

provides for filing but not registration.

See Walter J. Derenberg, The Myth of the Proposed

InternationalTrademark "Registration"Treaty (TR), 68 TRADEMARK REP. 433, 438 (1978).
79.

See Frayne, supra note 8, at 422-29.

80. See Derenberg, supra note 78, at 438-39.
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countries which brought the TRT into force: Burkina Faso, Congo,
Gabon, the Soviet Union, and Togo." In addition, the TRT no longer
appears in the publications listing current treaties in force. The author
argues that the basic compromise contained in the TRT could have been a
beginning for harmonization of national trademark laws, but the
international trademark community was not ready for the global village
which was only in its infancy at that time.
G. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
InternationalRegulation of Marks of 1989 (MadridProtocol)
After the TRT failed to attract sufficient signatories to make it
viable, the Madrid Union requested the WIPO to continue considering
changes to the Madrid Agreement which would allow Great Britain,
Ireland, Denmark, Greece, and the United States to join.' The WIPO
Initially, the international
responded with the Madrid Protocol. 3
trademark community, including the United States, hailed the Madrid
Protocol as acceptable to everyone."
Although the Madrid Protocol was similar to the Madrid
Agreement, the Madrid Protocol seemed to cure the ills of the Madrid
Agreemente for several reasons. First, the Madrid Protocol allowed an
international trademark application (WIPO application) based on a mere
filing of a national trademark application rather than a perfected national
registration.'
In addition, it extended the time to refuse the WIPO
application from twelve months to eighteen months'. It also revised the
fee structure by allowing a member country to charge its national fees for
The Madrid Protocol further
examining the WIPO application.u
81. See Browning, supra note 3, at 346.
82. See Browning, supra note 3, at 347-48. In addition, the Madrid Union wanted the
WIPO to consider how to link the Madrid Agreement and the proposed European Community
Trade Mark. See id. at 348.
83. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks, June 27, 1989, WIPO Pub. No. 204(E) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol].
84. See Madrid Protocol Implementation Act: Hearing Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Richard Berman,
President of International Trademark Association); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 44546; compare Allan Zelnick, The Trademark Forum: The Madrid Protocol--Some Reflection, 82
TRADEMARK REP. 651 (1992) with Jeffrey M. Samuels, Letter to the Editor, 82 TRADEMARK
REP. 810 (1992).

85.
86.
87.
88.

See infra pp. 82-83.
Madrid Protocol, supra note 83, art. 2(1).
Id. art. 5(2)(b).
Id. art. 6(3)(4).
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diminished the negative effects of central attack because an attacked
registration could be converted into a separate national registration with an
effective filing date of the original WIPO application's filing date. 9
Finally, it designated French and English as the official languages.'
Anticipating ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 9 Congress
introduced implementing legislation.' Initially, this legislation received
wide support from the Clinton Administration, Congress, and the domestic
trademark and intellectual property associations."
Unexpectedly, the
Administration withdrew its support because of the Madrid Protocol
provisions relating to the intergovernmental organizations and their voting
rights.' However, the Administratin had "no problem with the substance
of the treaty beyond these issues. ""
The House of Representatives passed the implementing legislation
on October 3, 1994, but before passing this legislation, the House of
89. Id. art. 8(7)(a).
90. Draft Regulations Under the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol 16, Rule
6(2)(i), WIPO Doc. GT/PM/VI/2 (Mar. 8, 1994).
91. Madrid Protocol, supra note 83, art. 14 (requiring four instruments of ratification, one
of which must be from a Madrid Union member).
92. H.R. 2129, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 5. 977, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see
Bills Would Implement Madrid Protocol for International Trademark, 46 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1131, at 53 (May 20, 1993) (discussing Madrid Protocol and the
implementing legislation).
93. See, e.g., House Panel Airs Bill to Implement U.S. Accession to Madrid Trademark
Pact, 46 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1132, at 94 (May 27, 1993).
94. See State Dep't Announcement That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1180, at 94 (May 19, 1994).
Under the terms of the Protocol, members may be countries or, under certain
conditions, intergovernmental organizations with regional trademark offices. These
organizations would receive a vote in the assembly of the members in addition to votes
exercised by the member states of the organization. They would also be counted
towards the members needed for the Protocol to enter into force, in addition to their
member states. Finally, there is no provision for the intergovernmental organization to
make a declaration of its competence. The United States does not accept such an
expansion of the role of intergovernmental organizations and their members. In other
agreements, we consistently have insisted on safeguard provisions to prevent
concurrent voting and double counting, and on a declaration of competence.
The Administration recognized the problems when giving its endorsement, but, at
that time, viewed it as "an exception to the general obligations . . . problems were
outweighed by the benefits of the agreement. But the EU recently has been citing the
Madrid Protocol as precedent for similar voting rights in the negotiations on the TLT
and the Hague Agreement on Industrial Designs." U.S. Will Not Join Madrid
Protocol on International Trademarks, 48 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
1180, at 81-82 (May 19, 1994) (describing the Journal's conversation with Attorney
Advisor Carlisle Walters from PTO's Office of Legislation and International Affairs).
95. Id. at 82.
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Representatives took into consideration the Administration's position. The
House of Representatives amended the legislation (H.R. 2129) with the
following new language on the effective date: "Subject to satisfactory

resolution of the issues relating to voting rights of Member nations under
the Madrid Protocol, this Act shall take effect on the date on which the
Madrid Protocol enters into force with respect to the United States."9
The Madrid Protocol has not entered into force because only Spain
has ratified it to date. '
The history of the Madrid Agreement, the
Trademark Registration Treaty, and the Madrid Protocol evidences the
desire for an international centralized filing and registration system, but
prove that desire is not enough. Although the global village existed when
the WIPO began its negotiations which resulted in the Madrid Protocol,
the international trademark community refused to recognize the global
village.
H. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 94)
1. A Brief History
The words, "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade," or
"GATT," belong to a multilateral trade agreement concluded in October
1947 between 23 developed and undeveloped countries (GATT 47).9" This
occurred immediately after World War II, a time when most agreed that
economic recovery depended on restoring and expanding former levels of
international trade.19 However, the war left two major barriers: high

96.

See Panel Approves Madrid Protocol Bill Subject to EU Voting Rights Issue, 48 Pat.

Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1185, at 188 (June 23, 1994).
97. To obtain the current status of the Madrid Protocol, contact the WIPO: 34 Chemin des
Colombettes, CH 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland; telephone number: (22) 730 91 11; and fax
number: (22) 733 54 28. The Madrid Protocol will not enter into force until five countries ratify
it.
98. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT 47].
99. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing InternationalTrade Law: The Evolution of the Modem
GAIT Legal System 3, 4 (1993). This book provides an excellent history and explanation of the
initial negotiations for an International Trade Organization Charter (ITO) and the Preparatory
Committee's negotiation of a trade agreement, GATI 47, among themselves, which they
intended to be merely provisional and would fold into the ITO structure after its ratification. Id.
at 4-7. However, the ITO was never ratified; thus, GATT 47 and its seven additional rounds
evolved into the foremost international trade agreement without the support of the ITO or any
formal organization. Id. Yet, GATT has functioned as an organization de facto, having a
building in Geneva, a staff, committees, budgets, and internal rules, but until the conclusion of
The Uruguay Round, most member countries viewed GATT 47 and its seven additional rounds
solely as an agreement, refusing to acknowledge an organization. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
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tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions.'" The GATT 47 provided a
means to substantially reduce tariffs and limit the right to use other trade

restrictions.''

In addition, it established five basic principles which

continue to evolve:

the most favored nation principle, the national

treatment principle, the tariff concession principle, principle against
nontariff barriers, and the fair trade principle. "
Since GATT 47, seven additional rounds of negotiation have
Annecy (1949), Tourquay (1950), Geneva (1956), Dillon
occurred:
(1961), Kennedy (1962-67), Tokyo (1973-79), and Uruguay (1986-

1993).103 The first five rounds concentrated on reducing tariff barriers to
trade in goods.'"

The sixth round, the Tokyo Round Codes, focused on

reforming dispute resolution and reducing non-tariff barriers to trade in
goods, including regulatory measures to deal with counterfeit goods.' °5
This was the first time a GATT round discussed trademark rights, although
it was only in the context of controlling infringement of trademark

rights. "
The Tokyo Round permitted member countries to approve separate
Codes, and they were bound only by the Codes they signed and
approved."° The Uruguay Round (GATT 94) departed from the first six
Remedies Along With Rights: InstitutionalReform in the New GATT, 88 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 477, 478 (July 1994).
100. Id.
101. See HUDEC, supra note 99, at 4.
102. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad:
Toward a New Multilateralism,76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 299 (1991) (enumerating and explaining
GATT's basic principles, citing GAIT's article numbers); John W. Head, Making International
Trade Less Foreign: A "Nutshell" for NonSpecialists on the Changing Rules Governing
InternationalTrade, J. KAN. B. ASS'N 42, 43 (1992) (enumerating and explaining GATiT's basic
principles, citing GATT's article numbers). Since this Article focuses on trademark protection in
international trade, the author relies on Leaffer's explanations for the principles that do not relate
to trademark protection; and, for those principles that do relate, they are explained throughout
this Article.
103. See HUDEC, supra note 99, at 3-273; see also JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT SYSTEM 37 (1990).
104. See Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral
Investment Treaties and the GAlT: Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U.
Prr. L. REV. 541, 558 (1994).
105. See Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights and
the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81 (1992) (explaining Tokyo Round's interest in
trademark rights led to TRIPS). Prior to the Tokyo Round, GATT mentioned trademarks only in
Article IX, prohibiting marks of origin from impeding international trade, and Article XX(d),
enumerating trademarks, patents, copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices as
exceptions in GAT. See Leaffer, supra note 102, at 299.
106. Id.
107. See Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 478.
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rounds because it included an intellectual property annex 1°8 and established
the World Trade Organization (WTO)' ° among other initiatives."
In
addition, it was an "all or nothing" agreement, meaning that a signatory
had to agree to the entire agreement with its annexes and be bound by it,
or not be a member country."' Could this mean the GATT 94 signatories
recognize our global village and will embrace it by promoting global
harmonization of national trademarks laws and centralization of filing and
registration?
2. Trademark Protection in GATT 94: The TRIPS
"I gavel the Uruguay Round has concluded . . . . Today, the
world has chosen openness and cooperation instead of uncertainty and

conflict. This is a success that will reinforce economic growth," declared
GATT's Director General Peter Sutherland to the representatives from the
117 member countries in Punta del Este, Uruguay, on December 15,
1993.1 Although the Uruguay Round took seven years to complete, and
"at times seemed more likely to reveal the irreconcilable trade rivalries of
the post-cold war world than its determination to pursue a quest for freer
trade, lower tariffs and greater economic cooperation," it resulted in
GATT 94 "provid[ing] the basis for global economic growth and cohesion
into the 21st century."" 3 Since GATT 94 now exists, and the United
States recently enacted implementing legislation,"' this section analyzes
108. The Agreement for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Annex IC to the Agreement for the Establishment of the World
Trade Organization, April 15, 1995, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
109. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, approved April 15, 1994, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 636 (Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter WTO]. "The WTO shall
provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among it Members
." Id. Art. II(1). GATT struggled for almost one-half of a century without a formal
organization, but the WTO now exists to administer GATT 94.
110. Other innovative initiatives in GATT 94 include the Trade-Related Aspects of
Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade in Services, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
111. See Lowenfeld, supra note 99, at 478-79; The GATT Lady Sings: What the New
WTO Will Mean for the U.S. and World Trade, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 595 (Apr.
13, 1994) (quoting John H. Jackson, a scholar in GAIT, "[n]o longer will the Tokyo Round
approach of side codes--resulting in 'GATT a la carte'--be the norm," but rather WTO will
reinforce "single package" idea that country must accept all Uruguay Round agreements annexed
to WTO, with few exceptions, or nothing at all).
112. See Roger Cohen, The World Trade Agreement: The Overview; GATT Talks End in
Joy and Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at DI.
113. Id.
114. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter URAA].
The URAA was enacted under the "fast-track" mechanism for trade
agreements, which mandates Congress to approve or reject the entire implementing legislation
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only the TRIPS agreement. It does not discuss the negotiations after the
Tokyo Round leading to the Uruguay Round and the inclusion of
intellectual property into GATT 94.11"
"The TRIPS agreement establishes substantially higher standards
of protection for a full range of intellectual property rights that are
embodied in current international agreements, and provides for the
effective enforcement of those standards both internally and at the
border."" 6 The TRIPS consists of a preamble" 7 and seven parts, divided
into a total of 73 articles." 8 Although TRIPS covers seven forms of
intellectual property, this Article addresses only trademarks. First, it
proposed by the Clinton Administration without any revision. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902(e),
2903(b) (1994). The URAA makes few changes to U.S. trademark law. Sections 521 and 522
of Public Law 103-465, the URAA, contain the trademark provisions, amending the definition of
"abandonment" in section 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1127, by increasing from two years
to three years the time of non-use that is prima facie evidence of abandonment, and adds to the
end of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act a prohibition against registering misleading geographic
indications for wines and spirits.
115. Numerous articles discuss these negotiations and the various proposals which led to
the TRIPS agreement. See, e.g., Michael L. Doane, Note, TRIPS and InternationalIntellectual
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465
(1994); Al J. Daniel, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: The Dunkel Draft and a
Comparison of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights, Remedies, and Border Measures, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 751 (1993); Eleanor K. Meltzer, TRIPS and Trademarks, Or--GAIT Got Your
Tongue?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 18 (1993); GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (1992); Willard A. Stanback, Note, International
Intellectual Property Protection: An Integrated Solution to the Inadequate Protection Problem,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 517 (1989); Robert W. Kastenmeier and David Beier, International Trade
and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285
(1989); Carlos A.P. Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GAIT: A
View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); Mark L. Damschroder, Note,
Intellectual Property Rights and the GAT: U.S. Goals in the Uruguay Round, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 367 (1988); and Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, Trade in
Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987).
116. Intellectual Property Rights, Trade Information Center and GATT Uruguay Round,
U.S. Dep't Com. (Dec. 10, 1993); see also TRIPS, supra note 108. With few exceptions (and
none related to trademarks), the TRIPS obtained its aims: "establishing adequate minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property rights; ensuring availability of effective
procedures, internally and at the border, for enforcing those rights; and taking advantage of the
procedures in the GATT for the settlement of disputes regarding the Members' obligations to
establish the minimum standards and the enforcement procedures." Id. Carlisle E. Walters,
Multilateral Trademark issues Affecting the United States, 367 PRAC. LAW INST./PAT. 67
(1993).
117. TRIPS, supra note 108. The Preamble sets forth the TRIPS' purpose "to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and
procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade.
... Id.
118.

TRIPS, supra note 108.
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discusses the articles relevant to trademarks. Then, it analyzes whether the
GATT 94 signatories recognized the global village and embraced it
through global harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization
of trademark filing and registration.
Articles 15-21 establish the minimum standards for protecting
trademarks in member countries. Other articles provide support for and
enforcement of Articles 15-21.
Article 15 delineates the subject matter capable of constituting a
registered trademark. Such subject matter consists of any signs, including
personal names, letters, numerals, figurative elements and color
combinations or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings." 9
Even if a sign possesses no inherent capability to distinguish the relevant
goods or services, it may still be registered based on distinctiveness
acquired through use.' 0 A member country may condition registration on
a trademark's visual perceptibility.'
In addition, registration may be
conditioned on use, but filing may not be conditioned on actual use." An
application must not be refused solely on the basis that the intended use has
not occurred within three years from the date of filing the application.,'
In addition, the nature of the goods and services connected with the
trademark must not be an obstacle to registration.'2 A trademark must be
published before registration or promptly thereafter, and other member
countries must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for cancellation.'
Member countries may also be afforded an opportunity to oppose
registration.'26 Finally, a member country may deny registration on
grounds other than those in Article 15(1), providing such grounds do not
derogate from the Paris Convention.'27
Article 16 confers to a registered trademark owner exclusive right
to prevent all unauthorized third parties from using, in the course of trade,
a sign affixed to identical or similar goods or services as those goods or
services connected with an owner's registered trademark, if such use

119.
120.

Id. art. 15(1).
Id.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. art.
TRIPS,
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id.
Id. art.

15(3).
supra note 108.
15(4).
15(5).
15(2); Paris Convention, supra note 20.
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would result in a likelihood of confusion.' 8 However, this exclusive right
must not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor affect a member country
from extending rights based on use.'29 In addition, Article 16 expands the
protection offered to well-known marks under Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention.'3 °
When determining if a trademark is well-known,
knowledge of that trademark in the relevant public sector must be
considered; this includes knowledge obtained from the trademark's
promotion which may include any promotion in international trade.' This
also applies to a sign affixed to goods or services, even if the goods or
services are not similar to the goods or services connected to a registered
trademark, if such use would indicate a connection with a registered
trademark that is likely to damage the registered trademark owner's
interest. 32
Article 17 allows a member country to provide limited exceptions
to the trademark rights. However, before permitting any exceptions, the
legitimate interests of the trademark owner and third parties must be
considered. 33
Article 18 requires a .minimum term of seven years for an initial
trademark registration, which shall be renewable indefinitely." " Like the
initial registration term, each renewal term must be at least seven years."'
Article 19 explains that when a member country requires use of
the trademark to maintain registration, the registration may be cancelled
only after non-use for at least three continuous years, unless the trademark
owner can show a valid reason for non-use. 'I The use of a trademark by a
third person, subject to the owner's control, must be recognized as a use
for maintaining the registration.'
Article 20 prohibits special requirements which cause an
unjustifiable encumbrance upon the use of a trademark in the course of
128.

TRIPS, supra note 108, art.

16(1).

A presumption in favor of likelihood of

confusion exists, if a sign appears to be identical to the registered trademark. Id.
129.

Id.

130.
131.

Id. art. 16(2)(3); Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 6.
TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 16(2).

132.

Id. art. 16(3).

133.

Id. art. 17 (fair use of descriptive terms constitutes a limited exception).

134.

Id. art. 18.

135.

Id.

136. TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 19(1). Circumstances beyond the owner's control
creating an obstacle to use, such as import restrictions on or other government requirements for
goods or services protected by a trademark, constitute a valid reason. Id.
137.

Id. art. 19(2).
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trade. However, this does not preclude requiring a trademark to identify
the undertaking producing the goods or services along with, but without
linking it to, the trademark distinguishing the specific goods or services in
38
question of that undertaking.
Article 21 allows member countries to determine conditions on
trademark assignment and licensing.
At the same time, it prohibits
requiring compulsory licensing and requiring the transfer of the business
39
when assigning its trademark.
In addition, TRIPS provides trademark protection similar to those
sections of the Lanham Act addressing filing and prosecution of trademark
applications by the United States Trademark office." ° The TRIPS also
supports the status quo controlled by territoriality, which allowed President
Clinton to sign GATT 94 without considering the need for global
harmonization of national trademark laws or the viability of a centralized
trademark filing and registration system. Furthermore, TRIPS requires
member countries to comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris
Convention 14' which do not harmonize national trademark laws. 42
However, TRIPS does evidence a desire to establish international
standards for trademark rights and obligations by the 117 countries who
signed GATT 94 in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994. These
countries agreed to implement national legislation to meet TRIPS'
minimum standards for trademark rights and obligations.
For some
member countries, such implementation involves a measurable change in
policy. Most developing and least-developed member countries possess
inadequate national trademark laws, and some possess no national
trademark laws. This implementation of national trademark laws in the
138. Id. art. 20. Requiring a trademark's use in a special form or in a manner detrimental
to its capability to distinguish goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings constitute special requirements, which are prohibited, encumbering unjustifiably the
trademark's use. Id.
139. Id. art. 21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). See also Walters, supra note 116. The
transfer of a business may be distinguished from the goodwill associated with the trademark.

This distinction is relevant, as some countries, including the United States, do not require a valid
trademark assignment to include the transfer of the business with the trademark but do require a
transfer of "the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the
[trade]mark." Id.
140.

TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 15-21; Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994).

See also Meltzer, supra note 115 (summarizing and comparing trademark protection in GATT
and Lanham Act).
141.

TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 2(1)(2) (prohibiting any trademark provision in TRIPS

from derogating the existing obligations which member countries may have to each other under
the Paris Convention); Paris Convention, supra note 20, arts. 1-12, 19.
142.

See supra text accompanying notes 11-18.
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developing and least-developed member countries constitutes what could
be the beginning of global harmonization and centralization.
In order to accomplish this beginning, TRIPS addresses the
concerns of the developing and least-developed member countries by
providing transitional arrangements that entitle developing and leastdeveloped countries to delay implementing TRIPS for four years beyond
the one year extended to the developed countries, except for Articles 3
(national treatment), 4 (most favored nation treatment), and 5 (multilateral
agreements on acquisition or maintenance of protection) of Part I which
must be implemented within one year. In addition, the provisions for
patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural products are extended
an additional nine years.4 3 The transitional arrangements also require that
the developed countries provide technical and financial cooperation to the
developing and least-developed countries.'" Further, a Council for TRIPS
must be established to monitor the operation of TRIPS and implement
cooperation with the WIPO. '41 5 International cooperation, including the
exchange of information, must be instituted to eliminate international trade
in counterfeit goods which infringes trademark rights.'
Finally, TRIPS
provides the registered trademark owner with specific civil and criminal
procedures for enforcement of trademark rights within each country and at
each country's borders.'47 However, TRIPS lacks a global centralized
trademark filing and registration system. The author argues such a system
would provide the basis for information exchange, and without such basis,
enforcement would be difficult if not impossible.
L

The TrademarkLaw Treaty, 1994 (TL)

The most recent effort to harmonize national trademark laws and
to create a centralized global trademark and registration system resulted in
the Trademark Law Treaty (TLT). However, the TLT does not provide
any harmonization or centralization, but it does establish common
procedures for national trademark filing and registration, and creates
143. TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 65-66. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 115, at 30. This
view demonstrates the United States approved GATr 94 due to what it perceived as protecting its
sovereignty rather than viewing the world as a global village. If the United States recognized and
embraced the global village, it would advocate the need to grant developing and least-developed

member countries additional time to conform their legal systems to TRIPS.
144.

TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 67.

145. Id. arts. 68, 71 (requiring Council for TRIPS to review implementation of TRIPS
five years after agreement establishing WTO entered into force).
146. Id. art. 69.
147.

Id. arts. 41-61.
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standardized international application forms which all trademark offices
must accept.' 8 The WIPO' 9 initiated the TLT discussions following the
lack of participation in the TRT 50 and the Madrid Protocol.' 5 ' Anticipating
an increase in international trademark application filings,'52 the WIPO
convened six sessions of its Committee of Experts on the Harmonization of
of Marks (CEHLPM) to discuss a draft trademark
Laws for the Protection
53
treaty.
harmonization
At the first session, in 1989, the CEHLPM discussed
Harmonization also
harmonization of substantive trademark law.'
dominated the discussion at the second session but proved too
Since the CEHLPM participants maintained their
controversial. 155
protectionist attitudes, refusing to discuss seriously global harmonization of
national trademark laws or even a centralized trademark filing and
registration system, the remaining sessions ignored substantive trademark
law.'56 These sessions focused on a draft trademark treaty prepared by the
WIPO's International Bureau, which addressed only administrative and
procedural matters, including implementing regulations and model
international forms for filing and registration. '51

148.

See TLT, supra note 12.

149.

See WIPO, supra note 67.

150.

See TRT, supra note 76.

151. See Madrid Protocol, supra note 83; see also infra p. 151. Although the United
States did not join the Madrid Protocol, it recognized the importance of an international
trademark filing and registration system, and, thus, it committed to joining such a system if the
system provided safeguard provisions including voting rights. See State Dep't Announcement
That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, supra note 94.
152.

See Browning, supra note 3, at 352.

See Walters, supra note 116.
154. The Committe based its discussion on a 1987 proposal from Dr. Arpad Bogsch, the
Director General of the WIPO. See Diplomatic Conference Adopts TLT, Geneva, WIPO PRESS
RELEASE No. 99 (Geneva), Oct. 28, 1994.
153.

155. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 84 (supporting attempt to first harmonize current
trademark formalities rather than substantive law because difficult to harmonize different national
trademark laws); Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 437-38 (describing participants' lack of
hope in reconciling substantial differences in world trademark law); Walters, supra note 116
(explaining that the United States expressed interest in a trademark harmonization treaty to create
business certainty and uniformity in obtaining international trademark protection but emphasized
that the treaty must recognize United States trademark law, including use-based rights, and allow
United States to enact substantive trademark law); Louis T. Pirkey, Treaty Would Harmonize
Many TrademarkLaws, NAT'L LAW J., Oct. 31, 1994, at C17.
156.

See id.

157.

See Walters, supra note 116.
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On October 10, 1994, the WIPO's Diplomatic Conference for the
Conclusion of the TLT occurred in Geneva. Ninety-seven countries and
non-governmental
and twenty
intergovernmental
organizations,
58
organizations' attended and discussed the CEHLPM draft treaty." 9 On
October 27, 1994, the Conference adopted the TLT.'" The 117 countries
and international organizations signed the "Act of Presence" which
concluded the Conference; thirty-five countries, including the United
States, signed the TLT, which opened for signature on October 28, 1994,
The WIPO member countries and certain
for one year.' 6 '
intergovernmental organizations may join the TLT even if they are not a
member of the Paris Convention. 62
The TLT contains twenty-five articles'63 and regulations consisting
of eight rules'" and eight model international forms. 65 It applies to "marks
consisting of visible signs, provided that only those Contracting Parties
which accept for registration three-dimensional marks shall be obliged to
apply this Treaty to such marks,"'" and to "marks relating to goods
(trademarks) or services (service marks) or both goods and services."' 6
"The participation of non-governmental
158. See WIPO, supra note 66, at 2.
organizations in the preparatory meetings and in the Diplomatic Conference ensured that the
views of the users of the trademark system were taken into account." Id.
159.

See id.

160. See State Dep't Announcement That U.S. Will Not Join Madrid Protocol, supra note
94 and accompanying text. Only one obstacle occurred having the potential to kill the TLT: the
European Union (EU) demand of the same voting rights it received in the Madrid Protocol.
(These voting rights resulted in the United States refusing to sign the Madrid Protocol.) See
U.S., 96 Other WIPO Members Conclude International TLT, 49 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
(BNA) No. 1203, at 22 (Nov. 10, 1994). The EU claimed it was entitled to its own separate
vote since trademark applications may be filed both with national patent.offices in the EU
member states and through the recently established European Harmonization Office for the
(European) Internal Market. Id. The United States opposed such a separate EU vote throughout
the negotiations and at the Diplomatic Conference. Unlike the negotiations for the Madrid
Protocol, the WIPO officials reached a compromised solution. The TLT eliminated the
"Assembly" of member countries, avoiding.the need of voting procedures since any voting would
be through the WIPO's General Assembly. Id.
161. See Diplomatic Conference Adopts TLT, supra note 154.
162. See id. at 2; U.S., 96 Other WIPO Member Conclude International TLT, supra note
160, at 23 (explaining that the TRIPS agreement bound all GAlT 94 signatories to Paris
Convention, and most GATT 94 signatories belong to WIPO, so not requiring membership in
Paris Convention lacks any diplomatic significance).
163. See TLT, supra note 12.
151. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. art. 2(l)(a).
167. See id. art. 2(2)(a).
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However, it does not apply to "hologram marks and to marks not
consisting of visible signs, in particular, sound marks and olfactory
marks,"" nor does it apply to "collective marks, certification marks and
guarantee marks." 69
The TLT establishes maximum procedural requirements which a
member country may impose prior to granting an application filing date, a
trademark registration, or recording an assignment or license.'
The
United States Patent and Trademark Office is drafting proposed legislation
to implement the TLT which will cause only procedural changes to United
States trademark law since the TLT contains no substantive trademark law
provisions. 7 ' The major United States trademark organizations, including
the International Trademark Association,' trademark owners, and bar
associations, support the TLT which has no substantial opposition.'
Although the TLT provides no global harmonization of national
trademark laws or centralization of trademark filing and registration, the
author argues that the TLT constitutes a step towards global harmonization
and centralization.
First, an exchange of ideas must occur for the
international trademark community to recognize the global village and to
move toward it. The TLT has encouraged such an exchange of ideas.
Although the participants decided global harmonization of national
trademark law was not feasible at that time, they continued their
discussions until a common procedure and application for trademark filing
and registration was developed and approved. The TLT emerged as the
treaty evidencing these discussions.
"[The TLT] will have a clearly positive economic impact in a
global economic environment in which trademarks become increasingly
important." 74 The numbers of registered trademarks are staggering. The
WIPO has handled over three hundred thousand actual trademark
registrations, and has estimated seven million national trademarks are
registered worldwide, including numerous duplications for registrations in

168.

See TLT, supra note 12, art. 2(1)(b).

169.

See id. art. 2(2)(b).

170.

See id. art. 3(7); Walters, supra note 116.

171. Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Lawrence, Attorney-Advisor, P.T.O., U.S.
Dep't Com. (Jan. 4, 1995) (explaining proposed legislation implementing the TLT will simplify
filing and registration application). See also Samuels & Samuels, supra note 10, at 439-40
(analyzing draft TLT and its effect on United States trademark law); Pirkey, supra note 155
(analyzing draft TLT and its effect on United States trademark law).
172.

See Hearings, supra note 84.

173.

See Pirkey, supra note 155, at C18.

174.

See supra note 155.
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different countries.'73 When considering the number of registrations and
the important differences in relevant national trademark law throughout the
world, the TLT constitutes an important step in unifying the international
trademark community toward global harmonization and centralization.
Furthermore, the TLT shows that compromise can solve differences when
the participants want to proceed toward embracing the global village.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL
VILLAGE

In 1995, multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements provide
the medium for acquisition and maintenance of trademark rights and
obligations in the global village. Part Three discusses the role of this
medium in implementing trademark protection through global
harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization of trademark
filing and registration.
A. MultilateralImplementation: Councilfor TRIPS and WIPO
The global village demands multilateral implementation of
trademark rights and obligations.
Once the international trademark
community recognizes and embraces the global village, the need for
multilateral implementation becomes self-evident. Both the WIPO 76 and
the Council for TRIPS'77 may negotiate global harmonization and
centralization. This section analyzes whether the WIPO or the Council for
TRIPS, or both, should initiate such negotiation.
As previously discussed, the WIPO functions as a specialized
United Nations' agency, administering numerous agreements with
trademark rights and obligations. If the Council for TRIPS did not exist,
the WIPO would provide the primary medium to negotiate global
harmonization and centralization.' However, the Council for TRIPS does
exist; and, it exists, in part, because the WIPO conceded jurisdiction of
intellectual property rights to the Uruguay Round."',
U.S., 96 Other WIPO Members Conclude International TLT, supra note 162, at 24.
See supra p. 79.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
178. See supra pp. 79-81.
179. See Cordray, supra note 26, at 141. The developing countries argued GATT lacked
jurisdiction over intellectual property rights because Article 18 of the Paris Convention required
any improvement in intellectual property be made through revisions of the Paris Convention.
However, the WIPO lacks a mandate from its members to revise the Paris Convention and,
further, has no funding, so it refuses to revise the Paris Convention, or increase its enforcement.
Id. Thus, the TRIPS agreement became part of GATT 94, and falls within the scope of Article
175.
176.
177.
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Article 68 of TRIPS authorizes the member countries to assign to
the Council for TRIPS the responsibility to negotiate global harmonization
and centralization:
The Council for TRIPS shall monitor the operation of this
Agreement and, in particular, Members' compliance with
their obligations hereunder, and shall afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights. It shall carry
out such other responsibilities as assigned to it by the
Members, and it shall, in particular, provide any assistance
requested by them in the context of dispute settlement
procedures. In carrying out its functions, the Council for
TRIPS may consult with and seek information from any
source it deems appropriate. In consultation with WIPO,
the Council shall seek to establish, within one year of its
first meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation
with [WIPO].'Im
No substantial discussion occurred at the Uruguay Round
regarding global harmonization' 8 ' and centralization with respect to
trademarks. However, TRIPS provides that "[iun order to facilitate the
protection of geographical indications for wines, negotiations shall be
undertaken in the Council for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating
in the system."" ' The author argues this provision can be extended to
include a notification and registration system for trademarks,' 83 but without
harmonization of national trademark laws because such a system would
19 of the Paris Convention permitting special agreements consistent with the Paris Convention.
Id. at 142. See generally Hans P. Kunz-Hallstein, The U.S. Proposalfor a GAZT Agreement on
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265 (1989) (explaining GATT 94 constitutes a special agreement
consistent with Paris Convention).
180. See supra note 18.
181. The TRIPS establishes minimum standards, not harmonization. See TRIPS, supra
note 108.
182. See TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 23(4).
183. Author argues that an extension of Article 23(4) of TRIPS to trademarks does not
conflict with Article 62(1), which allows member countries to require "as a condition of the
acquisition or maintenance of the intellectual property rights provided under Sections 2 through 6
of Part II, compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities.
Such procedures and
formalities shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." See TRIPS, supra note
108, art. 62(1).
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lack effectiveness. The author further argues the Council for TRIPS must
take charge and be the dominating force to propel global harmonization
and centralization because unlike the WIPO, TRIPS provides enforcement
for trademark rights and obligations. This enforcement will occur through
the WTO's"' dispute settlement mechanism. 5
In addition, the WTO provides the institutional framework needed
for global harmonization and centralization. As the Ministers declared in
Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994, when accepting and acceding to
GATT 94:

mhe establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) ushers in a new era of global economic
cooperation, reflecting the widespread desire to operate in
a fairer and more open multilateral trading system for the
benefit and welfare of their peoples. Ministers express
their determination to resist protectionist pressures of all
kinds. They believe that the trade liberalization and
strengthened rules achieved in the Uruguay Round will
lead to a progressively more open world trading
environment.

Ministers welcome the fact that participation in the
Uruguay Round was considerably wider than in any
previous multilateral trade negotiation and, in particular,
that developing countries played a notably active role in it.
This has marked a historic step towards a more balanced
and integrated global trade partnership. Ministers note
that during the period these negotiations were underway
significant measures of economic reform and autonomous
trade liberalization were implemented in many developing
countries and formerly centrally planned economies."
However, the Council for TRIPS must not ignore the WIPO,
because Article 68 of the TRIPS requires the Council for TRIPS to
establish appropriate arrangements for cooperation with the WIPO, and the
WIPO possesses a tremendous amount of expertise in international
trademark law, both procedurally and substantively. The WIPO's main
184. See WTO, supra note 109.
185. See TRIPS, supra note 108, arts. 64, 68.
186. Marrakesh Ministerial Declaration, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1263, 1264.
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activity, which occupies two-thirds of its 450 staff, involves registration of
patents, trademarks, industrial designs, and appellations of origin rather
than negotiation."' In addition, the WIPO offers technical assistance to its

member countries on drafting intellectual property legislation and
managing their offices.'88 Thus, the Council for TRIPS should propose a
working arrangement with the WIPO, which allows it to take advantage of
the WIPO's skill and expertise, especially in light of the TRIPS' lack of
staff " and the controversial issues ' involved in implementing global

harmonization and centralization.
The ideal situation would be for the United Nations to transfer its
jurisdiction over the WIPO to GATT 94, but the author does not advocate
considering such a transfer until the Council for TRIPS proves its worth as
a global protector of trademark rights and obligations. For the present, the
author advocates the Council for TRIPS establishes with the WIPO a
respectful, working relationship in which they recognize and embrace the
global village and initiate the negotiation of global harmonization of

national trademark laws and centralization of trademark filing and
registration.
B. Regional and BilateralImplementation
Since the end of World War II, the United States relied primarily
on GATT to establish international trade policy. Except in rare cases, the
United States viewed bilateral and regional agreements 9 ' as, at best,
187.

Francis Williams, GATT Joins Battlefor Right to Protect, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1994,

at 7.
188. Id.
189. Id.(explaining TRIPS currently operates with a staff of one and a half persons).
190. Issues encountered in implementing global harmonization of national trademark laws
and centralization of filing and registration are as follows: defining trademark and trademark
protection; protecting prior vested rights; priority of rights; status of regional, national, and local
trademarks; limited amount of words for trademark use; use, bona fide intent to use, or non-use
requirements to file and/or register; concurrent use; secondary meaning; unfair and deceptive
trade practices; abandonment; dilution; opposition; cancellation; confusion; review of refusal to
register; counterfeiting; gray markets; parallel markets; anti-trust violations; territoriality;
licensing and distribution rights; differing views of developed and developing countries;
enforcing rights including multilateral, regional, and unilateral sanctions; effect of technological
advances for computerized searching, filing, and registering. See Harmonization (Uniform
Systems), 82 TRADEMARK REP. 912 (1992) (listing numerous issues but not TRIPS); see also
Centralization (Unified System), 82 TRADEMARK REP. 919 (1992) (isting numerous issues but
not TRIPS); Effect of National and InternationalTrademark Offices Granting and/or Recording
Rights, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 944 (1992) (listing numerous issues but not TRIPS); Trademark
Counterfeiting, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 969 (1992).
191. This article uses the term "bilateral agreement" when two countries are parties to the
agreement; "regional agreement" when more than two countries are parties to the agreement and
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ineffective, and at worst, a serious threat to GATT members' commitment
to the multilateral process." However by the mid-1980's, the government
began to challenge this conventional position as causing, in part; its trade
deficit. "
The passage of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
helped to support the challenge against the conventional position. 19 In
addition, with the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement'"
and the signing of the Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles
and the Plan of Action (Summit DOP/POA),9 the conventional position
crumbled. Regional integration" emerged as the United States' new
all parties are within the same hemisphere; and "multilateral agreement" when more than two
countries are parties to the agreement and at least two of the parties are located in different
hemispheres.
192. The United States perceived bilateral and regional agreements as jeopardizing
GATr's most favoured nation principle. Article 4 of the TRIPS defines most-favoured-nation.
With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.
Exempted from this obligation are any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
accorded by a Member: (a) deriving from international agreements on judicial
assistance and law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to the
protection of intellectual property; (b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the
Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment
accorded by a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in
another country; (c) in respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms
and broadcasting organizations not provided under this Agreement; and (d) deriving
from international agreements related to the protection of intellectual property which
entered into force prior to the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the
WTO, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for [TRIPS] and do
not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other
Members.
193. Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Casefor BilateralAgreements, 22
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1989). But see generally C. Michael Aho, More BilateralTrade
Agreement Would Be a Blunder: What the New PresidentShould Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25
(1989).
194. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Can-US FTA].
195. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 32 I.L.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
196. The Summit: Declaration,Plan of Action, Statistics, Dec. 11, 1994, BUS. AM., Dec.
1994, at 10-13. [hereinafter Summit DOP/POA]. President Clinton and the leaders of 33 other
Western Hemisphere nations participated in the Summit of the Americas held in Miami, Florida,
in 1994. They signed the Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action, committing North
America, South America, and the Caribbean Basin to free trade by the year 2005.
197. Christopher P. Lion, Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, BUS.
AM., Dec. 1994, at 17. Regional integration occurs through a free trade area, customs union, or
common market: customs unions ("the CU") eliminate trade barriers between member countries
while maintaining them with third countries not participating in the agreement, and they maintain
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position. 98 These regional agreements support GATT. They pose no
threat to GATT since they constitute GATT-consistent agreements. They
require their provisions to be interpreted consistent with GATT's
provisions.'
In addition, most of these agreements include intellectual
property rights and obligations, which, at least, meet TRIPS' minimum
standards, or a higher standard. 2"
Such agreements promote a dialogue on international trademark
protection, and further, they encourage countries to address trademark
rights and obligations in international trade. They provide an additional
medium for understanding not only international trademark issues but also
the global village. The author argues a GATT-consistent bilateral or
regional agreement, which provides strong trademark protection,
constitutes a viable medium to encourage the Council for TRIPS to work
toward global harmonization of national trademark laws and centralization
of trademark filing and registration.

common external tariff (CET) nomenclature and rates for third countries; free trade areas ("the
FTA") also eliminate trade barriers between member countries while maintaining them with third
countries not participating in the agreement, but they maintain their own tariffs; and a common
market provides for harmonization of fiscal and monetary policies, but the CU and FTA do not
provide such harmonization.
198. However, the concept of regional integration is not new. Many years ago, Europe
embraced regional integration, and formed the European Union ("the EU"), formally the
European Community. The EU regulates trade within the borders of its member countries; its
regulation includes trademark rights and obligations.
In 1988, the EU began trademark
harmonization in earnest with a harmonizing directive. First Council Directive to Approximate
the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trademarks, Dec. 21, 1988, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
C 104) [hereinafter "Harmonizing Directive"]. See also James E. Rosini & Christopher C.
Roche, Trademarks in Europe 1992 and Beyond, 19 AM. INTEL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. (1991).
For additional information on bilateral and regional agreements the author refers the reader
to an in-depth article written by C.A. Primo Braga and Alexander J. Yeats, which provides an
analysis of "minilateral and managed" trade throughout the world, listing statistics and the major
bilateral and regional trade agreements.
See C.A. Primo Braga & Alexander J. Yeats,
Minilateraland Managed Trade in the Post-Uruguay Round World, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
213 (1994).
199.

See, e.g, Summit DOP/POA, supra note 183, at 12.

200. See, e.g, Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the North
American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 817 (1993) (explaining that NAFTA's approach is not only consistent with
GATT but also superior to TRIPS, and complementary to other multilateral intellectual property
regimes); Charles S. Levy & Stuart M. Weiser, The NAFTA: A Watershed for Protection of
Intellectual Property, 27 INT'L L. 671 (1993); Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office,
(Registration and Recordation), and Recent Developments in Administrative and International
Matters, 384 Prac. L. Inst./Pat., Course Handbook Series No. 94-3916 (Mar. 24, 1994).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In the global village, trademarks constitute valuable business
assets, but they lack the protection valuable business assets customarily
receive. The GATT 94 and, in particular, TRIPS, provide hope that
adequate global protection can be provided for trademarks. However,
such protection will evade the global village until the Council for TRIPS
works in conjunction with the WIPO to harmonize national trademark laws
and creates a centralized filing and registration system.
The international trademark community must take an active role in
their own governments to ensure global trademark protection. GATTconsistent bilateral and regional agreements, which address trademark
protection, serve as impetuses to the Council for TRIPS to work toward
global trademark harmonization and centralization. In addition, all people
and their governments must abandon yesterday's ideas of protectionism in
favor of today's global village. Then, and only then, will trademarks
receive adequate global protection.

WATCHING CZECHS LOOK WEST
Norman Silber*
I.

DISORIENTATION

"I prefer the way we live in my home of Krevitsonitze," the Czech
factory computer engineer named Dzhenek told me. Together we flew
toward Prague, conversing in broken English and pitiful Czech with the aid
of a bilingual dictionary. Dzhenek was going home after four months spent
in Pennsylvania, where he had been part of a team installing his Czech
company's first American export: a giant computer-directed lathe in a
machine-tools factory. I, on the other hand, was beginning my journey.
Through the courtesy of grants from Hofstra University, several foundations,
and the U.S. government, I was visiting Prague, on my way to help to
"install" a Western "export" in a city a hundred miles to the East. I was
there as part of a project designed to nurture a new, western-modeled law
school at Palatzky University in Olomouc (pronounced Alamohtz), an
ancient city in Moravia, the region that now constitutes the eastern part of
the Czech state.
Dzhenek had an illuminating, but often frustrating and difficult
experience in the United States. American dollars were dreadfully expensive
in exchange for Czech currency - about 30 Czech Crowns (Cr.) to one
dollar, when the wage for Czech professionals, including well-paid engineers
and computer experts such as he, was under 3000 Cr. per month. In
Krevitsonitze, Dzhenek lived well by Czech standards - the markets provided
food and most other needs at acceptable prices. In Pennsylvania, Dzhenek
barely could afford necessities. The supermarkets and "discount" stores
seemed too impersonal, unfriendly and confusing, and not particularly
affordable. Even the cheapest and shoddiest of souvenirs and toys that he
considered taking home for his children were overpriced.
At home Dzhenek could go anywhere he needed in town by foot or
bicycle or tram but public transportation was not a viable option in his new
surroundings. With no car, it proved difficult for Dzhenek to go anywhere,
especially after work. He felt himself a captive of the suburban block on
*
Professor, Hofstra Law School; Ph.D., 1978, Yale University; Juris Doctor, 1986,
Colombia Law School. The author expresses thanks to Richard Neumann and Eric Freedman for
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which his engineering team was housed. And he missed his wife and
children. A telephone call to home was much too expensive to contemplate.
At work, the employees of the American company resisted any
suggestion that they try to overcome the Czech language barrier to learn
about their new equipment from the Czech team. They steadfastly insisted on
being spoken to in English. The U.S. company bought the Czech equipment
because, compared to the German machinery which it previously bought, the
price was much better and the specifications of the Czech lathe were superior
- the lathe was much too good to resist. But unlike the German equipment,
which had come with precise instructions written in English, and which was
calibrated with English as well as in metric measurements, the Czech
machinery was far less "user-friendly."
Dzhenek designed the computer software that the machinery
required, and he understood the equipment backwards and forwards. But
the American managers discounted Dzhenek's intelligence and expertise
because his English was weak. They declined to learn or even to try to
figure out the smallest amount of Czech. Dzhenek was surprised by the low
level of education of workers below the management level; furthermore, and
he was absolutely astonished--offended, really--by the machinist's lack of
interest in, or pride of, workmanship. It came as a shock for him to
understand just how "fool-proof' the machinery control designs needed to be
to pass muster in Pennsylvania.
Dzhenek's enjoyments in America had nothing to do with shopping
the American way or experiencing the American work place. The fun
happened when he could interact socially with his hosts in backyard parties,
enjoying the weather and meeting American families at play and also when
his team borrowed a car and travelled to Washington for a trip to the various
national monuments. And then, when Dzhenek was about to head home, a
friend he had made in the American company presented him with a quality
point-and-shoot Japanese camera as a going-away gift. He thought the
camera was terrific.
Conversation ended as we landed at the airport in Prague. After we
cleared customs I offered to let Dzhenek share my taxi to downtown. He
was about to take the bus, and was afraid he might miss his only good train
connection to Krevitsonitze. Since I had never learned Czech and only
recently had borrowed two infuriating Berlitz cassettes, I asked Dzhenek to
arrange for the cab ride at the curb. He approached the cab driver to discuss
the fare. As he questioned the driver a short, but very heated exchange
ensued. Dzhenek returned, fuming. He told me that both of us should take
the bus instead of a cab, even if it meant that he would miss his train. He
dissuaded me from paying what seemed to him an exorbitant charge. The
fare, which had been 300 Crowns (about ten dollars) when he left for the
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United States, was now 800 Crowns. Since the taxi commission had been
deregulated, he explained, a cartel had formed. The taxi drivers had become
free to exercise their notorious-I'm tempted to say nearly universal--habit
for treating not only tourists but natives abusively.
An American graduate student witnessed the interchange with the
taxi driver. He introduced himself as we all boarded the bus. He told me in
English, and Dzhenek in Czech, that he had the same experience with the
taxis recently. He positively refused to take the cabs anymore because the
drivers were not trustworthy. He told us that he spoke Czech quite well that he was born and grew up in Texas but his mother only spoke Czech.
Thus he had acquired the valuable ability to speak fluent Czech. And he
held a law degree from a Texas school and now was earning an M.B.A. at
Columbia University. We learned on the bus ride how his talents already
were paying off.
His mother wanted to invest in Prague real estate. And so the Texan
took a video camera through some of the streets of the beautiful parts of
Prague. He photographed countless residential buildings that looked
attractive. He flew back home, and screened the video to his mother, who
pointed to thirty buildings she liked. Back to Prague, where our Texan
found most of the addresses he needed by searching the property records at
the City records office. He wrote thirty "cold letters" to owners, offering to
negotiate a purchase, in Czech. Three positive responses, along with a few
"go straight to hell" letters. And so the Texan's mother bought an apartment
building in Prague for about a hundred thousand dollars, making the
previous Czech owner a very rich woman by Czech standards, overnight.
And now the Texas graduate student was back in Prague. A partner
at a large New York law firm 'had paid him $20,000 to spend the summer
writing a "business plan" for constructing a large, modern hotel somewhere
in the city. Did I know any lawyers in Prague? Anyone in the Privatization
Ministry? Did I happen to teach or know much about Czech real estate law?
The Texan was busily building an address book of valuable contacts, he
acknowledged, because that was the way to get business done. Something
like a gold rush was going on in Prague, he said. He said so with all the
enthusiasm of a Forty Niner.
Dzhenek stepped off the bus earlier than the Texan or I did. We
exchanged addresses, but I was not able to see him again, despite my efforts
to carve out time to visit his small town. The Texan stepped off a little bit
later, shouting good-bye and telling me the name of the stop for the
dormitory I was to stay at in Prague.
Of course I got off at the wrong bus stop. The names of the stops
just didn't sound to me like their bizarre Czech spellings. So I was lost. I
paid another 250 Cr. to take one of the infamous rip-off taxicabs to my
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dormitory, at Kayatanka. I probably paid an exorbitant fee for the ride, but I
will never know for sure since I don't have the vaguest idea of where I
started from.
I.

THE DUBLINERS

The elderly woman presiding at the reception desk of the Kajetanka
Medical College Dormitory spoke no English, of course, and she resisted
any suggestion that she be the one to try to overcome the Czech language
barrier. Like vratnas at almost all of the buildings I entered throughout my
trip, she gave me a blank stare when I tried to use the pigeon Czech in the
Berlitz booklet. I went off searching for anyone who spoke English and
Czech, and so I found a half dozen students of Irish journalism and ,their
professor - who, having been around for more than a week, managed to get
me a key and a phone card. And the journalism group kindly asked me to
join them for dinner at the bar a few blocks away.
Not knowing other Irish journalists, I can't say if it is traditional for
them to vent their frustrations during dinner with strangers, but it seemed a
matter of habit for these good people. Entering their conversation that
evening was like coming into a theater in the middle of a play. From bits
and pieces of discussion I pieced together a rather interesting story.
It seems they had come to Prague under the auspices of two
organizations:
the BBC, to co-produce, with students of the Charles
University Journalism school, some radio spots about contemporary Czech
life; and the EEC, to help Charles University journalism students and faculty
to develop an understanding of Western ways of reporting and of the
Western approach to investigative journalism.
Things weren't going
smoothly.
As their first story, the Irish students suggested to their Czech
counterparts that it would be instructive for all concerned to investigate
racism and ethnic bigotry in the Czech Republic. The Czech students and
professors didn't think it was particularly useful or friendly on the part of
their guests to undertake such an investigation. But the Irish students
maintained that "we're here to demonstrate to you the job of the press in a
free society: to expose such underlying social problems, to attract attention
to the issues that should be confronted." "Well, go ahead," said the Czechs.
"But there isn't any racism here." One of the Czech professors provided a
taped interview to say as much.
Then off to the Bosnian refugee camps went the Irish students - to
record the way refugees felt about their Czech hosts. And off they went to
speak with Romani's, who are more often called Gypsies - to record their
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views about their life at the bottom of Czech society. Much evidence of
prejudicial attitudes was gathered.
And then back to the editing room, where the conflicts between
Czech and Irish became fierce. Why were they making the Czech professor
sound so foolish? Why weren't they giving the Czech professor the last
word? The Irish students were rather upset that their Czech counterparts
weren't catching their zest for investigative reporting. The Irish professor
told me that it was proving to be an intriguing lesson for him and his
students.
The next night I joined the group at the same bar, where they had
finished dinner and were having drinks. Things had not gotten better.
The Irish students had chosen their second story. In East Germany,
on the Czech border, and in parts of Hungary, there appeared to be a rise of
neo-nazi attacks and a growing number of fascist "Skinheads". Wouldn't it
be an interesting story to learn if there are skinheads in the Czech Republic?
Not particularly, replied the Czech guests: "You display a rather glaring
misunderstanding of our Czech society. We are perhaps the most pacific
nation in Europe. There are no assaults or episodes of brutality here. And
we have deep-seated and historically rooted hostility toward fascism in all of
its forms." (And, historically, this is essentially a truthful account.)
And then off went the Irish students to a bar known to teenagers in
Prague to be a meeting ground for punks and skinheads. Much verbal
evidence of prejudice was gathered on the skinhead subject. A young Irish
woman elicited venomous statements about wanting to evict non-whites and
non-Czechs from the country. She feared for her safety at points.
More conflict erupted in the editing room. Why were the Irish
students insistent about portraying Czech society in a negative light, the
Czechs wanted to know? I must say that at this point I too felt sympathy for
the Czech outlook, since I have little use for exposing open sores without
increasing the likelihood that they will thereby be healed.
But the Irish students that night seemed irate. "I could have
understood these hostile attitudes to our reporting if we were interviewing
officials of the Czech government," one told me. "But these are journalism
students at the leading journalism school in the country. They're not
learning to be an opposition press, they're continuing to be the government's
mouthpiece - it's just a Western-style government that they're supporting
now."
III.

CRIMSON

I arranged visits with lawyers and business people in Prague who I
thought could help me to understand the role Czech lawyers would be
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playing in the new society that is unfolding there. In New York, I had
spoken to someone attached to the Czech Ministry of Privatization. He
referred me to an investment banker, M., who was working at the ministry,
and who invited me to lunch when I called him after arriving in Prague.
I soon learned that M. grew up a few minutes away from my house
in suburban Chicago. We graduated a year apart, from sister high schools,
(Niles East and Niles West). His father owned a clothing shop my mother
visited. We spoke with the same Chicago twang. We both were bred with
visions of success and achievement that emerged from the post-War
suburban assimilationism of our parents. We had a nearly identical starting
point in a midwestern, predominantly Jewish, pedigree conscious, somewhat
intellectually inclined, materialistic and upwardly mobile environment subverted somewhat by the political and social spirit of the sixties. He went
to an Ivy League business school while I went to an Ivy League graduate
school. He went West to California while I stayed East in New York. And
perhaps it was the fact that we came from the same place, or were educated
in roughly the same ways at the same time; but I found it difficult to believe
that the intricate and delicate task of successfully carving into hundreds of
little pieces the assets of an Eastern European Socialist State with a complex
culture and a tortured political and social history, and auctioning the pieces
to foreign investors, could be carried off successfully any more by M. and
his team than by me, or any other such kids from our parochial world.
And yet here he was, laboring along with half a dozen others much
like him at notebook computers on small desks in an open office on the
upper floor of a shabby building in Prague, deconstructing Socialism and
reconstructing Capitalism. He'd joined the "Crimson Group," the elite
investment banking unit somehow related to Harvard, retained by the Czech
President Vacslav Klaus to work with the government to transform the
Czech Republic into a private, Western economy as rapidly and profitably
for the Czechs as possible. The Crimson Group was proceeding full speed
ahead when I encountered it. Already it had helped to transfer billions of
dollars of assets that formerly were part of the Czech state-factories and
stores and utilities-into the hands of American, German, French, and other
investors. According to M.'s sources, there would be essentially nothing of
marketable value left in government hands before the end of 1995.
Few in Crimson have any need to speak Czech, since everyone, or
almost everyone it does business with, speaks English or has English
translators at hand. "Why bother learning Czech, when Czech is spoken by
fewer people than any other major language? We will be going soon, and
who will there be to talk Czech to back home?" Members of Crimson often
bring their families to Prague, but basically they remain apart from Czech
life, and dip only selectively into Czech culture. They are part of the large
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population of Americans - perhaps as many as 20,000 - who have been
attracted to Prague by business opportunities, a strong dollar, and the
intrinsic beauty and excitement of the city. Because of the concerns widely
expressed about the contamination of the Czech food supply, however, many
of them import milk, meat and other staples from Western countries.
Crimson's legal documents are simultaneously produced in English
and Czech. Agreements are negotiated in English. The law is a brand of
generic Western commercial law that has been grafted into the Czech law
just for the purpose of making Western foreign investors comfortable.
Typical business days are as likely to be spent talking with foreign
investors and "doing deals" as dealing with Czech authorities. Much time is
spent estimating the price at which assets will be sold. How do they figure
out how much to sell a brewery or a record company or a utility concession
for? At Harvard, they were taught that valuation involved careful estimates
of every asset under the control of the corporation to be sold, using internal
and external estimates of costs of production and the value of goods
produced. But in Czech terms this would be futile. How can you measure
the value of a factory which has never produced what its buyer wishes?
How do you determine the value of a company which never calculated its
own costs of production in Western terms? Even if one could accomplish
such measurements, they would require more time and effort to compute
than the Czech government is willing to spend.
And so the Crimson Group has created its own rule of thumb: an
asset is worth as much as the last dollar that Czechs can get from the foreign
investor they have in mind, to pay for it. For example, if Crimson knows
that Budweiser is interested in buying Pilsner, it looks at Budweiser closely
to determine what it would be willing to pay for a fine Czech brewery. This
method has yielded a considerable amount of money for the government,
and a rapid disposition of assets.
But what happens in 1995, or whenever the last asset has been sold?
Where is the needed revenue to come from? "A combination of severe
personal taxes and corporate taxes on gains from properties purchased from
the Czech State is projected. A major measure of the funds is to be gathered
through a tax on private corporate earnings from the newly privatized
firms." But is the collection of such taxes realistic? "It's true that there is a
problem ahead. Since most of these companies will show losses indefinitely,
there may be no actual profits, let alone paper profits, for years. And even
in the United States, it is nearly impossible to enforce the tax rules against
subsidiaries of foreign parents. Foreign businesses often escape taxation
concealed as expenses to parent, offshore corporations. The impact of
bankruptcies, furthermore, has yet to be calculated." With his eyes tilted

110

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 1

toward the ceiling and his shoulders hunched, M. implied that the fiscal
picture for the years after 1995 looms as potentially a dark one.
If, as M. implied, the net effects of rapid privatization on Czech
society as a whole are uncertain, it is surely true that the effects on M.B.A.'s
and lawyers are overwhelmingly positive. Lawyers, in particular, are in
great demand. Their status has been rising in rough proportion to their
liberation from dependence on state employment and the magnification of
their salaries. Legal education, consequently, has become heavily sought
after.
With the new role of lawyers in mind I went back to the dormitory
and prepared to leave Prague for Olomouc and the Palatzky law school. As
I packed up to take the train out of the city and checked out of the dorm, I
met my friend the Irish journalism professor. He, too, was preparing to
depart.
I asked him how his project was faring. He told me that the Czech
faculty had been quite cordial in their meetings, and in fact invited him back
for future collaborative endeavors. But there were some more unfriendly
words between the Czech and his Irish students - and some further conflicts
about the editing of the radio stories. And so he decided to discourage his
students from doing a third story that they were contemplating - a story
about the underground sale and shipment of Centex plastic explosive by
certain Czechs arms merchants to terrorists in Northern Ireland. In light of
the objections to the stories about racism and skinheads, the professor
thought the Centex story would be a bit too incendiary.
The professor also surprised me when he stated that his students
were forced to leave the dormitory that very day. The dormitory's
accommodations office informed him that, "regretfully," there had been an
unfortunate misunderstanding about the length of their reservations; all the
dorm rooms were actually booked on behalf of others. And so the Irish
journalism students finished their radio series on a rather sour note and
moved out when I did.
IV.

DISHEARTENING REALISM

Eva, the young woman who prepared my visitor's program, and
who had been assigned by the Vice Dean as my English translator, greeted
me pleasantly at the train station in Olomouc. She led me to my boxy underfurnished flat in the back of a former Russian Army Headquarters, which
now houses the Pedagogical Faculty of Palatzky University. For perhaps an
hour or more, she took me on a walking tour of the city, with its narrow
streets, fortress walls, ancient buildings and historic churches. And.then to a
restaurant on the town's upper square. Cheerfully she dropped me back at
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my flat and told me to expect a visit from the Vice Dean of the Law School
the next day.
What Eva didn't tell me was that she was pregnant - and apparently
feeling very ill. The walking and touring may have done her some harm.
Eva also neglected to inform me that I had unknowingly scheduled my
arrival on a national holiday. And she didn't tell me that the Vice Dean had
postponed her holiday plans to wait at home, or that the Vice Dean expected
Eva to call when I arrived.
Helena, the Vice Dean, told me all this on the next day. She said
that Eva's doctor had advised her to stay in bed at least for the next month,
and that Eva would be unavailable and out of reach for some time.
Arrangements Eva had made would need to be changed. Eva had not shown
the Vice Dean my itinerary. Most items on the itinerary were incomplete
and some were not possible to accomplish. My accommodations were not
secure for the last week of my stay. Faxes I sent had not been received by
the proper parties. Not all of the classes I had come prepared to teach could
be taught. Different arrangements would have to be made for a translator.
Few of these problems could be solved easily, the Vice Dean
warned. And there were others of a more general nature. The students
didn't understand English very well. These law students were not graduate
students, as in the United States. They were undergraduate students who
had little enough background in Czech law, let alone American law. It was
nearing the end of the term and the students were losing interest in
everything unessential to their examinations.
We needed to discuss which of the series of lecture subjects I had
prepared would be presented. It would overwhelm the students to discuss
the detailed word-for-word translations of the privatization agreements I had
brought with me from the Ministry in Prague to illustrate warranties and
contractual risk allocation. Furthermore, there would be no commercial
specialists from the faculty available to attend or help. The historical
material I had sent ahead about the Nuremberg trial released a very old and
bitter fight; it might be better left to talk about this with the faculty legal
historian. As to my suggested topic of nonprofit organizations, "We are at a
loss in this country to know what to do about such groups and this might be
a subject of great usefulness, but it would be too complicated to discuss - the
students don't even know what a nonprofit corporation is, after all." My
lectures about consumer law would be the most appropriate, she felt.
I needed to appreciate that translation of law school material would
require extraordinary preparation and great care, and there was little time
available.
I needed to understand that the university administration
chronically took on more in the way of foreign visitors than it adequately
could handle. I needed to realize that there were only six full-time faculty on
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the law school, of whom only three spoke any English at all. And I needed
to know, quite frankly, that there was no true appreciation on the part of
those above, of the difficulty of making foreign visits work. Vice Dean
Helena, it seemed, was fairly tired of taking up slack whenever problems
arose. And now she must prepare a new program for me.
She would see what she could do; I must go now to meet the Dean.
V.

OPTIMISM

A broad smile greeted me as I looked into the eyes of Mirek, the
Dean. He looked genuinely glad to see me. His was the first familiar face I
had seen arriving in Europe. And since the first time we had first met at my
apartment in New York more than a year earlier, he had become much more
familiar with English.
"We are so happy to see you. Perhaps we can return to you some of
the hospitality you showed to us in New York. Our faculty is very interested
to learn about commercial law and consumer protection from you. You
know that we have made great advances here, with the help of your school
and your colleagues. We have more than 2,400 students applying for less
than 70 spots; they all come on one day to take an entrance examination.
Our enrolled students are learning more and more English, every day. We
have a Peace Corps volunteer here who is teaching our students English."
"It is unfortunate that Eva became ill, but we will find another
translator for you. The students are enthusiastic about learning about
American law, and it is important for them to do so. They are having a
valuable experience with our foreign lecturers. You know we have just
returned from a field trip to Graz in Austria, where our students learned
much about law in the European Community. The students are eager to
learn anything they can about law in the West."
"Isn't it remarkable what we have done in just a few short years?"
"I hear you have a very nice flat, and whatever problems you have
we will iron out."
"How is your little daughter and your wife? I understand they will
be joining you soon. You have seen all the stores up and down the streets?
Five years ago there were hardly any. It is incredible."
"Would you like to go with us on a trip into the countryside,
perhaps? You will see how beautiful it is here."
"We have all been looking forward to your visit."
I was relieved and buoyed to receive all of these enthusiastic
comments from the Dean. But I wasn't sure whose outlook-Helena's or
Mirek's - was the more constructive one for making a new institution like
this one work.

1995]

Silber
VI. CONSUMERISM

The Vice Dean, Helena, took it upon herself to translate my threepart lecture on the subject of consumer protection law, and she did a superb
job. She and other visitors had been dissatisfied with student translators who
had no background in the law, because they could not describe the legal
terms with sufficient refinement or precision. And so she worked together
with me to be sure that she understood concepts like "private right of
action," "common law," "representation," "reliance," "concealment," and
"odometer fraud." I wrote these and other terms on a giant blackboard on
the podium of the lecture hall.
The Palatzky law school is new but class attendance rates here, as at
all other law schools in the Czech Republic, are generally low. As at the
other law schools, the days are heavy with large lectures. Grading is not
anonymous, so students rarely ask questions that might challenge a
professor. Students seek out the back of the rooms, accustomed to passively
listening to canned speeches.
Forty or fifty students assembled lethargically into the "Large Hall,"
an auditorium originally built for Communist Party meetings that could seat
perhaps five or six hundred. Helena called the class to order and asked the
students to come sit up in the front. In Czech she told them who I was, and
provided a general description of the topic I would speak about. Then
Helena turned to me, and, as I spoke, she proceeded to translate, phrase by
phrase.
I began by telling the students about the problem of deception in a
free marketplace. I explained that buyers usually depend upon sellers, for
representations about the goods and services that they are buying. "Both
mainstream economic theories and the American common law support the
view that bargains should be enforced in cases where buyers receive honest
and complete information about goods," I said.
But I then emphasized something less obvious: that mainstream
economic theories and the common law both suggest that it is inefficient and
also unjust to enforce bargains that are based upon frauds or
misrepresentations. "If the law approved of dishonest misrepresentations,
buyers would buy goods they didn't truly agree to buy, and producers would
be encouraged to produce goods that buyers didn't want. Society as a whole
would be less well off than if such bargains were not enforced," I said. All
of this was rather abstract, but I with the help of Helena, seemed to get it
across.
I later learned, the students, found my proposition fairly hilarious:
that Western theory and law embraces the view that a seller is not free to
represent anything at all about a product in order to make a sale! Salesmen
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in Eastern Europe apparently make exaggerated claims fearless of legal
impediments. Isn't any kind of salesmanship tolerable under the new
Westernized Czech deregulatory order? Under prior Czech law, it was
theoretically possible to bring a complaint before a commission, and this
occasionally happened. However, nobody today holds the new breed of
consumer marketers responsible for their false statements if those
representations are not embodied in a contract.
I talked about representations. "Representations aren't only those
contained in a written contract, or only limited to oral representations made
at the time of a sale," I said. "Actionable representations can be made, for
example, by the distant manufacturer of a car." I opened up a Czech
magazine to a car advertisement and suggested that the picture of a car
winding around a turn was a representation that the car could handle well.
"At American common law, an individual can bring a lawsuit against a seller
and claim a misrepresentation, even if the misrepresentation is not written up
in a contract."
Suggesting that distant manufacturers could or should be held
responsible for the advertisements of their goods which consumers bought
from local stores, I later learned, also seemed unreal to the students because
under current Czech law, notions of privity that made sense in a socialist
state still apply. A consumer's recourse in most cases of economic injury is
against the retail merchant he bought from. When the merchant goes out of
business, the consumer is basically out of luck.
It ran contrary to the students' experience with the stores they were
visiting and the advertising they were encountering, furthermore, to suggest
that these claims could be tested in court. These law students are also buyers
themselves, and they are new to the world of consumer marketing tactics.
They are regularly disappointed by the quality of the goods they are buying
and regularly absorbing the cost of their reliance upon less than truthful
merchants.
I started to speak about the history of odometer frauds. "Setting
back odometers, (which I figured correctly) is not uncommon in the used car
market in the Czech Republic." "How many of you know somebody who
has had problems after buying a used car?" Guessing that everyone in the
class would know at least one other person who at some time had purchased
a used car, I had decided to discuss fraud in the purchasing of used cars.
Two people raised their hands - most students didn't know anybody wealthy
enough to purchase a used car.
I explained how difficult it was under common law
misrepresentation doctrines to establish all of the elements necessary for a
recovery: Materiality, Reliance, Scienter, Injury, Causation. Then I traced
the development of the federal statute. "In 1972 Congress had made
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recovery much easier by creating a federal statute which simplified the
matter of proof greatly, criminalized certain conduct, and provided for the
recovery of lawyers fees and treble damages. Since then, the problem of the
setting back of odometers has become much less severe than it was."
Finally, I discussed fraud as a general matter and expressed the view
that in the new social order Czech lawyers would prove to be a necessary
component of consumer protection efforts. "If there are enough statutes
which contain private rights of action with provisions for attorney fees and
damage awards," I suggested, "lawyers can thrive while playing a
constructive and important role in improving the safety and honesty of the
marketplace."
The lecture took place over three hour-and-a-half sessions. In spite
of the many efforts I made to generate a conversation, there was very little
comment by students in the first talk. By the second class, I realized that the
evolution of legal and economic doctrines and the role of lawyers in
vindicating consumer rights was too abstract to be meaningful to the
students. The suggestion that these law students might actually be able to do
something about the stings and bites they themselves were suffering in the
new unlicensed and unregulated marketplace was far more interesting to
them.
During the second class, most of the thirty or forty students who
came stayed engaged and many of them responded when I posed questions.
Others came up to discuss their own consumer problems after the class.
These problems proved to be not too different from the ones American
students present to me after class. For example:
1. According to three or four students' personal
experience, new shoes fall apart much too quickly, and
merchants refuse to take them back;
2. It seems that many small businesses are beginning to
fail, leaving consumers out in the cold and without a
remedy for services and goods unprovided;
3. Several in the class stated that theft is on the rise, and
the police appeared unwilling or unable to take action that
they would have taken under the old regime when personal
property crimes (including the theft of bicycles) are
concerned;
4. A student talked about his unhappy experience trying to
return goods that were sold to him as appropriate for his
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needs (an audio speaker) but which proved to be
unsatisfactory;
5. Students talked about being denied refunds or
replacements for defective goods simply because they had
no receipt; since it is still almost exclusively a cash
economy, there are few other ways to prove a purchase.
Consumer grievances in the new Czech economy are real, and they are
growing more severe.
My third consumer lecture concerned a problem which surely will
emerge for Czechs in the near future: checking accounts and credit cards.
Although the acceptance of credit cards is ubiquitous in Prague, only one
store in the whole city of Olomouc accepted VISA card payments during the
time I was there. Nonetheless, it is apparent that within a short time Czechs
will have their own debit and credit cards. I talked about the benefits
involved in credit, and the legal issues that would be raised by a growing
credit card debt: usury regulations, mandating accurate credit card charge
disclosures, barring discrimination in granting credit to women and
minorities, preventing telemarketing frauds, and forestalling personal
bankruptcies.
The students were very interested in most of this discussion about
credit. After class, one of them came up to tell me he was travelling to New
York, and he had only cash and no credit card. He had heard on CNN that
New York merchants would not let some consumers buy items with cash but
insisted on credit cards. I told him not to worry; he had confused the credit
card phenomenon with a federal tax law which required car dealers to record
the name of those who pay for a car or boat with more than $10,000 in cash.
Another student had heard somewhere that cash customers were going to be
charged more than credit customers in absolute terms in some places and felt
that this was a kind of discrimination that should be prohibited. I told her
that while it was common for cash customers to subsidize credit card
customers by paying an identical price for goods, I was unaware of the
existence of the practice of cash customers being charged more for goods
and could not envision it happening.
At the end of my last consumer lecture, I suggested that students
seek out honest representations about products, and that they try to obtain
reasonable consumer regulations and disclosure laws in Czech consumer
markets which have become increasingly chaotic. I left them with a copy of
a Consumer Transactions lawbook, a compilation of consumer statutes, the
Consumer Reports Buying Guide, and best wishes.
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VII. WADING WARILY

What amazes me still is how quickly the law school developed its
own identity and a strong presence within the University. Despite a great
deal of Western "influence," and despite the intensity of its gaze West, the
identity of the law school is fundamentally un-Western in its outlook: so
Czech in its approach to making faculty appointments; in its approach to
teaching; in its approach to examining students; and in its approach to
defining the curriculum. Although the University's Rector would like to
move faster, Palatzky University is wading very gingerly into the Western
academic ocean.
By the time I left the law school I came to feel that I had given it a
wee, incremental assist, by teaching, offering help in composing grant
requests, and providing some advice to the Rector of the University about
American law. My inner reaction, however, often resembled the engineer
Dzhenek's response to consulting in Pennsylvania: With so much useful
knowledge to share, why wasn't there more eagerness to listen?
I believe that in my educational zeal, in one way or another, I
revealed a great deal of obtuseness toward Czech culture and social
behavior. So did most of the other Westerners I encountered--including M.
in his economic planning and the Irish in their efforts at journalistic reform.
However well-intentioned we were, this obtuseness no doubt contributes to
widespread reticence and well-placed skepticism about the wisdom of our
approaches.
It is possible to estimate the prospects for the Country as a whole,
but not with any confidence. If the Czechs can continue to tap two forceful
dimensions of their character that I encountered, they will make the
necessary transformations of the Czech economic and legal systems. They
will need the liberal spirit of the optimists like Mirek, who vividly see how
far they have come. They also need the pragmatic coolness of realists like
Helena, who recognize immediately the difficulty of taking even the smallest
steps.
Sustaining hope and realism simultaneously, however, is not an easy
task-not anywhere today in Eastern Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

The right of all peoples to self-determination has been one of the
most vigorously promoted and widely accepted contemporary norms of
international law.' There is no clear consensus, however, as to what the
meaning and content of that right is, and it has gained the distinction of
"being one of the most confused expressions in the lexicon of international
relations."2 The meaning of the principle is as vague and imprecise today
as it was when, after World War I, President Woodrow Wilson told a
cheering session of Congress that "self-determination" is"an imperative
principle of action."3 Lee Bucheit used the following analogy to describe
the principle of self-determination:
As a descriptive phrage the title "Holy Roman Empire"
was defective, Voltaire noted, inasmuch as it denoted an
entity neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. As a legal
term of art, "the right to self-determination" fails in much
the same fashion. The expression itself gives no clue to
the nature of the self that is to be determined; nor does it
provide any enlightenment concerning the process of
determination or the source and extent of the self's putative
right to this process."
This paper will explore the principle of self-determination by
examining its development over time from Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen
Points to its modem day meaning as expressed by the United Nation's 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations. Once the principle has been explored, a
modem interpretation of self-determination will be explained in the context
of the recent break-up of Yugoslavia.

II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELFDETERMINATION DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The historical and current development of the right to selfdetermination shows that it has become one of the most
important and dynamic concepts in contemporary
1. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 27 (1990).
2.

AND SELF-DETERMINATION:

THE

W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW vii (1977).

3. George F. Will, Bedeviled by Ethnicity, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1989, at 47; see also
HANNUM, supra note 1, at 27.
4. LEE C. BUCHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 9 (1978).
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international life and that it exercises a profound influence
on the political, legal, economic, social and cultural
planes, in the matter of fundamental human rights and on
the life and fate of peopleg and individuals.'

The historical development of self-determination during this
century can be divided into two distinct periods: the post-World War I
period of nationalism and the post-World War II period of decolonization.6
A. Post-World War I
The first World War is sometimes referred to as the "war of selfdetermination."'
President Woodrow Wilson claimed that the Allies'
objective was to free the many small naionalities of Europe from the
domination of the Germans and the Russians. Wilson identified the
honorable aim of the war as the achievement of self-determination for these
trapped nationalities In an address to Congress in May of 1917, Wilson
declared, "No peace can last or ought to last, which does not accept the
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of
the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."9
The realization of Wilson's idealistic vision of self-determination
and self-government for all peoples required a victory against the
aggressors of Europe. 0 He made this clear on January 8, 1918, when he
announced the goals of World War I in his Fourteen Point Plan to a joint
session of Congress. Although the term-"self-determination" was never
specifically mentioned in Wilson's Fourteen Points, seven out of the
fourteen points embodied the principle." Wilson, however, would not see

5. Aureliu Cristescu, The Study of the Historical and Current Development of the Right to
Self-Determination para. 679, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1980). Mr. Cristescu was the
special reporter of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. His report was authorized by the Economic and Social Council in 1974 (Res.
1865[LVI]).
6. Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the InternationalLaw of
Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia'sRight to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
213, 221 (1992).
7.

UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE,

SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11

(1972).
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 14 (citing J.B. SCOTT, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
52 (1921)).
10. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 14.
11. Id. at 18.
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his idealistic vision fulfilled by the Allies' World War I victory. The goal
of the war-self-determination for all the oppressed nationalities--could
not be fully achieved in the aftermath of the war.
At the peace conference following the Allied victory, President
Wilson and the other world leaders redrew the boundaries of Europe and
confirmed the independence of certain territories formerly dominated by
their stronger neighbors. 2 Due to many agreements entered into after the
war, however, they could not give all the individual nationalities the right to
self-determination. Consequently, many of the newly created states
contained groups of minorities who were now, for one reason or another,
worse off than they had been before separation.'"
In addition, Wilson and the other world leaders realized that they
could not extend the right of self-determination beyond the confines of
Europe without greatly disturbing the world order. Wilson realized that his
idealistic goal of self-government for all peoples was over ambitious and
that he had stretched the principle of self-determination too far. The Allies
and the League of Nations subsequently denied the application of selfdetermination principles to colonial territories which were held by the
Allies. 4 Because of World War I, the principle of self-determination was
push to the forefront of international politics.
B. Post-World War II
The second major historical period important to the development of
the principle of self-determination is the post-World War II era. Since 1945
the principle of self-determination primarily has been used to provide a
legal basis for the process of decolonization.' 5 The United Nations ("UN")
has successfully used the principle to justify its unequivocal stand against
colonialism, and has worked diligently to achieve the independence of
peoples under colonial rule. 6 The UN, however, has been far from clear
regarding whether the right to self-determination should be extended
12. Id. at 22.
13. For example, the redrawing of a border often resulted in splitting up a minority group
or placing a minority group within a larger majority, thereby giving that group an even smaller
minority presence than they had previously. The world leaders may have assumed that they had
the knowledge and the foresight to divide Europe properly; the divisions they made, however, are
the cause of many of today's problems in central Europe. See Will, supra note 3, for a discussion
of the carving up of Europe at the Versailles peace conference.
14. UMOZURIKE, supra note 7, at 22. President Woodrow Wilson said that "lilt was not
within the privilege of the conference of peace to act upon the right of peoples except those who
had been included in the territories of the defeated empires." Id.
15. BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 16.
16. Id. at 17.
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beyond the colonial context and used as a basis for allowing the secession
of oppressed minority groups within an independent state.'7
The UN and other international governmental organizations
("IGOs") are reluctant to recognize the right of secession as a part of the
principle of self-determination because by doing so, they would be inviting
or justifying "attacks on the unity and integrity of their own member
states."' 8 Colonial self-determination does not invite this political danger. 19
The fact that the UN wholly embraces the right of colonial selfdetermination but not the right to secession highlights that the two concepts
are not equivalent. The self-determination/secession distinction is at the
heart of the majority of self-determination debates taking place today.2"
III. UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION - THE CONTEMPORARY VIEW
United Nations agreements form the core of the contemporary
interpretation of the principle of self-determination. The United Nations
has also been the primary arena in which the claims and counterclaims of
self-determination have been advanced and debated.2
In the practice of the UN, the principle of self-determination has
been recognized to mean that all peoples have the right to determine freely

17. Id. Applying the principle of self-determination in the colonial context appears to be a
politically more salient alternative than applying it to the right of secession. Id. Whether or not
a group is recognized as a colony under international law is a reflection of historical luck and
political circumstances rather than a reflection of reality. See A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES
BEFORE THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 73 (John Tessitore & Susan
Woolfson eds., 1991).
18.

ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS 23 (1991).
19. BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 7.
20. The problems concerning the self-determination/secession distinction are complex and
far-reaching. For example, if every nationality that existed within a nation state had the right to
secede, there would be a huge upset in the balance of power in the U.N. General Assembly.
Consider the following excerpt by John Quigley:
Tanzania, though not a large state, includes 120 nationalities, each with its own
territory, language culture, and traditions .

. .

. If Tanzania were to divide along

nationality lines, these nation-states would outvote a combined Europe and North
American constituency in the U.N. General Assembly. If the same development
occurred elsewhere in Africa, the world community would have a majority of African
states.
John Quigley, Prospectsfor the InternationalRule of Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 311,
316 (1991).
21. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 2, at 39.
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their own sociopolitical and economic circumstance."
Among the UN
documents reflecting this position are the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 3 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (the "1960 Declaration");' the two covenants on
human rights-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights; " the
Definition of Aggression; 6 and the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (the "1970
Declaration").

A. The United Nations Charter
The UN Charter expressly mentions

the principle of self-

determination in articles 1(2)28 and 55.29 The UN Charter also acknowledges

the principle in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII by imposing upon the trustee
states of Non Self-Governing and Trust Territories the obligation to help
those territories achieve self-government.'
Although the UN Charter
embraces the notion of self-determination, it contains surprisingly little

22.

CHRISTOPHER 0.

QUAYE,

LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 213

(1991).
23. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71, 75 (1948).
24. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR Comm., Sess. Supp. No. 21, at 166, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter the 1960 Declaration].
25. Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
26. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
27. G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 66, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1970) [hereinafter 1970 Declaration].
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 2. Article 1(2) states that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is to "[to] develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures
to strengthen universal peace. " Id.
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote: . ..universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id.
30.

See,

e.g.,

U.N.

CHARTER art.

73(b)

(explaining that members assuming the

responsibility for the administration of a territory must assist the people in the "progressive
development of their free political institutions").
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information about it." Therefore, an examination of other pertinent UN
documents is necessary to understand the principle of self-determination
and its contemporary interpretation.
B. The 1960 Declaration
The 1960 Declaration proclaimed unconditionally that colonialism
must end.
It declared that "[a]ll peoples have the right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic social and cultural development."32
This reaffirmation of the right of peoples to self-determination was
extremely important because the principle of self-determination was to
"constitute the driving force in the decolonization activities undertaken by
the United Nations."33 In addition to reaffirming the principle of selfdetermination, the 1960 Declaration in combination with the International
Covenants on Human Rights" provides the basis for the "unquestioned
acceptance in international law" of the fact that the right to selfdetermination applies only to peoples under colonial and alien domination.35
The concept of "peoples" encompasses "a specific type of human
community sharing a common desire to establish an entity capable of
functioning to ensure a common future."'' Under contemporary notions of
international law, this concept of peoples has not been extended to include
minorities;3' thus minorities do not have the right to self-determination.38

31.

QUAYE, supra note 22, at 213.

32.

1960 Declaration, supra note 24, at pmbl., para. 2.

33.

Cristescu, supra note 5, at para. 682.

34.

See supra note 25.

35. Hector Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United
Nations Resolutions 11979 U.N. Sales No. E. 79 XIV 5 para. 56. Mr. Espiell was the special

reporter for the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. His report sets out the definition, scope, and legal nature of the right of peoples
under colonial domination to self-determination, and the means by which the international
community has monitored and promoted that right. See EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1333 (1991).

36. Espiell, supra note 35, at para. 56.
37.

Id.

38.

Id.
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C. The 1970 Declaration
1. Generally
The United Nations has established that the principle of selfdetermination is primarily, if not exclusively, a vehicle for decolonization,
not a justification of secession.39 "The right does not apply to peoples
already organized in the form of a State which are not under alien
domination."' The theoretical basis for this anti-secession position is that
secession disrupts the borders and the political structures of independent
states. Consequently, the principles of territorial and political integrity,
embodied in the majority of UN documents addressing self-determination,
are violated.
This pure and restrictive interpretation of the principle of selfdetermination was not shared unanimously by the members of the UN.
Some members felt that a more liberal interpretation should be adopted that
would allow the right of self-determination to extend beyond the colonial
context. The UN attempted to clarify the meaning of self-determination and
resolve the differences between its members in the 1970 Declaration.
The differing opinions of the UN members about the principle of
self-determination were evident from the discussions and meetings which
preceded the drafting of the 1970 Declaration."1 The majority of the
members expressed their belief that secession should not be recognized as a
The 1970 Declaration is
legitimate form of self-determination. '
representative of this majority view; however, it also contains specific
language which extends the right of self-determination beyond the realm of
traditional colonial domination and recognizes that in some situations
groups suffering oppression within an independent state may have the right
to seek self-determination. "3
The 1970 Declaration advances the theory that if colonial and alien
domination exists under a guise of national unity, then the group of peoples
39. Id. at para. 60; BUCHErr, supra note 4,at 87.
40. Espiell, supra note 35, at para. 60.
41.

See BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 88-92.

For example, the Polish government, as did the

majority of Eastern Bloc countries, felt that the right to secession was inherent in the right to
self-determination. Id. at 88-89. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, felt that selfdetermination was a political principle, not a legal right, and that the U.N. Charter was not
meant to be a basis on which a province could claim a right to secede from an independent state.
The United Kingdom feared that if the right to secession was incorporated into the principle of
self-determination, then Wales could conceivably secede from England. Id. at 89.
42. Id. at 90.
43. See Espiell, supra note 35, at para. 60.
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subject to this domination have the same right to self-determination as do
traditionally defined colonial peoples."
The 1970 Declaration
simultaneously protects the concept of territorial integrity for independent
states and the right of self-determination for this special group of peoples.
The Declaration protects both concepts by reaffirming the need to preserve
the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent States, but imposing on
States the requirement that they must be "possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour."'45
This interpretation of the 1970 Declaration appears to be crucial to
an understanding of the modem concept of self-determination.
The
following is a detailed analysis of that portion of the 1970 Declaration
which directly addresses the principle of self-determination of peoples.
2. The Self-Determination Section of the 1970 Declaration
The 1970 Declaration contains a separate section on the principle of
self-determination entitled:
"The principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples" (the "Self-Determination Section").4 The SelfDetermination Section is an attempt to codify the principle of selfdetermination and reconcile the divergent opinions that were expressed by
the members during the drafting phrase of the 1970 Declaration.4" The
following paragraphs describe the content of various parts of the SelfDetermination Section.
Paragraph one of the Self-Determination Section emphasizes that
self-determination is a right and not a mere political concept." Paragraph
two imposes the duty on every state to promote equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples. In addition, paragraph two differentiates between
the denial of human rights and the denial of the right to self-determination
by stating that "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of equal rights and selfdetermination], as well as a denial of fundamental human rights."49
Paragraph three reiterates the principle that every state is to promote respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting The Self-Determination Section of the 1970 Declaration, para. 7).
46. 1970 Declaration, supra note 27. [For the convenience of the reader, the text of the
Self-Determination Section has been reproduced in the Appendix.]
47. BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 90-91. See 1970 Declaration, supra note 27.
48. BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 91.
49. 1970 Declaration, supra note 27, at para. 2.
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Paragraph four sets out the four modes by which people may assert
their right to self-determination: (1) the establishment of a sovereign or
independent state, (2) the free association with an independent state, (3) the
integration with an independent state, or (4) the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people.' It is important to note that
this implementation provision is addressed to the people themselves rather
than to states or nations, thereby implying that there is a right to selfimplementation by a "people."'"
Paragraph five imposes a duty on states to refrain from using force
to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination and entitles people
that are subject to such forcible action on the part of a state to receive
support in their endeavor to resist that force. Paragraph six gives a colony
or other non-self-governing territory a distinct and separate status from the
state that is administering it.
Finally, and most importantly, paragraph seven appears to
recognize that secession may be a legitimate option under certain
circumstances. The paragraph is divided into three parts. The first part
reaffirms the principle of territorial integrity expressed in the 1960
Declaration. 3 It warns that nothing in the preceding paragraphs should be
construed as authorizing or encouraging the dismemberment or impairment
of the territorial or political unity of sovereign and independent states. A
similar admonishment is made in paragraph eight which directs states to
refrain from actions which are aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and territorial integrity of any other state or country."
Paragraph seven implies, however, that only those states "conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples described above" will enjoy this "guarantee" of
sanctity for its borders and political unity.5 The final phrase of paragraph
seven implies that a state will be in "compliance" and therefore protected
against violations of its territorial integrity and political unity if its

50. Id.at para. 4.
51. BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 92. "However, when the People and the Nation are one and
the same, and when a people has established itself as a State, clearly that Nation and that State
are, as forms or manifestations of the same People, implicitly entitled to the right of selfdetermination. " Espiell, supra note 35, at para. 56.
52.

BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 92.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55. Id.at92-93.
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government is representative of "the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed, or color."'
The notion expressed in this final clause of paragraph seven derives
from the beliefs of Woodrow Wilson that government gains its legitimacy
from the consent of the governed, and that consent cannot be forthcoming
unless it is given by all segments of the population." This consent-of-thegoverned concept has been interpreted to mean that if a government is not
representative of the whole people it is illegitimate and in violation of the
principle of self-determination.
This illegitimate character of the
government serves in turn to legitimize "action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity" of the
state which is violating the principle." In other words, the fact that a
government is unrepresentative may provide an oppressed group within a
state with the justification for their secession from that state.
An
unrepresentative or abusive government will be viewed as if it were a
colonial power; therefore, the people under its "colonial" rule will have the
right to self-determination. The Self-Determination Section of the 1970
Declaration appears to establish that a denial of political freedom and/or
human rights is the sine qua non for a valid separatist claim by an oppressed
group within an independent state.59
IV. THE RECOGNITION OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: A MODERN APPLICATION OF THE SELFDETERMINATION SECTION OF THE 1970 DECLARATION
The recent recognition of the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina (the "Provinces") from Yugoslavia by the UN ° can be
explained in terms of the "pseudo-colonial" theory which was expressed in
the Self-Determination Section.
A. Background
Yugoslavia originated in 1918 as a State of three peoples (Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes) and emerged after World War II as a federation of six

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 93.
BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 93; see also text accompanying note 9.
BUCHEIT, supra note 4, at 93.
Id. at 94.
See Josh Friedman, U.N. Admits Ex-Yugoslavs, NEWSDAY, May 23, 1992, at 8.
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republics and two autonomous provinces.6' Eight of the major ethnic
populations live in areas that roughly correspond to the political boundaries
of eachofederation. The names of the republics generally correspond with
the ethnic groups that occupy them.62 For example, Serbia is named for its
Serbian majority.
Not all of the minorities, however, live in federations that bear their
6
3
name. One province, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is populated by three major
ethnic groups--Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
The current crisis in
Yugoslavia is the result of differences in ethnicity, religion, and wealth
among the warring parties and each sides' claims to self-determination."
B. Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Claim Independence
In mid-1991 Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their
independence from Yugoslavia. All three provinces held plebiscites, or
referendums of independence, that resulted in a majority of the population
voting for independence. The Serbian minorities in both Croatia and
Bosnia, however, did not vote for independence and have rebelled against
their province's majority in order to oppose secession from Yugoslavia. 6
Because of this uprising, the federal government of Yugoslavia, which has a
Serbian majority, sent federal troops into the seceding republics to restore
order, but apparently the federal government has actually been supporting
the Serbian Guerillas.' All out civil war followed, and stories of atrocities
committed by Serbian forces against Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians were
heavily publicized in the world media.67

61. Iglar, supra note 6, at 215. The republics of Yugoslavia are Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Serbia possesses two autonomous provinces:
the province of Vojvodina and the province of Kosovo. Id. at n.21.
62. Id. at 215.
63. For example, the Krajina Region in the Republic of Croatia is considered a major
Serbian enclave. See John Darton, Croatia'sChief Vows 'Liberation' of More Land in Serbian
Enclave, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1993, at 3, for a discussion of the dispute over the Krajina Region
and the problems associated with the different ethnic groups trying to live within the same
boundaries as each other.
64. Whereas the civil war in the former Yugoslavia generates many different issues and
questions concerning the principle of self-determination, this paper will only concentrate on the
initial claims of independence (secession) of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina from
Yugoslavia and the U.N. 's subsequent recognition of their independence.
65. See Iglar, supra note 6, at 216-21.
66. Id. at 216, n.29.
67. See, e.g., New 'Nuremberg' Urged for Balkans Holocaust, U.N. OBSERVER, Sept.
1992, at 1; Memory of Life in a 'Death Camp' Haunts a Freed Bosnian Refugee, U.N.
OBSERVER, Sept. 1992, at 9.
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C. The Recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina
and the Self-Determination Section of the 1970 Declaration
At first the world community denounced Slovenia's, Croatia's, and
Bosnia's attempts at self-determination through secession as being in
violation of the principle of territorial integrity. Yet, after the federal
government of Yugoslavia began to use force against the peoples seeking
self-determination and news reports emerged of the human rights violations
committed by Serbs in the Federal Government, the UN and the world
community changed its mind. In May of 1992, the UN formally recognized
the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
republics become official members of the world organization.6
UN recognition of the Provinces can be explained in terms of the
Self-Determination Section of the 1970 Declaration. Prior to their unilateral
claim of independence, the Provinces were part of an existing state which as
a member of the UN. Because they were neither under colonial rule nor
alien domination, the Provinces were not entitled to claim the right of selfdetermination and unilaterally secede from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia according to the principle of territorial and political integrity.
The Self-Determination Section of the 1970 Declaration provides
that in certain circumstances the right to self-determination will be applied
to groups which do not fall in the traditional colonial category. When a
government is not representative of its people and operates under the guise
of national, the oppressed groups within that state will be treated as if they
were under colonial or alien domination (a "pseudo-colony") and will have
The provinces arguably meet these
the right to self-determination.
conditions and should be viewed as having been colonies of or dominated
by the Serbian government of Yugoslavia. Thus, the Provinces have the
right to self-determination by means of secession from Yugoslavia under
the principles expressed in the Self-Determination Section of the 1970
Declaration.
There is no bright line rule that can be used to determine when this
"pseudo-colony" theory will be applied to grant the right of selfdetermination and hence the right to secession to groups within sovereign
states. It appears that this theory is applied by the world body whin it is
politically popular to do so: In the case of the Provinces, the media reports
of aggressive tactics of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army coupled
with the reports of human rights violations committed against the seceding
peoples have made the secession of the Provinces politically acceptable.

68. Friedman, supra note 60.
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CONCLUSION

The principle of self-determination has under gone many stages of
development since Woodrow Wilson concluded that his idealistic goal of
self-determination for all peoples could not be realized in the aftermath of
World War I. Unfortunately, if Wilson were alive today he would find that
his idealistic vision has not yet been achieved. Today, right to selfdetermination is still a limited one and is not something to which all peoples
are entitled. Furthermore, it remains a right which depends upon the current
political climate; the politicians only seem to support and sanction claims of
self-determination when situations escalate into crises. Hopefully, in the
future, the right of self-determination will be more clearly defined so that
conflicts like the one in the former Yugoslavia can be avoided.
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VI. APPENDIX
THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political
status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and
every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter.
Every state has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render
assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities
entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the
principle, in order
(a)
To promote friendly relations and co-operation
among states; and
(b)
To bring a speedy end to-colonialism, having due
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples
concerned;
and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well
as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
Every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate
action universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
The establishment of a sovereign and independent state, the free
association or integration with an independent state or the emergence into
any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of
implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible
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action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and receive support in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter.
The territory of a colony or other non-self-governing territory has,
under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the
state administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the
Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or non-self-governing
territory have exercised their right to self-determination in accordance with
the Charter, and particularily its purposes and principles.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.
Every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other
state or country.
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INTRODUCTION

Liquid hydrocarbon deposits often extend across national frontiers
in such a manner that an entire deposit may be exploited, wholly or in
part, from either side of the boundary line.' This "characteristic of liquid
hydrocarbons has been a fundamental cause of disputes, conflicts, and
even wars in many parts of the world. As the economies of nation-states
grow more dependent on this relatively cheap energy source, the
likelihood of conflict will increase unless an international legal regime can
be developed to resolve these disputes on a fair and equitable basis and
upon which future treaties and agreements may be predicated. As a result,
this area of law has increasingly attracted the attention of legal scholars
and the international legal community.2
Because of the major impact this subject has on geopolitics and the
world economy, it is difficult to understand why the most recent United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, did not
squarely address the issue of liquid hydrocarbons. Although the 1982
UNCLOS specifically addresses some transboundary marine resources,
such as submarine hydrocarbon deposits, it does not address the
transboundary element of hydrocarbon deposits between two or more
states or, between states and special zones.3
Although hydrocarbon market prices have fluctuated dramatically,
experts predict that demand for this relatively cheap energy source and

1. Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L.
215, 215-16 (1979).
2. Id. at 215.
3. Alberto Szekely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary Hydrocarbon
Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 733, 738-43 (1986).
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chemical feedstock will grow significantly.' As a result, pressure to
develop transboundary energy reserves will also increase, and conflicts
will be difficult to avoid. Thus, the development of transboundary
hydrocarbon resources requires the attention of specialists to provide an
adequate legal regime in order to prevent future conflicts. 5 These legal
and environmentally sound
regimes must also promote efficient
6
exploitation by those nations involved.
The issues of delimitation and exploitation of transboundary liquid
hydrocarbon deposits are a branch of international law that has immense
global impact but, surprisingly, has remained quite stagnant with relatively
few exceptions.' This paper will attempt to give the reader a basic
understanding of oil and gas exploration and extraction principles,
summarize the existing international case law on transboundary oil and gas
deposits, review developing trends, and postulate some rules for possible
inclusion in the next United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Alleviating the existing confusion surrounding the law of transboundary oil
and gas deposits might help to defuse the international tensions associated
with the indefiniteness of the current legal regime concerning
transboundary oil and gas deposits.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. The Basics
Due to the migratory properties of oil and gas, liquid hydrocarbon
deposits often extend across national boundaries in such a manner that the
entire deposit may be exploited from either side of the boundary line.8 In
this respect, deposits of fluid hydrocarbons differ from hard mineral
deposits which are separated into discrete units by a state's frontier or
boundary. 9 Transboundary oil and gas deposits, clearly, "[d]o not
conform well to property lines, licensing demarcations or political
boundaries.",,"

4. Alberto Szekely et al., Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: The Puerto Vallarta
Draft Treaty, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 609, 613 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
8. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.
9. Alberto E. Utton & Paul D. McHugh, On an Institutional Arrangementfor Developing
Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 717, 722 (1986).
10.

Id.
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Oil and gas deposits are typically composed of porous rock
bounded by impermeable strata which trap the hydrocarbons usually under
high pressure. Drilling through the impermeable cap decreases the
reservoir pressure allowing the oil and gas to migrate through the porous
media to the source of lower pressure. This source is usually the newly
drilled well. The fluids are then propelled to the surface by the hydraulic
pressure of the water table exerted on the deposit and the expansion of gas
trapped in the liquids. One can achieve a similar result by shaking a bottle
of soda and then decreasing the internal pressure by opening the cap.
This production of hydrocarbons under the reservoir's own
pressure is called primary production. Based on empirical data, primary
production is usually capable of recovering fifteen to twenty-five percent
of the oil in the deposit." By using secondary recovery methods, such as
injecting gas or water into the well, well pressures can be maintained and
recoveries of up to eighty percent may be achieved.' 2 Newer, more
complex and costly methods of enhanced recovery, known as tertiary
recovery, include surfactant flooding, carbon dioxide flooding, steam
injection, and fire flooding 3 can further increase recoveries.
Over many years, the United States has developed some rules of
law, consisting of federal and state statutes, that address the problem of
adjacent land owners exploiting transboundary oil and gas deposits."' The
rules center around an attempt to develop the deposit as a single unit with
the cooperation from all other property interests in the deposit. 5 This
method of exploitation allows for optimum geologic placement of wells
and produces maximum hydrocarbon recovery from the deposit.
B. The Early Years of Oil and Gas Law in the United States
A brief explanation of the development of oil and gas law in the
United States may provide some perspective on possible solutions to
transboundary oil and gas problems and issues in the international arena.
During the period of the development of oil and gas law in the United
States, the courts lacked "adequate understanding of the physical
properties of oil and gas . . . and the subsurface structures containing

11. Will R. Knedlik, Introduction to U. S. - Mexico Transboundary Resource Issues, 26
NAT. RESOURCES J.661, 683 (1986).
12.

Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 722.

13.

Id.

14. Larry S. Eubanks & Michael J.Mueller, An Economic Analysis of Oklahoma's Oil and
Gas Forced Pooling Law, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 469, 470 (1986).

15.

Id. at 469.
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them."' 6 Consequently, courts used the Rule of Capture, by way of
analogy to migratory wild animals and marine life, as the basis of law for
The courts held that liquid
transboundary oil and gas deposits."
hydrocarbons, within transboundary deposits, belonged to the land owner
who extracted and controlled them, regardless of whether the
hydrocarbons being extracted on A's property had initially come from
beneath B's property.'
In essence, B's property rights in oil and gas
beneath his land were conditional upon his extraction and control of them.
In fact, B's property rights extended to that portion of the deposit beneath
A's property if B could extract and acquire them from his side of the
boundary. Thus, the only solution an owner apparently had, if he was to
retain the hydrocarbons that lay beneath his property, was to drill first and
fast in order to extract and control the hydrocarbons before his neighbor
did.' 9 Consequently, the early law created incentive to drill as many wells
as quickly as possible in order to maximize individual production from the
deposit, usually at a neighbor's expense. This self-serving and haphazard
race to drill wells and produce the underlying oil and gas unnecessarily
reduced the pressure in these reservoirs and, thus, reduced overall
hydrocarbon recovery." Little regard was given to the most efficient and
effective development of the reservoir as a whole unit.
Spacing legislation eventually was passed limiting the number of
wells that could be drilled per acre.' This was followed by legislation
regulating the production from each well based on overall market demand
for hydrocarbons. 2 These legislative acts helped maintain reservoir
characteristics which maximized recovery of the deposit and thereby
conserved the resource. Also, the legislation, by regulating production in
an attempt to establish a balance between oil and gas supply and demand,
helped to stabilize declining prices. 3

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 722.
Id. at 722 n.28.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 723 n.32.
Id. at 723.
Id.
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C. ForcedPooling and Unitization
The most cost effective method of maximizing production from oil
and gas deposits requires the strategic placement of wells in the deposit.24
By properly placing wells based on the physical and geological
characteristics of the entire deposit, favorable reservoir characteristics can
be maintained and production is thereby maximized.' Unitization, as it
was called, requires all land owners to submit to development of the entire
hydrocarbon deposit as a unit.26 The trend has been toward compulsory
unitization because of the obvious problems associated with voluntary
unitization.
Unitization and forced pooling" promote drilling and production
by allowing a producer to force other nonconsenting lease holders within
the specified drilling area to participate in the drilling activities as either 8 a
full working interest partner, wherein the land owner would have a
percentage ownership in the well and bear the burden of his fair share of
expenses, or as a royalty interest owner, wherein the producer would pay
the land owner a one-time state determined bonus plus a royalty interest in
lieu of ownership.29 While there is no international law on the subject of
joint management schemes, the United States law of unitization can be
used to make a persuasive argument for its regular international use by
analogy. Unitization was used internationally with success in some of the
North Sea operations.'
Rainer Lagoni suggests that international state practice, as
reflected in common deposit arrangements in the past, may support the
emergence of a customary rule of international law that would require
states to cooperate in the exploration and exploitation of common deposits
of oil and gas. 3' If this were accomplished, and the 1982 UNCLOS
required unitization for transboundary oil and gas deposits, the result
would lead to maximized recovery (value) for all concerned parties,
minimized waste, and minimized environmental concerns and operating

24. Id. at 724.
25.

Id. at 723.

26. Eubanks & Mueller, supra note 14, at 470.

27. Id. at 469.
28. Id. at 470 n.3.
29. Id. at 471.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
(Feb. 20), reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 340, 383 (1969); see Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS 1280-82 (3d ed. 1993).
31.

Lagoni, supra note 1, at 243.
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costs because transboundary deposits would be developed as a whole unit.
It is also likely that a single operator would develop the deposit which
would eliminate the duplication of effort and costs associated with multiple
operators.
D. Marine Based Subsurface HydrocarbonDeposits
Marine based subsurface hydrocarbon deposits pose a different set
of problems. These problems usually concern the delimitation of the
boundaries of the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) between the adjacent or opposing nation-states." The first problem
is delimitation ,of the continental shelf.
E. Continental Shelf: Delimitation - The Drawing of Boundaries
Article 83 of the 1982 UNCLOS deals specifically with the
delimitation of the continental shelf between nation-states with opposite or
adjacent coasts. 33 In essence, it says that nation-states engaged in the
delimitation of adjacent or opposite boundaries of their continental shelves
shall do so by agreement in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) "[in order to achieve an equitable
solution."" This provides little direction except to advise states that it is
up to them to negotiate.
The adoption of a bargaining process, rather than a more
mathematical approach to delimiting the continental shelf area leads some
experts to believe that Article 83 was intentionally left vague by the states
during negotiations. It is further believed that it was motivated by greed
for the resources within the shelf.35 Under the current system it may be
possible for states with stronger bargaining positions to end up with more
than their fair share of the continental shelf and its resources at the expense
of others.
However in many instances, it is all too probable that
agreement will not be reached, and this will result in dispute, gridlock, or
submission to the International Court of Justice for resolution.'
It seems as though the drafters of the 1982 UNCLOS have not
taken a definitive posture on this contentious issue. Perhaps this was done
32. See Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.
33. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on Dec. 10,
1982, art. 83, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
34. Id. at 1286.
35. Szekely, supra note 3, at 741.
36. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1231.
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to accommodate as many states as possible with a watered down agreement
in order to get the requisite number of states to ratify the treaty and deal
with the tough issues later, or to sit back and wait for the states themselves
to create law on the issue of continental shelf delimitation by their customs
and practice over time.
F. High Seas Exploitation of NaturalResources
The freedom to fish remains one of the oldest freedoms of the
sea.3 7 The 1982 UNCLOS confirmed the freedom of fishing for all states
and their people, but also recognized the need to regulate and conserve the
living resources of the seas.38 Articles 116 through 118 address states'
rights and duties of fishing, conservation of living resources of the seas,
and cooperation and management of those living resources.39
1. Who Owns the Resources of the High Seas?
An attitude already exists that the living resources in the water
column of the high seas have always been available to all nations. That
attitude has yet to extend to the minerals on and beneath the seabed. At
present, the option to explore and extract minerals from the seabed is
available only to those few nation-states who have adequate technology and
financial resources.
However, given that technology and financial
resources are readily available, the resources must be able to be exploited
in a commercially economical manner in order to make the effort
worthwhile.
As high technology reduces the cost and increases the commercial
viability of exploration and extraction of minerals in the deep waters of the
seas, the legal question becomes: Who is, or should be, entitled to exploit
these resources and under what bases and limitations? ' What is needed is
a legal regime that will give incentive to the nations with the technology
and financial resources to exploit the seabed, ensure that a state's claim is
protected against encroachment by other nations, and assure that those who
take the risks will be able to reap the rewards."' As with other branches of
the law, it is virtually impossible to define the entire legal regime prior to
allowing exploitation to begin; however, some basic rules become
necessary if conflicts are to be avoided. The law should then develop
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1308.
41.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1308-09.
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naturally based on practice or custom and the treaties that are formed
between nations. It should be noted that General Assembly Resolution
2574D (XXIV) (1969) deals with the Moratorium on Exploitation of
Resources of the Deep Seabed. The United States challenged the statement
of law reflected in the 42resolution and the authority of the Assembly to
declare a "moratorium.
In the 1982 UNCLOS, Articles 136 through 140 address the
mining of natural resources of the seabed. Articles 136 and 137 state that
the seabed area of the high seas and its resources are for the common
heritage of mankind and that no state, natural person, or juridical person
shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the
area or its resources. 3 Any attempt to acquire such rights will not have
legal recognition by the appropriate authority." Article 139 specifies that
joint and several liability will apply to parties who, while acting together,
fail in their responsibilities or duties to maintain compliance with the
Convention which results in damages to other parties. 5 Article 140
specifies that seabed mining in the high seas shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole. This article also provides that equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in
the high seas area shall be made on a nondiscriminatory basis. '
2. Share the Bounty-Share the Cost?
Some may argue that the seabed resources belong to all the nations
of the world, and that even though they may be exploited by a few nations
that are financially capable, they should be made available to all. The
international marketplace and international commerce have already created
a system of distributing wealth based on supply and demand which, in
turn, determines price and availability. However, some regulation may be
necessary to ensure the world's access to these resources. Perhaps all
nations should have the opportunity to participate in the bounty of the
seabed by either sharing in the cost of exploitation or by being afforded the
opportunity to purchase these minerals at fair market value. 7 The same
42.

Id. at 1316.

43. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, supra note 33, arts. 136, 137.
44. Id.
45.

Id. art. 139.

46. Id. art. 140.

47. When dealing in global economies, even something apparently as simple as deciding on
a fair market price is problematic. Price is usually a function of local market demand and, varies
based upon the geographic location of the nation wishing to purchase. This complication allows
one to look more favorably upon the joint participation scenario.
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guiding principles that govern transboundary resources should apply to
seabed exploration: duty of good faith and cooperation, duty to share
data, duty to protect the environment, and the duty to avoid wasteful
practices in order to conserve the resources.
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES

Liquid mineral deposits that extend across national frontiers on
land or a dividing line on the continental shelf between adjacent or
opposite states have increasingly attracted attention in international law
during the late 1960's and 1970's."
An emerging legal concept of
cooperation -between neighboring states has already occurred when two or
more states share water resources. '9 It appears likely that this concept of
cooperation will be extended to transboundary hydrocarbon deposits.'
The 1982 UNCLOS does not address the transboundary element of
these deposits between nation states and special zones;51 therefore, nationstates are left to their own devises within the context of a few guiding
principles to formulate a solution. Several principles have developed over
time and proven useful in transboundary issues, such as consultation and
negotiation toward the conclusion of agreements for joint cooperation, the
principle of adequate and effective exploitation, the principle that the
coastal state may enter into joint cooperation schemes without
relinquishing its rights over that part of the deposit on its side of the
delimitation line, the emerging principle of equal sharing in benefits
derived from the exploitation of the transboundary deposit, and the
emergence of the principle of unitization."2
Mexican-U.S. experience in the field of transboundary
resources has contributed to some of the guiding
international principles ruling the use and conservation of
transboundary resources, namely:
the duty of each
country at either side of the border, when exploiting its
part of the resource conceived as a natural unity, to refrain
from producing a sensible harm; the principle of equitable
48.

Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.

Id. (quoting INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 1966, 477 et seq. (1967)). See also OSCAR SCHACHTER,
SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 64, 74 (1977); Symposium, U.S. - Mexican Transboundary
49.

Resources, (pt. II) 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. (1978).
50. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.
51. Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
52. Id. at 766.
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and rational utilization; and the duty to undertake previous
consultations and to exchange information. 3

These principles constitute "good neighborliness."-"
Mexico proposed the concepts of good faith and non-abuse of
rights at the third UNCLOS.55 These concepts are basic to transacting
business between nations and should be directly incorporated in the legal
regime of transboundary resources. Hard mineral deposits across frontiers
are dealt with in reference to territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
territorial integrity.
A. Legal Concepts
1. Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights
"The territorial sovereignty of nation-states extends to the mineral
resources in the soil and subsoil of their land territory and territorial sea to
an unlimited depth."' "This exclusive authority exists whether or not the
deposit has been discovered or the state is able or intends to exploit it.""
No nation-state may exercise rights over these mineral resources without
consent of the state under whose territory they reside.58 This holds true as
well for mineral resources within the territory of the continental shelf;
however, in that situation nation-states have exclusive sovereign rights
rather than full territorial sovereignty over the resources. 9 Although the
literature makes a distinction between sovereignty and exclusive sovereign
rights, none will be made for purposes of this discussion.'

53. Knedlik, supra note 11, at 683.
54. See Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
55. Id.
56. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 216 (citing L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 462 (8th
ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955); I, 2 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 99
(H. Bonfils, 8th ed. 1925)).
57. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 216.
58. Id.
59.. Id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 3, at 22 (Feb. 20). See also
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311. The state's authority over the mineral resources of its land territory and
territorial sea is based on the concept of territorial sovereignty as an essential part of its legal
personality, whereas its sovereign rights over the mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of its
continental shelf are derived from the geographical concept of natural prolongation. d. at 31.
60. Id. at 216.

146

ILSA Journalof International & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 1

2. Territorial Integrity
Territorial integrity is a "necessary corollary to the principle of
territorial sovereignty.""' It protects the sanctity of a nation-state's
territory from unauthorized invasion by another nation-state. 6
For
example, this principle would be violated by the unauthorized mining
through the boundary line by state A into part of a shared deposit residing
within the territory or continental shelf of state B or by state A conducting
mining operations within its boundary which results in material damage to
the territory of state B.63 The rule of law that another state is responsible
for material damage it causes to another state's territory has been
developed by analogy to the damage to a state by extraterritorial effects
such as air and water pollution."
Violations of the principle of territorial integrity for oil and gas
deposits are especially difficult to establish.' Complicated characteristics
of these deposits such as equilibrium of rock pressure, gas pressure, and
underlying water pressure affect the extraction process to the extent that
extracting hydrocarbons at one point will inevitably change conditions
within the entire contiguous deposit. '
Thus, this character of
transboundary fluid hydrocarbon deposits often creates tension even
between nations who may have enjoyed the best of relations in the past. In
this author's opinion there has been some suggestion and speculation in the
media that land based transboundary hydrocarbon issues were, in part,
responsible for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
3. Territorial Sea
Once states had acknowledged the idea of a territorial sea about
the coast, they had to address themselves to the matter of its breadth.

61. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.
62. See, Lagoni, supra note 1.
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id. (citing Gunther Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of Transnational
Pollution, 69 AM. J. INTL. L. 50, 72 (1975)). The author inferred this rule from extensively
discussed principles and concepts, basing it on well known precedents and state practice, such as,
the principle of territorial integrity, the emerging principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
the concept of good neighborliness as representing an expansion of the principle of abuse of
rights, and, inter alia, the Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (Apr. 9), and the Trail Smelter
Arbitration, 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905, passim.
65. Id. at 217.
66. Id. at 217 (quoting Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1209,
1219 (1937-38)); HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL

AND GAS 1-12 (3d ed. 1974).
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Territorial sea limits varied over historical time and were based on such
theories as the line-of-sight doctrine, the cannon-shot rule, and the marine
league doctrine.67 These doctrines have outlived their usefulness. Based
upon the principles for which they were originally formulated, where does
one draw the boundary line now?
In 1793, the United States became the first country to adopt a three
mile limit in its domestic laws." Later the three mile limit generally
became recognized by international treaty and was accepted by nationstates until the early 1960's. Although it was recorded by the 1930 Hague
Conference as common practice,' it was never codified. 70 The ILC
suggested a twelve mile upper limit in its 1956 report, but it did not
specify any specific limit between three and twelve miles.7 ' In accordance
with the 1982 UNCLOS, every nation-state has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical
miles, measured from the low water line along the coast unless otherwise
provided .72 As a matter of course, the limit is generally set by states at
twelve nautical miles.73
4. Continental Shelf
"The concept of national jurisdiction over a continental shelf
beyond the territorial sea is relatively modem in origin, usually being
traced to the 1945 Truman Proclamation." 7 4 The 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf defined the continental shelf "[t]he seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas. "7 Later, in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the continental
shelf of the coastal state as a "[n]atural prolongation of its land territory
existing ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land,
67. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1240.
68.

Id. at 1241.

69. Id. at 1240-44.
70.

Id. at 1242.

71.

Id. at 1243.

72.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1245.

73.

Id.

74. Ernst Willheim, Australia - Indonesia Seabed Boundary Negotiations: Proposalsfor a
Joint Development Zone in the "Timor Gap", 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 826 (1989).
75.

(1958).

ZDENIK J. SLOUKA,

INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 89
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and as an extension of it, an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.""

5. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Louis Henkin notes that during the negotiations for the 1982
UNCLOS, extensive pressure from states with varying interests at stake
led the Convention to adopt the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).77
Articles 55 through 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS establish and define the EEZ
at 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea.78 The EEZ
gives the coastal state sovereign rights, but not sovereignty, 9 for certain
sanctioned activities such as for the purpose of exploring, exploiting,
conserving, and managing the natural resources, whether living or nonliving, on the seabed, in the subsoil, and the superjacent waters. The EEZ
also gives coastal states rights to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone.' All other states enjoy freedom
of navigation, overflight, and other lawful acts associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft, submarine cables, and pipelines that are
compatible with the 1982 UNCLOS.8"
Although the 1982 UNCLOS does not specifically designate the
EEZ as part of the high seas, the United States and other maritime states
believe the convention reflects the general understanding that, as a matter
of customary law as well as under the convention, their rights and
freedoms of navigation, overflight, and laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, are available to other states in the EEZ and are the same as on
the high seas. However, the rights of noncoastal states to participate in
fishing and other commercial activity is subject to the special rights of the
coastal state.82

76. Willheim, supra note 74, at 826 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 20)).
77.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1291.

78. Id. at 1293.
79. For purposes of this discussion, there is no discernible distinction between sovereign
rights and sovereignty for minerals beneath the continental shelf.
80. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1292 (citing U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 65, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261

(1982), art. 56).
81.

Id. at 1292 (referring to Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS).

82.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 514,

cmts. b, c, d, e (1987).
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6. Contiguous Zone
Kenneth P. Beauchamp states that "[tihe theory of free ocean use
beyond the territorial sea became subject to certain recognized exceptions
in a belt of water adjacent to, and extending seaward from, the territorial
sea.83 Initially during time of war, a coastal state would stop and search
vessels nearing its coast."' This activity grew into state enforcement of
various other specific functions in line with its economic and trade interests
and activities, such as a state's concern for drug running close to its shores
or territorial sea.8
William W. Bishop, in a paper prepared for the sixth conference
of the Inter-American Bar Association in 1949, justifies the expansion of
control of the coastal state over the seas adjacent to its coast:
The exercise of jurisdiction in contiguous zones of the high
seas becomes necessary inview of the inadequacy under
modern conditions of any reasonable breadth of territorial
waters; whatever we may regard as the breadth of
marginal sea now accepted under international law, there
are occasions and purposes for which jurisdiction must be
exercised farther out from shore. This differs from an
attempt to declare such areas territorial waters subject to
the full sovereignty of the coastal state.8
Bishop describes a state's sovereign rights as distinguished
from sovereignty in what is now known as the Contiguous
Zone. Article 33 of the 1982 UNCLOS defines the
Contiguous Zone as that area of sea, contiguous to its
territorial sea, in which a nation state may exercise control
necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea. The contiguous zone may not
extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the

83. Kenneth P. Beauchamp, The Management Function of Ocean Boundries, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 611, 633 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86.

William W. Bishop, Jr., The Exercise of Jurisdiction for Special Purposes in High

Seas Beyond the Outer Limit of Territorial Waters (paper prepared for the Inter-American Bar
Association, Sixth Conference, Detroit, May 1949), reprinted in 99 CONG. REC. 2493 (1953).
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baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured."
7. High Seas
Principles of common usage and freedom once governed all the
seas. Emergence of the territorial sea and other special zones reduced the
areas subject to the regime of the high seas. Further reduction in the area
governed by the principles of the high seas resulted as an exclusive
economic zone, and archipelagic states were recognized. The high seas
are reduced even further by the special purpose zones that are specifically
designated for scientific research and pollution control, etc., and by states'
sovereign rights in extended continental shelves beyond the 200 mile limit
of the EEZ.18 Articles 86 through 90 of the 1982 UNCLOS define the
EEZ and some of the rights of its use.
As technology allows drilling efforts to take place in deeper water,
resolution of ownership of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits across the
EEZ and the high seas will become an issue for which nations should
prepare. There will be many concerns, such as: who has rights to that
portion of hydrocarbons beneath the high seas; who is responsible for the
costs associated with extraction of that portion of the hydrocarbons beneath
the high seas; on what basis will production be allocated, and to whom will
it be allocated? These appear to be simple questions until it is realized
that, in theory, the entire global community of states has rights to the
resources of the high seas.
8. Joint Development Zone (JDZ)
States may designate joint development zones (JDZ) by agreement
absent the desired agreement on boundary delimitation: Article 83 section
3 of the 1982 UNCLOS provides that parties "[p]ending agreement . . .
the states concerned . . . shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature."" This type of arrangement permits
business and commerce to continue by allowing exploitation of the natural
resources so that they may be utilized by both states while the delimitation
of the boundary is still in dispute. Upon entering into a joint development
arrangement most states are concerned that any interim arrangement does
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on Dec. 10,
1982, art. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1276 (1982)

[hereinafter UNCLOS].
88.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1297.

89.

UNCLOS, supra note 87, at 1276.
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not prejudice its long term interests toward a favorable delimitation.
While agreeing on the delimitation of the JDZ is a substantial task, the
more formidable task is that of applying the legal and administrative
systems of both states to the JDZ so that all the attributes of sovereign
rights of both states are effectively combined.
This situation also presents the possibility, and the potential
danger, of discovering hydrocarbons on the boundary of one of the states
and the JDZ. This possibility will be a sufficient reason to enlarge the
JDZ at the expense of narrowing that state's continental shelf area,
diminishing the JDZ to the detriment of the other state, or to work out
some sort of equitable arrangement to avoid a conflict. As desirable as it
might be to have a definitive set of rules to apply to a boundary dispute
situation, there will always be exceptions. Why not just let legal precedent
evolve naturally by treaty and custom? Joint development is a workable
situation, but only if the nation-states involved have the intention of
making it work.

9. Functional Zones
The functionalistic view of the state doctrine based on territorial
sovereignty is that it is inappropriate for the resolution of international
conflicts over global issues. Therefore, functional zones provide a state
with control for limited purposes not based on sovereignty, but rather,
based on specific sovereign rights that have been granted.' The EEZ can
be said to be a functional zone since the state only has exclusive rights to
the resources of the water column, the seabed, and the subsurface
minerals, but not sovereignty over this area.

B. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: The Law of the Sea
Generally
A law of the sea is as old as nations, and the modern law of the sea
is virtually as old as modem international law. For three hundred years, it
was probably the most stable and least controversial branch of international
law. It was essentially reaffirmed and codified as recently as 1958. By
1970, it was in disarray. 9
"An early and basic principle of the law of the sea was that of
freedom. The sea could not be acquired by nations and made subject to

90. Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 633.
91. Paul D. McHugh, InternationalLaw - Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, 25 NAT.
RES. J. 1025 (1984) (quoting Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 212 (2d ed. 1979));
HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1231.
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national sovereignty. "I Coastal states have recently sought to increase and
expand their jurisdiction over their adjacent sea areas through different
zones of jurisdictional control articulated in the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).93
The law of the sea was largely customary law, until it was codified
and developed by the International Law Commission in a major
undertaking culminating in the first United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1958. That Conference adopted conventions: on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, on the
Continental Shelf, and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas .1'
In the decades following the 1958 UNCLOS, worldwide changes
necessitated a rewriting."
In 1973, following the U.N. General
Assembly's effort in dealing with the resources of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction, the third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was
convened at which virtually the whole law of the sea was reexamined."
Eight years of negotiations produced the Draft Convention on the Law of
the Sea which was considered virtually complete.'
However, the
provisions on the contentious issue of seabed mining were largely
rejected.98 A final draft of the UNCLOS was approved on April 30, 1982,
by a vote of 130 states in favor, 4 against, and 17 abstentions. The United
States, Israel, Turkey and Venezuela voted against the final draft." It is
interesting to note that Turkey and Venezuela were embroiled in
continental shelf delimitation disputes during this time." ® The Treaty
received the necessary 60th ratification on November 16, 1993, ' and
came into force in 1994. "Insofar as the Convention merely codifies
customary law, it reflects law binding also on states that have not adhered
to it." 0
92. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1029.
93. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1289.

94. Id. at 1232 (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97.

Id.

98.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1313.

99.

Id.
100. Id.
101.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Receives Sixtieth Ratification to

Enter into Force inOne Year, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs SEA/1396/Rev. 1, (Nov.
19, 1993) (sixtieth ratification received on November 16, 1993).
102.

HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1232.
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This Convention is significant in that it enables a coastal state to
establish an EEZ beyond its territorial sea. The state's EEZ may extend
200 nautical miles from its territorial sea baselines, within which it has
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of the water column and the seabed. The coastal state also has
jurisdiction in the EEZ for purposes such as the protection of the marine
environment.' 3 It also adopted a two part definition of the continental
shelf: either 200 nautical miles from the base lines from which the
territorial sea is measured, or to the limits of the actual continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles through the prolongation of the state's land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.'" In the latter case,
a wealth sharing system operates in which the coastal state makes
contributions to an escrow fund for distribution based on its production of
the non-living resources beyond the 200 mile limit.'" This raises an
interesting question of whether the state has sovereign rights in the water
column of its continental shelf extending beyond the 200 mile limit.
C. Jurisdiction
Traditionally, international law divided the seas into two legal
categories: those under sovereignty of the coastal states; and the high
seas.'" In the recent past, however, coastal states have sought to increase
and expand their jurisdiction over their adjacent sea areas.' 7 This
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction has changed people's perception of
the sea and the applicable law."'° The seas have been divided into different
legal regimes, with the principle of common usage applicable only in the
areas beyond national jurisdiction where the high seas begin."° Difficulties
and conflicts can sometimes arise in the overlap areas, over which more

103. Willheim, supra note 74, at 826 (citing Official Records of the Third United Nation
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter
Official Records]).
104. Id. at 827 (citing Official Records at 33, art. 76).
105. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1285 (1982) (article 76). The contributions are to begin
after the first five years of production at that site. In the sixth year, the rate of payment or
contribution is one percent of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate increases by
one percent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and remains at seven percent
thereafter. Id. See also HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1279-80.

106. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1028.
107. Id.

108. Id. at 1029.
109. Id.
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than one nation state has jurisdiction because of these recent extensions of
coastal states' jurisdictions."10 In these areas of dual or multiple
jurisdiction, which law should govern in the delimitation of the boundary?
These are some of the useful but difficult questions to answer.
D. Customary InternationalLaw
Customary international law is comprised of two distinct elements:
general practice, and its acceptance as law."' As you can imagine, the
development of sufficient practice among nations and its acceptance as a
means of legal precedent is a painstakingly slow process. In 1958, the
International Law Commission codified customary practices in the first
2
UNCLOS.
E. InternationalTreaty Law
"Some debate exists as to whether treaties should be viewed as a
source of international law or merely as a source of obligation, much like a
contract.

"I

In the former case, treaties would set legal precedent.

Insofar as these Treaties reflected current world views on the subject
matter of transboundary hydrocarbon resources, it would be consistent to
view the doctrines embodied in these treaties as emerging international
law.
Although treaties governing transboundary resources describe
unique situations between nations, common issues consistently arise." 4 In
the event that these common issues are treated by nations in relatively the
same manner, the solutions should and would be considered to be
emerging principles of international law.
The reality of the situation is that issues of transboundary
resources between nations are resolved with each nation having its
particular socioeconomic interests in mind. We are, therefore, not likely
to see the solutions to these problems themselves emerge as law, but,
rather, the guiding principles used in arriving at specific solutions appear
to be the substance of the emerging law."'

110. See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30. See also Lagoni, supra note 1; UNCLOS, supra
note 33.
111. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1029 n.26.
112. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1232.
113. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1030 n.35.
114. Szekely et. al., supra note 4, at 609.
115. Id.
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F. InternationalCase Law

"Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
requires the Court to apply judicial decisions, subject to the provisions of
Article 59, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Article 59 states that decisions of the Court are not binding except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case. The Court's decisions,
therefore, are not governed by the principle of stare decisis.""16 However,
this does not mean that the Court ignores precedent. It uses precedent as a
persuasive argument rather than a binding one. If the Court does not
follow precedent, those cases are likely distinguished from the one at
7
bar."

1. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
A partial delimitation of the continental shelf had been in effect by
agreement in 1965, between Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany on the
basis of equidistance from the nearest points on the baselines of the
territorial seas of the parties." ' Agreement could not be reached on the
remainder of the boundaries because of differences over the rules to be
used.' " The Netherlands and Denmark asserted that due to lack of
agreement between the parties and absent special circumstances, the
principle of equidistance should be used.' 20 Germany responded that the
equidistance method would not lead to a just and equitable solution and
that delimitation should be governed by equitable principles. 2 ' The court
left the final solution of delimitation to the parties and limited itself to
providing criteria that the parties would take into account during
negotiations including "[t]he physical and geological structure, and natural
resources, of the continental shelf areas involved."' 22
The court further stated in its decision, that the parties should
resolve their differences by agreement, "[o]r failing that, by an equal
division of the overlapping areas, or by agreements for joint exploitation,
the latter solution appearing particularly appropriate when it is a question
116. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1032 nn. 43-45.
117. Id. at 1025.
118.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.

340 (1969). See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1280-82.
119.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.

340 (1969).
120. Id.

121.

Id.

122.

Id.
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of preserving the unity of a deposit." ' The court also said that it "[d]oes
not consider that unity of deposits constitutes anything more than a factual
element which it is reasonable to take into consideration in the course of
the negotiations for a delimitation."24 Even at this early stage of resolving
transboundary issues, it appears that preserving the unity of the deposit as
a means of economic and efficient exploitation was recognized but that it
did not rise to the level of creating a special circumstance and that, in and
of itself, would not alter the boundary delimitation." 5
2. United Kingdom/France Arbitration
France and the United Kingdom engaged in negotiations between
1970 and 1974, with the purpose of delimiting the continental shelf that lay
between them.' 6 The negotiations resulted in only limited agreement and
the dispute was submitted to an arbitration commission by agreement in
1975." ' The matter at issue in the arbitration had to do with the meaning
of "special circumstances."' 28 Although the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the North Sea Cases stated there "[i]s no legal limit to the
considerations which states may take account of for the purpose of making
sure that they apply equitable procedures . . ." it subsequently determined
that the presence of hydrocarbons within the continental shelf alone was
not sufficient to invoke special circumstances unless the parties otherwise
provide by agreement.' 29 Thus, it would not be sufficient to require a
delimitation of boundaries based on equitable principles.
3. Greece/Turkey Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case
In 1974, Turkey granted petroleum research permits and began to
explore for oil and gas in the Aegean Sea outside the territorial sea of
islands belonging to Greece. 30 Greece did not recognize Turkey's claim to

123.
124.
340 (1969).
125.
126.
(1979).

Id.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.
Id.
Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr. v. U.K.), 18 I.L.M. 397

127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129. Id.
130. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11),
reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 985 (1976); see, HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 820.
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that portion of the seabed.' 3' Subsequently, the parties engaged in
unsuccessful negotiations.'32 Turkey then proceeded to send further
scientific expeditions to the same area escorted by warships.133 This action
prompted Greece to submit the dispute to the ICJ in 1976. 3
Greece wanted not only a delimitation of the continental shelf
between the two countries in the Aegean Sea, but also prevent Turkey
from acquiring knowledge of the strata under Greece's continental shelf. 35
Turkey avoided the ICJ proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."'6 In terms
of the development of international law, it is unfortunate that the ICJ did
not have jurisdiction because the court would have had to address the
problem of transboundary hydrocarbon resources within the scope of this
dispute. ,3
4. Iceland/Norway Conciliation Recommendations on the
Continental Shelf Area Between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island.
Jan Mayen Island belongs to Norway and lies 292 miles off the
coast of Iceland.'38 The island is of volcanic origin, and its year round
population is about 30 to 40 residents.' 39 The island received little attention
until Icelandic fisherman netted a large catch of fish off its shores in
1978.'40 This raised the question of Jan Mayen's right to an EEZ and a
continental shelf as contemplated in the UNCLOS then being drafted.' 4'
Although Norway's title to Jan Mayen was by act of Parliament in 1929,
Norway did not claim a 200 mile EEZ around the island when it

Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.

131.
985 (1976).
132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134.

Id.

135.

Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.

985 (1976).
136. Id.
137.
138.
Norway),
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Ice. v.
21 IL.M. 1222 (1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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established one around the mainland.' 2 Norway's rush to correct its
3
oversight in 1978, drew immediate objections from Iceland. '
The parties agreed to refer the matter to a three member
conciliation commission.'"
Each of the parties would appoint one
member, and the third would be jointly selected., 5 The commission was to
recommend a dividing line taking into account Iceland's strong economic
interests in the seas in that area, and the pertinent geographical and
geologic factors.'" Because of the geology, the commission disregarded
the prolongation principle, proportionality, and the median line. ,41
A scientific committee was assembled to determine the potential
for hydrocarbon deposits in the disputed area.'"
The commission
ultimately suggested a detailed joint development zone comprised of the
areas with the highest potential for hydrocarbons.' 9 The establishment of a
joint venture exploitation agreement was based on the principle of
unitization.'"° The Court again, as in the North Sea Cases, recognized the
importance and, in fact, depended on unitization for the most effective and
economic recovery."'
5. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case
Tunisia and Libya submitted its question to the ICJ to determine
exactly the principles and rules of international law which may be applied
in delimiting the continental shelf between them. Both nations also wanted
the Court to specify precisely the practical manner in which the principles
should be applied so as to be able to accomplish the delimitation without
difficulty.'
In this case the Court reiterated the natural prolongation
principle, but did not specify the concept of "equitable principles" or
142.
143.
(1982).
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222

148.

Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(1982).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151.

Id.; see also Elliot L. Richardson, Jan Mayen in Perspective, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 443

(1988).
152. Agreement to Submit Question of the Continental Shelf to the International Court of
Justice (Libya v. Tunis.), 18 I.L.M. 49 (1979).
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"special circumstances" and for that reason the two dissenting judges on
the Court criticized the judgment as lacking in legal principle.' 53 The
Court came to the conclusion that the existing economic status of the
parties may not be taken into consideration as part of "relevant
circumstances" when delimiting the boundary. However, "[t]he presence
of oil wells in an area to be delimited may, depending on the facts, be an
element to be taken into account in the process of weighing all relevant
factors to achieve an equitable result."' 54
6. United States/Gulf of Maine Case
The essence of the Gulf of Maine case was a delineation of natural
resources of both the seabed and the fisheries in the boundary area near
George's Bank.' 5 The ICJ actually drew the boundary line once the
applicable rules and principles were determined. The United States and
both the
Canada requested that the Court use a single line to delimit
15 6
continental shelf and the 200 nautical miles fisheries zone.
Historically, the jurisdiction over fisheries has been asserted on the
basis of geography, and jurisdiction over the minerals in the continental
shelf has been based on geology.'57 The Court formulated the general
principles of equity applicable to a fair allocation of the resources between
neighbors and fashioned a solution which was basically the average of the
requests initially made by the parties.'58
7. Libya/Malta Case
In 1982, Libya and Malta requested the ICJ to decide the
principles and rules of international law that were applicable to the
delimitation of their respective continental shelves. Additionally, they
requested that the court outline the practical application of these principles
such that the Parties could delimit the areas without incident.'59 This was

153. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 2, (Feb. 24),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225, 288 (1982).

154. Id. at 255.
155. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.),
1984 I.C.J. No. 67 (Oct. 12); Thomas J. Trendl, Maritime Delimitation and the Gulf of Maine
Case: A Guide for the Future of Merely 'Slicing the Pie?', 12 S.ILL. U. L.J. 599 (1988).
156.

Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 155.

157.

Id.

158.

Id.

159. Special Agreement for the Submission to the International Court of Justice of a
Continental Shelf Dispute (Libya v. Malta), May 1976, 21 I.L.M. 971 (1982).
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the same problem in the Tunisia/Libya case only without the prejudicial
influence of natural resources.
In 1956, Malta asserted that it informed Libya of its intention to
delimit its continental shelf by means of a median line." 6 Libya's silence
was interpreted as acquiescence which Malta claimed precluded Libya in
law from challenging the validity of Malta's position. 6 Malta also wanted
the Court to take into account the relative economic position of the two
states and the range of Malta's fishing activity. The Court refused to do
this, stating that such conditions are totally unrelated to the applicable rules
of international law.' 62 The Court gave greater weight to distance criteria
where the distance between the two opposing coasts is less than 400
63
nautical miles.
8. Australia/Indonesia Seabed Case
A dispute over a portion of their common continental shelf area
arose between Australia and Indonesia. There was overlap of their EEZs
because the shelf distance between the two countries was less than 400
nautical miles. Australia asserted jurisdiction over its shelf based on the
theory of natural prolongation of its land territory, as was promulgated in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.'
Indonesia asserted jurisdiction
based on the 200 nautical miles EEZ.' 6 Under the 1982 UNCLOS, the
extension of the land mass in a prolongation of the shelf appears to be a
primary basis for continental shelf jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign
rights and not sovereignty. Also, the 200 nautical miles EEZ is based on
sovereign rights so it might be argued that these two states are on about
equal footing regarding their assertions of jurisdiction."
The parties chose to resolve their differences in the disputed area
by adopting a temporary three part Zone of Cooperation within which joint
development activities were to proceed under different legal and economic
67
sharing regimes.

160.
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Id. at 1203.
Willheim, supra note 74, at 828.
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Id.
Id. at 840.

1995]

Reynolds

G. Delimitationof ContinentalShelf Boundaries
As we have seen, the delimitation of boundaries in the continental
shelf can be rife with problems. It seems that for every scientific way that
might be proposed to dissect the disputed area, exceptions can be
envisioned. For example, since the EEZ establishes sovereign rights in a
200 nautical mile belt of ocean measured from the base of the territorial
sea, one can easily see that nation states divided by a body of water less
than 400 nautical miles will not yield each state its requisite 200 nautical
mile EEZ. Islands, close to shores of another state, pose a similar
problem.
States whose continental shelves extend beyond the 200 nautical
mile EEZ have been given partial sovereign rights in the minerals beneath
the shelf.'1 This early attempt at designing a rudimentary set of rules
actually created some conflicting situations. For example, states could
each have a valid method and argument for delimiting its continental shelf.
However, the application of the method proposed by each state might
produce an incongruous result, as in the case of Iceland and the island of
Jan Mayen. Application of Iceland's 200 nautical miles EEZ would have
encroached on the sovereign rights of Jan Mayen's EEZ since they were
only 292 nautical miles apart."
The relevant question becomes: In the face of all of the possible
configurations of nation how does one arrive at a fair and equitable result
in the delimitation of boundaries where hydrocarbon deposits are present?
The author of this article agrees with Beauchamp's philosophy when he
states: "The division of ocean space according to political ideas of
boundary-making does not always relate to -logical ocean management
purposes." 70 Rather than boundary-making being about a quest for
extending a nation state's territory, it should reflect the functional purposes
for which the boundaries are being drawn.

168.
169.
(1982).

See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1279-80.
Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222

170. See Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 656.
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H. Delineation of Boundaries of Subsurface Fluid Hydrocarbon
Deposits
1. Volume of Subsurface Hydrocarbons Residing within Each State
Fluid mineral deposits spanning across national boundaries cannot
accurately be determined without the cooperation of all nation states
involved. Geological data is needed for delimitation of the deposit
boundaries which is likely available only from the individual states under
which the deposit resides. The legal literature does not spend much time
discussing the determination of the extent of the deposit. However, this is
an important piece of information when calculating the allocation of
production for each state. This is not so much an issue of technical
acquisition of the data but rather an issue of the cooperation necessary
from all parties involved. Cooperation is necessary in almost every facet
of data acquisition, drilling, production, transportation, and processing of
the hydrocarbons. Success of the project depends entirely on the level of
cooperation and trust that the parties are willing to give to one another.
2. Non-Homogeneous Deposits or Processing of Comingled
Hydrocarbons Originating from Separate Deposits
Although the literature consistently assumes that hydrocarbon
deposits are homogeneous, this is not always the case. Different parts of a
reservoir may produce hydrocarbons of different composition and,
therefore, different relative value. If, for example, an equal volume of the
deposit resides beneath two adjacent states and one side of the deposit
contains more valuable hydrocarbons than the other, that side should be
appropriately compensated in the allocation process. In structuring
allocation agreements, information regarding deposit composition is
critical.
Also, in the situation where offshore production platforms produce
hydrocarbons from different deposits and comingle these fluids in a
common pipeline for transport to a processing center and tanker loading
terminal, it is critical to know both the amount of production and its
composition to determine the proper allocation of value. After the
hydrocarbons have been processed, a nation state's objective should be to
receive the same value of products as the value of the raw hydrocarbons
they put into the pipeline less, of course, any agreed upon losses.
The legal property issues associated with commingling are
nonexistent if the allocation agreement is based upon value. In the end the
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parties should find that the value taken out of the system is equal to the
value put into the system, striking a value balance.
L

Maximizing Recovery of Hydrocarbons as a
Exploitation Methods Used

Function of

The percentage of recovery of hydrocarbons from the deposit is
directly related to the exploitation methods used. Earlier we saw how
unitization allowed strategic placement of wells based upon geological
formation in order to maintain favorable reservoir characteristics for as
long as possible. Also, producing from the reservoir at a rate that
optimizes reservoir pressure allows maximum recovery over the life of the
reservoir. However, maximum recovery may not be the result desired by
some nation states. Sometimes developing nations are more concerned
with the rapid production of cash to pay national debts than they are with
maximizing recovery over the life of the reservoir. Prime examples of this
practice are Iraq and Iran.
The most profitable situation for nation states would be to
maximize the present value of all future income streams.'
Income
streams will vary as a function of production rates. Production rates vary
as a function of well-head pressure and well-head pressure will, in turn,
affect total hydrocarbon recovery over the life of the reservoir. Thus,
there is a delicate balance of producing enough oil and gas to satisfy
current cash requirements while tempering that behavior with the
knowledge that the deposit must be operated in a manner that will continue
to supply specific future demand for cash. This disparity between the
attitudes of nation states over cash flow can be a significant source of
problems in joint ventures where each state operates its own production
facility from the common deposit.
If we are to establish a legal duty toward operations, it must
necessarily be linked with good faith efforts to conserve the resource, to
minimize adverse impact to the environment, operate safely for all
concerned, and consider the cash requirements of each state. How states
choose to weigh these attributes depends on the specific circumstances of
the situation.

171. This depends on many factors such as speculation on the future price of oil and a
discount rate for calculating present value. Recognize, also, that maximizing the present value of
future income streams from the deposit may require operation outside the envelope of prescribed
operation in order to maintain other factors in line. For example, maximizing present value
based on estimated future petroleum prices may require producing from the deposit at a rate that
is not consistent with maximizing recovery nor may it even be consistent with existing legal
requirements regarding wellhead operation.
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J. A State's Liability to Adjacent States for Inefficient Recovery:
InternationalClaimsfor Damages
Lagoni suggests that if mining operations conducted on one side of
the boundary were to cause material damage on the other side, the
principle of territorial integrity would be violated.' The rule that material
damage to the territory of another state gives rise to state responsibility
developed mainly with regard to extraterritorial environmental effects,
especially air and water pollution. It appears, however, to be equally
applicable to the extraterritorial effects of mining or extraction
operations.' One possible type of resulting damage would be that other
nation states would be unable to extract-the minerals from their part of the
deposit, even if the first state has extracted only that portion originally
situated in its territory or continental shelf.'74 Another type of damage
would be inefficient or wasteful exploitation which may sometimes be
determined by "mass balances" over the system.' The theory behind the
concept of the mass balance states that an operator should be able to
account for the whereabouts of all hydrocarbons coming from the wellhead on a daily basis.
IV. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE MULTI-STATE
MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON RESOURCES
A. Differing Perspectives on Natural Resource Management
1. Maximize Current Income or Maximize Total Value of Natural
Resource Deposit?
As mentioned previously, sometimes a nation states' operations
criteria are at odds with another's fiscal policies regarding natural resource
deposits. One state may want to maximize current income and the other,
with less need for current income, may want to maximize the total value of
the resource. It seems the duty to conserve the resource deposit would
imply a duty to maximize the total value of the deposit. Optimal recovery
in a timely manner with regard for the environment and the minimization
of waste would appear to play primary roles in determining the overall
plan for exploiting the deposit.
172.

Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. A mass balance is a mathematical engineering device which allows the engineer to
ensure efficient recovery and to either predict and account for any losses.
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It may be argued, however, that the degree of wealth of the nation
state should play a part in the decision of how to exploit the deposit. In
the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, the Court ruled that economic
considerations cannot be taken into account in delimitation of the shelf and
7 6
that they are extraneous circumstances and could easily change.'
However, a state's current and future cash requirements may be valid
criteria for use in proposing an equitable production plan after delimitation
of the boundary is accomplished. Making a production plan requires the
determination of how fast to exhibit the deposit. This will have a direct
bearing on cash flow and ultimately the stability of the state's economy and
the welfare of its people. If natural resources are considered a sovereign
source of wealth, should not the state decide how best to exploit that
wealth to meet its needs?
2. Joint Resource Development Versus Single State Development,

Operational Control, and Resource Management
In joint development of natural resources in transboundary areas,
there are as many alternatives as the mind can conceive. This endless
array of possibilities should be tempered by the administrative
As in the Australia/Indonesia
requirements and equitable principles.
dispute in the Timor Gap, the parties chose a three part temporary zone of
cooperation in the disputed area, each with different legal and economic
regimes governing them.'" The possibilities of cooperative agreements are
limited only by imagination, ingenuity, common sense, and the
determination to achieve an equitable solution.
B. What Price for Development?:
Issue

The Environmental Pollution

The act of drilling for oil in the continental shelf necessitates
considerable measures for pollution control. Upsetting the ecological and
chemical balance of the region can have far reaching and serious
consequences on marine life, the marine environment, and on nation states
whose economies depend heavily on the fruits of the sea.
If the exploiting states through their negligence harm the marine
environment, how and where will the harm manifest itself? What types of
monitoring will be done to safeguard the environment and help to timely
recognize changes and trends in quality of the environment? Where will
176. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. 2 (Feb. 24), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 225, 288 (1982).

171. Willheim, supra note 74, at 828.
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the monitoring be done? How often and at what cost? Using what
technologies? To what degree should the pollution from marine drilling
activities be abated? Will this effort be a joint effort or will each nation
state be responsible for its own pollution abatement activities? How will
success of the pollution abatement activities be measured? What remedies
are available to states who have suffered damages from the exploitation
efforts?
These questions are easy to pose but much more difficult to
answer. A full discussion of these issues could be the subject of a legal
treatise and will not be dealt with here. Rather, these questions are meant
to be thought provoking in a way that empowers the parties to answer
them in the planning stages of the development rather than administering
an ad hoc approach to pollution abatement.
C. Migration of Fluid HydrocarbonsAcross State Borders - Whose
Property?
The migratory properties of subsurface fluid hydrocarbons give
nation states an incentive to unitize the development so that the deposit is
treated as a whole for exploitation purposes. Then, optimal strategic well
placement will maintain favorable reservoir characteristics and maximize
recovery of hydrocarbons over the life of the deposit. One project
operator can then be selected for the exploitation of the deposit which will
avoid duplication of drilling, production, administrative activities, and
associated costs.
Unitization also avoids the problems associated with property
A state's share of the unitized
rights in migratory hydrocarbons.
production will be determined by the value of recoverable oil and gas in
place beneath property for which that state has sovereign rights as a
percentage of the value of the entire deposit. This is, by far, the best
approach to take in terms of simplicity, cost effectiveness, maximization of
hydrocarbon recovery from the deposit, and for the policy reason that it
fosters an environment of cooperation between the parties.
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V.

EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF CONVENTIONAL LAW

A. New Approaches to Drawing and Making Ocean Boundaries
1. Multiple Boundary Regimes
The state practice of negotiating maritime boundary delimitation is
a recent one and developing trends can be witnessed.'
While the
traditional political rationale of drawing a hard definitive boundary line
served a purpose in the past, these hard lines have outlived their usefulness
in today's global society.

It may be more beneficial to enter into

agreements where one of the adjacent nation states is responsible for
exploration and exploitation of minerals of the continental shelf because of
the overriding technological advantage that one state may have. On the
other hand, it may be necessary to think of shelf delimitation not in terms
of drawing one line, but rather in terms of drawing several lines to
accomplish different objectives in the most cost efficient and
environmentally sound manner that maximizes resource recovery. For
example, the shelf boundary might be different for exploitation and
management of fisheries than it would be for exploitation and management

of minerals. 9
If the overall objective in these boundary regions is to maximize
wealth, " minimize costs, minimize adverse effects on the environment,
and maximize overall resource recovery over the life of the operation then
extensive cooperation is needed between states.
2. Evolving Principles of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resource
Law and Trends in State Practice
There has been an evolution of the body of customary international
law surrounding transboundary hydrocarbon resources, which is embodied
in treaties. In 1979 a multinational team of experts in international law
and geology met under the auspices of the School of Law and the Natural
Resources Center of the University of New Mexico for the purpose of
researching the international law applicable to the utilization and
conservation of submarine transboundary hydrocarbon resources and to

178. Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 653.
179.

Id.

180. 1 am speaking here of the time value of wealth. But this should be governed by any
overriding concerns for minimizing costs, minimizing adverse effects to the environment, and
maximizing resource recovery.
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observe trends in that law.' 8 ' In preparing a draft treaty that could be used
as a model for future treaties on transboundary hydrocarbon deposits they
referred to numerous conventions and treaties on the subject. They put
forth the following nine guiding principles in order to ensure proper
coordination of these activities for the benefit and protection of the rights
and interests of all concerned parties:
1.
The duty of cooperation between the Parties to
ensure the continued attainment of the purposes and
objects of the Treaty;
2.
The duty of good faith and good neighborliness of
each of the Parties in the undertaking of their respective
activities, in the mutual coordination of such activities and
in the compliance with the guiding principles and criteria
established pursuant to this Treaty;
3.
The duty not to take advantage of or use their
respective national laws and regulations and applicable
rules of international law in such a way as would
unnecessarily impede the equitable and reasonable
utilization and distribution and
conservation of
transboundary hydrocarbon resources;
4.
The duty of each of the Parties to abstain from
undertaking activities within its jurisdiction or control that
may cause damage to the resources or the environment of
the other Party, or that may create an unreasonable risk in
that respect;
5.
The duty of the Parties to consult with each other
on a continuing basis in order to secure the coordination of
activities which is the main purpose and object of this
Treaty;
6.
The duty of each of the Parties to provide the other
with prompt notification of its intention to undertake any
activities relating to transboundary hydrocarbon deposits;
7.
The duty of the Parties to exchange all
information, data and publications relevant to maritime
181.

See Szekely et al., supra note 4, at 609.
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transboundary hydrocarbon deposits and the purposes and
objectives of this Treaty.
The use of proprietary
information exchanged between the Parties shall be subject
to the conditions of confidentiality established by the Party
providing such information;
8.
The duty of the Parties to cooperate with each
other in order to prevent waste of maritime transboundary
hydrocarbon resources and to prevent or abate
environmental pollution or damage stemming from
activities relating to maritime transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits; and
9.
The duty of the Parties not to undertake any
unilateral or bilateral activities contrary to their obligations
under international law, whenever a transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit extends across their common
maritime boundary, or extends into the subsoil of the
seabed under the jurisdiction of a third State, or in the
subsoil of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 82
VI.

CONCLUSION

The business of producing oil and gas from the seabed floor is
complicated enough without having to further confound the issue with
transboundary deposits. However, as advances in technology promote a
rush to explore the marine areas of the continental shelf and seabed of the
high seas, we must be prepared to resolve the resulting legal, social, and
economic issues. Not only must we pro-actively resolve existing disputes,
we must search for consensus on how to manage the large, but ultimately
limited, ocean resources.
As the socioeconomic needs of nation states evolve, so should our
thinking about the payout that the act of drawing hard boundaries yields.
Boundaries tend to isolate nations and individuals from the real issue of
how nation states are going to inhabit this planet in meaningful way and in
a spirit of trust and cooperation. If we must draw boundaries, let us draw
boundaries that make sense for the function for which they were intended.
For example, the boundary that makes sense for demarcation of the
territorial continental shelf, may not make sense for fisheries management.
182.

See Szekely et al., supra note 4, at 634-35.
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We should be ready to apply sound judgment and equitable
principles to address the needs of all parties concerned notwithstanding the
obligation all nation states have regarding the ecology. The principles and
duties of good faith, cooperation, unitization of the transboundary deposit,
ecological interests, conservation of the resource, sharing of data,
abstention from wasteful or uneconomic activities, and the desire to make
joint efforts work will do more toward promoting a workable solution than
any measure of scientific application of hard and fast rules.
However, we must recognize that we now understand some of the
current and future issues of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. We must
be prepared to develop a regime of cooperation as a context for resolving.
disputes. Disputes happen most often because people do not listen to the
needs of the other parties. States must listen for one another's needs and
use the information to negotiate on a fair and equitable basis.
Based on what we know about transboundary hydrocarbon deposits
today, we can accurately predict where the conflicts of tomorrow will be.
We have a duty to plan the legal regime of transboundary natural resources
with this foresight as a guide.
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INTRODUCTION

Latvia regained its independence from the former Soviet Union in
August 1991. Since then, it has begun the slow and arduous path of
replacing the centrally-planned, socialist system with an economic
structure based on free-market principles. Latvia began this transition "in
a difficult environment characterized by macroeconomic imbalances
inherited from four decades of central planning and disruptions caused by
a sharp contraction of trade with Russia and other states of the former
Soviet Union." Further, Latvia was left with a detriment in trade terms
* B.S., 1988, Cornell University; Candidate for Juris Doctor, 1996, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge thanks to the Professional Development
Fellowship Program administered by the Institute of International Education and funded by the
United States Department of State.
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"resulting from the sudden adaptation of world market prices for energy
and raw materials, and the existence of many inefficient industries."'
An economic goal of the current Latvian government is to manage
a smooth transition into a market economy. Measures adopted by Latvia
to achieve this goal include controlling inflation, limiting the growth of the
state budget deficit, promoting foreign investment, moving forward with
privatization, and building a legal and regulatory infrastructure comparable
to those in advanced industrialized countries.' Unfortunately, the slow
process of privatization is a primary reason for the lack of considerable
progress in implementation of these economic reforms in Latvia. The
Ministry of Economics has pinpointed deep crises in the majority of stateowned enterprises, such as "delays in structural reforms, a lack of proper
legislation on immovable property," and other relevant laws as reasons for
the downturn in Latvia's gross domestic product. 3
This comment seeks to describe the evolution of privatization as it
pertains to different sectors, small enterprises and large enterprises.
Further, it analyzes current approaches that are being used to accelerate
the privatization process. This comment will first outline the initial
privatization legislation that was passed when Latvia regained its
independence. Second, it will outline the problems that have slowed the
process. Third, this comment will survey legislation that has been passed
within the past year to alleviate some of the problems and difficulties that
the initial legislation promoted.
II.

BACKGROUND

Even with the collapse of communist rule, Latvia has been rather
successful in avoiding a deterioration in government finances that often
accompany significant deficits, inflation, and overall macroeconomic
instability which normally result from such a revolution. Despite the fact
that Latvia lacks energy, it has evolved to enjoy a standard of living
superior to that of its neighbors in the former U.S.S.R., and promises an
agricultural potential (particularly in lumber, textiles and agro-industry),
and service potential (particularly in tourism, banking, insurance and

1. ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN LATVIA,
WORLD BANK MEETING IN PARIS 1 (May 19, 1994).

STATEMENT FOR THE

2. Trade Act Report Highlights - Latvia, Statement from the U.S. Embassy, Riga, Oct.
1993, at 3.
3. THE SURVEY OF LATVIA'S ECONOMY AND PROGNOSES FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, DEPARTMENT OF MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND
PROGNOSES, RIGA 2 (1994).

19951

Berzups

173

transit) that is quickly reviving. Above all, it possesses well developed
human resources with a conscientious quality labor force.'
For most of the republics of the former U.S.S.R., and particularly
Russia, Latvia remains the obvious maritime and transit route to Northern
Europe and the United States. This is due to six reasons. First, Riga has
the only container port between St. Petersburg and Poland. Second,
newly-established ferry services linking Riga to Scandinavia and Western
Europe allow overland trucking easy access to Russia, the three Baltic
States, and Belarus. Third, railroads and highways from Riga to Moscow
and St. Petersburg are good. Fourth, Riga has the largest airport in the
region and is steadily expanding air links with Western Europe. Fifth, it is
the only city in the Baltic to have regularly-scheduled direct air service to
the United States. Finally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development has financed expansion of the main airport runway to enable
B747 aircrafts to land at the airport in Riga starting in the summer of
1994.1 Latvia is a transit point for many goods, and the volume of transit
is bound to increase once Russia succeeds, even partly, in managing its
economic and political crisis.' "Transit cargo already accounts for more
than 90% of the cargo handled in the ports of Ventspils, Riga and Liepaja,
and for 70% of the cargo transported by railways.""
Latvia's medium term prospects for output recovery in the public
sector appear good,' even though the level of unemployment has increased
due to the tremendous decrease in industrial activity.9 This decrease in
industrial activity was caused by the closure of the Soviet market for such
goods."0 Fortunately, private sector dynamism has often compensated for
4. Christian Scuiller, Economic and Commercial Ambassador of France in Latvia, Latvia A New Directionof Development Towards Northern Europe and the ex-U.S.S.R., Statement from
the French Embassy, Riga, Sept. 3, 1993, at 2.
5. Press Release by American Chamber of Commerce in Latvia, July 6, 1994, at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. See ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN LATVIA, supra note 1.
8. This is stated conservatively since gross domestic product at constant prices continues to
decline. By the end of 1993, it was 80.1% of the previous year's level. In examining different
categories of production in comparison with 1992, the highest level of GDP (the smallest
percentage decrease) was reached for services (89.5%), supply of electricity, water and gas
(89.0%), but the lowest for construction (50.2%) and the mining industry (50.0%). LATVIJAS
BANKA ANN. REP. 5 (1993).
9. Industrial output, in terms of constant prices, decreased by 38.1 %. When one examines
the growth in industrial output per month, the decline had apparently leveled out in the period
from September until November, but decreased again by 6% in December compared to
November. LATVUAS BANKA ANN. REP. 6 (1993).
10. At the end of 1993, 76,700 unemployed persons were registered in Latvia, which was
5.8% of the employable population. The number of persons out of work grew approximately 2.5
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this decrease by absorbing these newly laid-off workers. As a result,
several thousand private enterprises have already been created chiefly in
retail trade and services.
Recovery still has a long way to go." Buying capacity did not
attain 1991 levels, although wage increases were above consumer price
index increases.' 2 According to the World Bank Social Protection
Identification/Preparation Mission statistics, the poverty level has gone up
from 4-5% of the total population to 35% of the population.' 3
Furthermore, according to information provided by EC-PHARE, "direct

investments per one inhabitant in Latvia between 1991 and the middle of
1993 were much less than the average for the rest of Eastern Europe.'
These statistics clearly indicate that in order to remedy these
problems, Latvia will need to depend on investments from the government
and the private sector, as well as from abroad. The World Bank estimates
that in order to "realize an annual growth rate of 4-5% in Latvia's
domestic product, the share of investments in the GDP must increase by
22% in the coming years.""
In furtherance of this realization, the government has decided to

increase public investment expenditure from a low of 0.8% to about 3% of

times. Slightly more than 25,000 (32.9% of all unemployed) have been out of work for more
than 6 months. Women comprised 53.2% of all unemployed. During the first half-year, the
number of unemployed grew rapidly. In the first seven months of 1993, it was on average
14.1% monthly, in August-October the number remained steady, and started growing again by
2.9% in November and by 2.3% in December. LATVIJAS BANKA ANN. REP. 7 (1993). As of
May 1994, 6.6% of the working age population of Latvia was registered as unemployed; the
government estimates total unemployment (those registered plus the "hidden" unemployed) at
9%. Press release by American Chamber of Commerce in Latvia, July 6, 1994.
11. Economic Reform and Public Investment in Latvia, Statement for the World Bank
meeting in Paris, at 6 (May 19, 1994).
To protect vulnerable groups from the impact of the transformation of the
economy, the government is taking steps for the development of an effective social
safety net. Present reforms aim at establishing a system in which means-tested social
benefits more specifically aimed at low income groups play a larger role. As a
reflection of the government's concern for social assistance the 1994 budget includes
anticipated social assistance payments equivalent to about 1.75% of GDP, up sharply
from about 0.75% of GDP in 1993.
12.
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13. The Mission occurred from October 25 to November 5, 1993.
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DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 4.
15. LATVIA PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW, WORLD BANK, Washington, Mar. 1994. As
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GDP in 1995 because Latvia has low levels of debt. 6 The government
will also devote a tremendous amount of energy and resources to
privatization, because it "considers privatization as the crucial element in
promoting the private sector to lead in economic development and
efficiency."' In particular, transfers of state property are expected to result
in stimulating investment activity and facilitating the reabsorption of
workers. ""
The government will also focus on attracting foreign investment.
A liberal foreign investment law has been enacted.
The Latvian
Development Agency has been set up to attract foreign investment and to
provide "one-stop" services to foreign investors.' 9 Although foreign
investment remains modest, there are signs of optimism.
Scandinavian clients are showing up in increasing numbers
to benefit from distribution costs significantly lower than in
the capitals of the Nordic countries." Many buyers are
also coming from other republics of the former Soviet
Union, (because practically everything is available in Riga,
and Moscow is less than 1000 km away). 2 '
The United States, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland continue to provide
the largest investments to Latvia." Hopefully, this will continue, as
foreign trade will play an essential role in the national economy and the
living standards of the population.
III.

ECONOMIC REFORM

In the midst of economic fury, Latvia faces the daunting task of
developing a completely new legal, financial, tax, and regulatory
infrastructure. "The economic reform program has been undertaken in
16. BUSINESS WITH LATVIA, LATVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, May 1994.

Through

November 1, 1993, the government of Latvia has borrowed USD 184.8 million from foreign
creditors. Foreign credits and official credit guarantees amounting to USD 316.8 million for
Latvia have been approved, including an SDR 54.9 million stand-by arrangements with the IMF.
On October 1, 1993, Latvia's official foreign exchange and gold reserves were valued at USD
336.2 million. Trade Act Report Highlights - Latvia, Statement from the U.S. Embassy, Riga, at
4 (Oct. 1993).
17. ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN LATVIA, supra note 1, at 5.
18.

Id.

19. Id.at 6.
20. Scuiller, supra note 4, at 2.
21. Id.
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DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 5.
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stages." 3 Initially, "an independent tax system was established in 1990. "2'
The establishment of the tax system was followed by a liberalization of
prices and elimination of subsidies in 1991 and 1992. "Measures were
then implemented to achieve macroeconomic stability through tight fiscal
and monetary policies and currency reform.""5
"Once this was
accomplished in the middle of 1993, attention has been focused on
structural reforms and the promotion of economic growth." 6
The creation of a stable national currency was one of the most
important achievements for the Latvian government and the Bank of Latvia
in 1993.12 Based upon International Monetary Fund guidelines, the Bank
of Latvia has exercised monetary restraint that has created one of the
world's strongest currencies, with the lat appreciating 44% against the
United States dollar and 41% against the German mark between January
and September of 1993.8 Inflation rates dropped from 958.6% in 1992 to
34.8% in 1993, to 12.3% in the first five months of 1994, with only 0.2%
growth in May and 2% growth in June.29
Based upon foreign reserves equal to twice the value of all lats in
circulation, the Bank of Latvia has guaranteed full convertibility of the lat,
with no restriction on the import, export, exchange, or use of foreign
currencies inside the country." As a result, 1993 was characterized by a
rapid inflow of convertible currencies to Latvia. The Bank of Latvia
purchased 272.2 million United States dollars more than it sold, in
comparison to only 20.9 million in 1992.
In consideration of the
possibility that the growing exchange value of lats can negatively affect
exports, the Bank of Latvia exercised tight monetary policy by restraining
the appreciation of the lat, thereby ensuring its stability in the currency
market." As a result, the strength of the lat and the inherent increase in
ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN LATVIA, supra note 1, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. The economic situation in Latvia during 1993 was complicated. The volume of
production continued to decline in nearly all the branches of the national economy, and the level
of unemployment rose. Nevertheless, a considerable reduction in inflation should be noted as a
positive development, alongside with the successful completion of currency reform. This may
reasonably be considered the main achievement of the monetary policy implemented by the Bank
of Latvia during 1993. LATVIJAS BANKA ANN. REP. 4 (1993).
28. Trade Act Report Highlights - Latvia, supra note 2.
29. American Chamber of Commerce in Latvia Press Release, July 6, 1994, p. 2.,
Normands Lisousleis, Inflation in June - 2.0%, DIENAS BIZNESS, July 13, 1991, at 17.
30. Id. at 3.
31 LATVIJAS BANKA ANN. REP. 21 (1993).
23.
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purchasing power has provided the foundation upon which the Latvian
economy can grow.
As Latvia makes striking progress toward economic stability, the
government is working to complete reforms that will lay the foundation for
this modern market economy. As. Vilfred Talvic, World Bank Vice
President for Central and Eastern Europe, emphasized, "the main goal of
Latvia's government should be to ensure the development of the
infrastructure and a social production system."32 Lars Jeurling, chief of
the World Bank Regional Mission to the Baltic Countries in Riga, Latvia,
agreed, stating that improvements in the financial sector and private sector
are critical to provide the necessary environment for restructuring
privatized enterprises so that they can face international competition.33
Talvic further emphasized, "critical to the successful development
of Latvia's national economy is political unity in priority issues of property
matters and privatization." ' This type of unity is essential to promote
investments from the private sector as well as from foreign investors.35
Based upon these recommendations and on the fact that Latvia's
privatization process has been slow-moving it has become one of the top
priorities in the government's economic reform movement.'
IV. PRIVATIZATION - THE BEGINNING
Property reform began in 1990 with changes to the constitution,
which reintroduced guarantees against confiscation or other infringements
of an individual's property rights.37 This was followed by legislation to
transfer state-owned assets to private individuals or organizations
(privatization), and to restore nationalized property to its previous owners
(restitution).3"
The direction of Latvia's privatization program has changed
frequently, yet the basic privatization principles, established with the

32. The World Bank and the Latvian Ministry of Economics organized a seminar in Riga
on April 14, 1994 where Vilfred Talvic, Vice President for Central and Eastern Europe spoke.
BUSINESS WITH LATVIA, LATVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, May, 1994, at 1.

33. Lars Jeurling, The Baltic Countries - Toward Sustained Economic Growth, BALTIC
OBSERVER, Mar. 24-30, 1994, at 15.

34. See BUSINESS WITH LATVIA, supra note 32, at 1.
35. See Jeurling, supra note 33, at 15.
36. Scuiller, supra note 4, at 2.
37. COOPERS & LYBRAND, LATVIA - A BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT GUIDE 16 (Apr.

1994).
38. Id.
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March 20, 1991 resolution, State Property and Basic Principles of its
Conversion, have remained constant. This resolution stated:
1) State property privatization will be carried out
according to the particular characteristics of individual
industrial sectors.
2) Restitution rights will have priority over the
privatization laws. Property rights for nationalized or
alienated property as of June 17, 1940 can be resumed by
any former owner or by his legal heir, regardless of his
present citizenship.
3) Privatization of unclaimed state property or property
that does not have former owners has to be carried out on
the basis of the redemption of property objects for local
currency of the Republic of Latvia and other means of
payment in operation.
4) Permanent residents of Latvia wilLbe able to purchase a
limited share of a state-owned property using privatization
certificates.
5) A special privatization fund will be formed from income
gained from the privatization process, to help promote the
activities of newly established private enterprises.
6) Privatization has to be carried out openly, under the
supervision of authorized public representatives of the
municipal privatization commissions. 9
Furthermore, privatization occurred in the following two phases:
privatization of buildings, and privatization of land. Land ownership in
Latvia is limited exclusively to Latvian citizens. Foreign nationals may
lease land upon which a building stands for a maximum of ninety-nine
years. However, both citizens and foreign nationals may purchase houses,
individual apartments and factories. The Civil Code of 1937, reintroduced
October 1, 1992, provides that enterprises may purchase buildings from
other enterprises, private persons, state or local governments.'

39.

BusINESS WITH LATVIA, LATVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, at 3, Apr. 1994.

40.

COOPERS & LYBRAND,

supra note 37.
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Under this system, the various ministries owned state enterprises
and were the initial decision makers in the privatization of these enterprises
and their property. This system was characterized by delays, confusion,
overlap of various ministry responsibilities, and arbitrary decisions.',
Furthermore, the situation regarding land ownership proved to be
unsatisfactory throughout this process. Reportedly, the government is
considering new legislation regarding land ownership."
V.

RESTITUTION

The regulation of land restitution was divided into those laws
covering land in rural areas, and those laws covering land in urban areas.
Laws covering rural areas were initially adopted on November 21, 1990
and expanded with the July 7, 1992 law, "On Land Privatization in Rural
Regions." The main purpose of this legislation was to: (1) provide a
guaranteed foundation for agricultural development; (2) restore property
rights to the rightful owner as of July 20, 1940 or their heirs; (3) provide
citizens the opportunity to obtain property for proper compensation; (4)
protect the ecological system currently existing on such lands; and (5)
respect the current tenants and governmental interests. '
If it proved
impossible to restore ownership of a certain tract of land, the owner
received restitution in the form of land of equal value or financial
compensation."
Laws covering urban areas, enacted on November 20, 1991,
repealed all laws and decrees passed since July 21, 1940 which affected
the nationalization of land. The purpose of this legislation was to: (1)
provide for the systematic denationalization, conversion, privatization and
restitution of urban lands; (2) reorganize the legal, social and economic
aspects of urban land ownership to promote rational utilization and
development of such properties for the common good; (3) provide the legal
foundation for such property rights, including guaranteed respect for
property borders delineated in the land registry; (4) restore property rights
to the rightful owners and their heirs; and (5) protect objects of historical
and national significance.4s Under the law, the land is transferred from the

41.

Raimonds Slaidins, Latvian Law and the Foreign Investor, Lawyers and Attorneys,

AM. BALTIC NEWS, May 1994.
42.
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federal level to the local municipal government, where the restoration
process will be accordingly monitored and controlled.
The Law for Denationalization of Buildings was passed October
30, 1991, with an effective date of January 1, 1992. It provided former
owners and their heirs, regardless of citizenship, ' the right to reclaim any
nationalized houses. Buildings, apartment blocks and private houses
These
exceeding 170-220 square meters were nationalized in 1940.'
buildings could not be alienated, reconstructed, renovated or demolished
until all restitution rights were resolved. Furthermore, if any rooms within
the building have become unoccupied, no new tenant relationship, legal or
otherwise, could be established until privatization had been completed. 8
Existing tenants, upon payment of rent not to exceed that delineated by the
Cabinet of Ministers, could not be evicted until after seven years from the
time of the privatization, unless a replacement of comparable value was
found."9 Aside from this hindrance, the condition that the property
subjected to denationalization could not be privatized until the deadline for
making claims had passed also considerably slowed the privatization
process."0
VI. PRIVATIZATION CERTIFICATES
To further complicate the privatization process, the legislation
introduced privatization certificates on November 4, 1992. The law aimed
to create a legal foundation for the participation of Latvia's citizens in the
government and municipal privatization process by developing a payment
methodology with privatization certificates. These certificates are issued
to Latvian citizens that reflect length of residence in Latvia, and to owners
and their heirs as a form of restitution for nationalized and unlawfully
Further, politically
occupied properties that will not be returned.
repressed individuals receive certificates as delineated by the May 13,
1992 status determination law, which defines entitlement based upon the

46. The Law "On the Ownership Rights in Relationship between Foreign Countries and
Latvia" passed September 4, 1991, recognized the property rights of foreign persons and legal
persons for the property nationalized in 1940, including diplomatic establishments and consulate
premises. Internal memorandum of the Latvian Privatization Agency, at 5 (on file with author).
47.

ANDRIS GRUTUPS, KA ATGUT NOLAUPITO (HoW TO REGAIN STOLEN PROPERTY - A

JUDICIAL EXPOSITION ON How PROPERTY IS RETURNED TO LAWFUL OWNERS IN LATVIA) 5
(1991).
48. See Tomsone, supra note 43, at 44.
49. Id.
50. Privatization in Latvia, Internal memo of the Latvian Privtization Agency, at 6 (on file
with author).
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length of time spent in political confinement, exile and concentration
51
camps.
The value of the certificate equates to an ownership of 0.5 square
meters of an average apartment or a nominal value of 28 lats. A
certificate account can be opened at the Latvian Republic Savings Bank or
Latvian Republic Land Bank. Only through these accounts can certificates
be inherited, bought, bequest or devised. These Banks must insure that an
individual only has one certificate account. Therefore, those requesting
any transaction with certificates must show a line of inheritance and
ownership. The option to open such an account expires December 31,
1996.2
A Latvian citizen will receive one certificate for every year of
residence in Latvia up until December 31, 1992, irrespective of how many
actual years were spent in Latvia. In addition, every person who was a
Latvian citizen, as of June 17, 1940, receives fifteen certificates. Any
offspring, regardless of age and citizenship, also receive fifteen
certificates, as long as one parent was a citizen of Latvia on June 17,
1940. Any resident born outside of Latvia, or one who does not have
Latvian citizenship will receive five certificates less than the calculated
time he or she has resided in Latvia. Anyone that immigrated to Latvia
after reaching retirement years, which is fifty-five for women, sixty for
men, and has not been employed at least five years in Latvia will not
receive any certificates. If a resident, who was not born in Latvia nor is a
citizen of Latvia, has documentation that indicates he invariably resided in
Latvia prior to June 17, 1940, he is entitled to certificates in a similar
fashion to anyone who had Latvian citizenship as of June 17, 1940.Y"
Up until recently, privatization certificates and their use have been
a bit of an anomaly. As Uldis Klauss, consultant to the Latvian Bank
stated,
I am very pessimistic about the certificate system. The
government at present needs funding to develop its
infrastructure and technology.
State-owned property,
therefore, should be sold rather than purchased with
certificates.
Unfortunately, the certificates will not
provide anything in regards to forwarding these goals. In

51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 10-11.
53. Id. at 11-12.
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effect, by issuing these certificates the government is
reverting back to socialism principles."
As of yet, no certificates have been used to acquire ownership in any
private or state-owned enterprise. By April 1994, 45% of the population
had received these certificates."
VII. SECTORAL PRIVATIZATION - AGRICULTURE
Structural reform has proceeded most rapidly in agriculture and in
The Law on Privatization of
the privatization of collective farms.
Fisheries and Collective Farms, passed on June 21, 1991, provided that
agricultural enterprises be converted to entrepreneurial enterprises
allocating shares in the property to members of the collective farm and
former owners of the property. 6 Employees received shares based upon
the labor input and time worked at the farm. The members of the newly
formed entrepreneurial companies would then have a chance to buy the
The
property and tangibles of the company through shareholding.
legislation proposed a promotion of independent management by former
collective farmers.
Financial resources obtained from the privatization
was used to pay off the respective liabilities of the enterprise, with the
remaining monies to be transferred to a state fund that is independent of
budgetary constraints.
Over 53,800 private farms have been established and most
remaining collective farms transformed into private joint stock
companies. 9 However, many of Latvia's new farmers are operating at
subsistence levels due to lack of financial resources and credit.' As a
result, agriculture did not attain 1992's level of production as gross
domestic product reached only 85.9% of 1992 levels. Production of the
major products in the livestock and animal husbandry sector decreased by
24.2% for meat, 17.6% for dairy products, and 35.0% for eggs.6' More
than 260,000 hectares of farmland remained unseeded due to the

54. Interview with Uldis Klauss, U.S. Treasury Department Delegate to the Development
of the Central Bank of Latvia, in Riga, Latvia (July 1994).
55. ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT INLATVIA, supra note 1, at 6.
56. See Privatization in Latvia, supra note 50, at 3.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 4.
Id.
See Trade Act Report Highlights - Latvia, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
LATVIJAS BANKA ANN. REP. 5 (1993).
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destruction of many of the collective farms.6" Adding to these problems is
the fact that while control over urban and rural property is being returned
to former owners, the legal right to urban property has not been
established, and mechanisms for title registration, sale and mortgaging of
real property are not yet fully developed. 3
Privatization of agricultural foodstuff processing, such as milk,
meat and bread, was further regulated by independent laws that took into
consideration the specific nuances of each enterprise. Based upon two
resolutions On the Privatization of Milk Processing Plants, passed April
15, 1992, and January 27, 1993, respectively, state owned milk collecting
and processing enterprises were privatized in two rounds. In the first
round, a 1940's functioning dairy cooperative society was allowed to
resume operation, including the processing plants associated with such
societies. During the second round, those milk processing plants that had
not been claimed by these societies as of April 1, 1993, were transformed
into joint-stock companies and sold on the basis of 70% of shares going to
milk producers, 10% to the employees and 20% to other persons or legal
persons."
Based upon the laws, On Privatization of Meat Processing Plants
passed May 18, 1993 and On State Bread Producing Plants passed June 1,
1993, the Ministry of Agriculture formed separate privatization committees
for bread production and meat processing plants to oversee and coordinate
the privatization of these specific industries. Both types of plants were
converted to state joint-stock companies and shares sold according to the
order specified by the Ministry of Agriculture.65
VIII.

SECTORAL PRIVATIZATION - BANKING

Underlying the obvious changes to property ownership and
business ownership are those of the Latvian banking system. The Latvian
banking system underwent a separate privatization process of the former
Bank of Latvia branches in 1993. The Bank of Latvia comprised fortynine branches until the 1992 passing of On the Bank of Latvia law. Under
the auspices of this law, the Bank Privatization Commission of Latvia and
the Bank Privatization Fund of Latvia organized and implemented the

62. Karlis Briviba, (Latvian Economist), Ekonomiskas krizes ietekme (Influence of the
Economic Crisis), DIENAS BIZNESS, July 8, 1994, at 8.
63.

See Trade Act Report Highlights - Latvia, supra note 2, at 2.

64. See Privatization in Latvia, supra note 50, at 4-5.
65. Id. at 5.
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process of separation and privatization by legally ceasing commercial
banking activities in 1993.
On May 10, 1993, the Bank of Latvia passed these branches to the
Bank Privatization Fund of Latvia where their claims and liabilities were
monitored. in 1993, eleven of these were sold in auctions to functioning
commercial banks, namely, Banka Baltija, Parekss-Banka, and Olimpija.
In addition, eight independent commercial banks were formed out of
fifteen former branches by attracting new private capital. At the end of
1993, the recently established Rezekne Commercial Bank (formed out of
five former branches) was merged with the commercial bank Banka
Baltija. One of the branches was liquidated, and the privatization of one
branch had not yet been completed by the end of 1993. The remaining
twenty-one branches were united in a new government-owned commercial
bank Latvijas Universala banka."
The Bank Privatization Fund of Latvia received payments totalling
4.6 million lats from the privatization of the branches. Out of this amount,
2.3 million lats were applied to cover losses arising from guarantees issued
by Saldus Branch, and to make provision in the Universal Bank of Latvia
for the bad debts of these privatized branches. The rest of this revenue
(2.3 million lats) was used to augment the statutory capital of the Universal
Bank of Latvia. '
The effects of this privatization were evidenced in interest rate
decreases and the creation of a more favorable environment for the
extension of credit. There was a slow, though definite, reduction in
interest rates charged by commercial banks on credits during 1993. With
inflation falling, the Bank of Latvia cut its refinancing eight times during
1993 - from 120% at the beginning of the year to 27% in October.
Commercial banks followed this reduction much more slowly, keeping
interest rates high on short-term credits." Annual interest rates on credits
to enterprises and private persons were generally above 100% at the
beginning of the year; they were around 80% during the third quarter and
fell to 60-70% on average toward the end of the year.' The continued
high interest rates on credits imposed by commercial banks may be

66.

LATVIJAS BANKA ANN. REP. 27 (1993).

67. The share of the Universal Bank of Latvia in the national banking system was
considerable; it ranked among the ten largest Latvian banks. Nevertheless, the successful
performance of this bank was hindered by the bad credits in its credit portfolio alongside with
other problems. As a result, the World Bank has offered assistance to rectify the situation, and
to develop it further. Id. at 27.
68. Id.at 11.
69. Id.at 12.
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explained by the very high levels of risk incurred due to economic
instability in the commercial sector, as well as the high interest levied by
already signed deposit agreements. The range of interest margins imposed
by various commercial banks was extremely wide, sometimes from 6% to
360%.70 It is clearly evident such credit rates at commercial banks do not
promote investment into the national economy and loans on such
conditions are not acceptable for the majority of manufacturers."
Ongoing efforts to restructure and rehabilitate the former branches
of the Bank of Latvia will continue by the strengthening of bank
supervision and development of a securities market. The legislative basis
for securing of loans by collateral will be improved through the adoption
of land property and land titling laws for legal entities.'
With these
measures and the promotion of competition by opening the banking sector
to foreign banks," the government hopes to bring down the presently high
interest rates on issuance of credit.
IX.

SMALL SCALE PRIVATIZATION

Small scale privatization has also helped the Latvian economy
because Latvia's growing private sector is estimated to account for as
much as 25% of the country's gross domestic product. ' In the World
Bank's experience, new private enterprises are perhaps the most dynamic
force in promoting economic growth."5
Small company privatization was carried out according to the
November 5, 1991, Law on Privatization of Municipally Owned Retail,
Public Eating Places, Service Establishments and Small Businesses. The
law denotes that municipal privatization committees organize the
privatization of qualifying enterprises within their jurisdiction.
Such
committees select the enterprises to be privatized, analyze the operation of
such enterprises, determine the initial selling price with specified criteria
for the purchaser, and set the form of privatization. Businesses are sold by
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a range of methods including tender, auction, sale to employees or sale to
another business entity."6 Bidders for the business are required to have
resided in Latvia for a minimum of sixteen years."
Initially only very small businesses with no more than ten
employees were eligible for privatization." The scope of the law was
widened when this size limitation was relaxed under an amendment
adopted in 1992." Although privatization began slowly during the first
quarter of 1992, it accelerated during the remainder of the year and by the
last quarter of 1993, an estimated 70% of all small businesses had been
transferred into private ownership.'
To further promote this sector, the government is in the process of
setting up business support centers with the aid of EC-PHARE. "I This
program is intended to provide training, technical expertise and financial
assistance to small and medium size enterprises.'
X.

LARGE PRIVATIZATION

Unlike the progress in small scale businesses, the pace of
privatization of large enterprises has been slow. Large privatization in
Latvia began in 1991, with partial price deregulation, a liberalization of
foreign trade, and the introduction of various legislation. It has proceeded,
however, at a relatively slow pace, and the primary reasons for this, as
stated by government officials, include non-existing central privatization
authority and a general lack of precise privatization legislation. 3
The large scale privatization was further stalled throughout most of
1992 and 1993, by a series of political, legal, and institutional obstacles,
including delay in the settlement of restitution claims because of the
citizenship issue; confusion about the currency was to be used to acquire
assets and uncertainty about which government ministry had responsibility
for the privatization of a particular enterprise. Other obstacles included
complicated procedures, poor institutional framework, poor marketability
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of the products of many state firms, high investments to restructure these
enterprises into commercially viable units, and difficulties in the settling of
debts between firms and the banking system.85 According to the State
Statistics Committee, only thirty-five large state-owned enterprises or 15%
of the total earmarked enterprises for privatization had been privatized by
November 1, 1993.' As of April 22, 1995, eighty-five large state-owned
enterprises had been privatized amounting to approximately 19.1 million
lats.87
The initial laws regulating large privatization, On the State and
Municipal Property Privatization Commissions and On the Privatization
Order of Objects of State and Municipal Property (Enterprises) were
passed on March 17, 1992, and June 16, 1992, respectively.
The
Czechoslovakian model was used as a basis for these laws. These laws
delineated the various methodologies that an enterprise can undergo to be
privatized and set the informational requirements for each privatization
proposal. The laws further defined the process by which approval must
occur, the methods of financing for privatization, and the procedures to
which penalties were not adhered."
This case by case privatization process was decentralized and
could be initiated from "the bottom up" by any private entrepreneur or
enterprise manager.19 The government compiled and accepted annual lists
of enterprises and separate structural units which could or could not be
privatized, based upon the proposals made by these enterprise managers or
branch ministries. Of the 1,270 enterprises listed for privatization in 1993,
712 were deemed privatizable while 558 enterprises were not.'
Accordingly, the government had the right to add or delete enterprises to
this list.
Once an enterprise was deemed privatizable, any person or legal
person (even foreign) could prepare a privatization proposal based upon
the enterprise's prospectus, within three months of the initial offering date.
Such proposals were submitted to the branch ministry which had the
oversight function for the respective enterprise. Unfortunately, such
proposals often were delayed or deemed nonfeasible because they did not
85.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN LATVIA, supra note 1, at 5.

86. Id. at 20.
87. Ekonomikas ministrias valst ipasuma privatizacyas politikas dalas (PoliticalDivision
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consider the burdens of freeing these enterprises from incompetent
management, shoddy products, disputed title claims and payrolls padded
with thousands of unnecessary workers.9 1 If the respective ministry
approved the project proposal based upon the development principles of a
particular ministerial branch, the project was introduced to the Ministry of
Economics. Once approved by this ministry, the proposal became the
official document by which the particular privatization activities had to be
Subsequently, a privatization commission was formed to
carried out.'
perform the valuation and oversight functions of the particular
privatization method.
Based on the fact that numerous state institutions were involved,
that often these institutions performed overlapping functions, and that often
these institutions and ministries had differences of opinion, the
privatization process continued at a snail's pace.9"
XI.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRIVATIZATION AGENCY

With the creation of the Privatization Agency (P.A.) by passage of
its statutes on March 29, 1994, responsibility for the privatization of large
enterprises was transferred to the P.A. Similarly, responsibility for the
privatization of large municipally-owned enterprise was transferred to
municipal privatization commissions (P.C.), based upon the February 26,
1994 law "On State and Municipal Privatization Commissions." The goal
of these institutions (in particular the P.A.) was to consolidate, within one
institution, the privatization process. In addition, by providing a more
professional centralized approach to this process, under the auspices of the
new law "On Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises" passed on
February 17, 1994, the government hopes that state enterprise
privatization would be accelerated.' The new law further declares that the
key objectives of the privatization of state-owned property in Latvia are to
create a favorable environment for the activities of private capital, and to
narrow the scope of state entrepreneurial activities."
The P.A. reports to the Minister of Privatization, who is directly
supervised by the Ministry of Economics. Enterprises under the control of
91. John M. Goshko, Stability Eludes Post-Soviet Eastern Europe; Detours on Painful
Journey to Democracy, Free Markets Raise Disenchantment in West, WASH. POST, May 23,
1992, at A27.
92. See Ekonomikas ministrijis vaist ipasuma privatizacijis politikas dalas, supra note 87,
at 2.
93. Id.
94. Privatization in Latvia, supra note 50, at 3.
95. BUSINESS WITH LATVIA, supra note 39.
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individual branch ministries are either transferred directly to the P.A. for
immediate privatization or to the State Property Fund (SPF), where they
The P.A. is
are held until such time as they can be privatized.'
responsible for supervising all aspects of the privatization process
including: (1) evaluating the privatization projects submitted by potential
investors, (2) determining any conditions that are to be attached to the
privatization of particular enterprises, including the main principles for its
restructuring and developmerit, (3) determining any claims for restitution
of state-owned property, (4) organizing tenders and auctions, which
include disseminating information about the company to the general public,
reviewing purchase bids and negotiating sales agreements, (5) receiving
privatization receipts, and (6) supervising the operation of sales contracts.'
Privatization may involve an entire enterprise, or parts of an enterprise,
and can be achieved through a number of different methods, including:
(1) sale by tender public auction or auction to selected bidders, (2)
transformation into a limited liability or joint stock company and sale of
shares, (3) by contributing the assets of an enterprise to a joint venture; or
(4) closure of an enterprise and liquidation of its assets.98 The number of
state owned enterprises to be privatized amount to several hundred, of
which 417 are on the list of enterprises that are not to be privatized."
The new privatization law further denotes that any physical person
or registered entity, with private equity capital exceeding 25% (even
The
foreign), can propose upon and acquire state-owned property.'0
buyer must prove his solvency (i.e. purchasing power), must not be
indebted to the state, and the purchase agreement must specify the
financing arrangements, with the proper mechanisms of investment
guarantees. The P.A. will determine whether such enterprise can be
bought by a deferred payment structure, or whether immediate payment is
required. The law does not give priority for staff and management to buy
shares in enterprises to be privatized. In turn, the buyer has the right to
refuse acquisition of certain fixed assets and working capital, which he is
not able to use in the further operations of the company. Transactions that
are connected with privatization and transfer of the ownership to new
owners are exempt from any state or municipal taxes. jot
96.

COOPERS & LYBRAND LATVIA - A BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT GUIDE 18 (Apr.

1994). The SPF also holds those state assets that will not be privatized. Id.
97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99. Id. at 2.
100. Privatization of Latvia, supra note 50, at 3.
101. Id.
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The P.A. will evaluate applications for the privatization of a stateowned company according to several specific criteria. These include the
conditions of work, employee training, number of vacancies to be
produced, the amount and purpose of the proposed investment, and
environmental protection safeguards.'" Once certain criteria are met, the
P.A. will conclude an agreement and land lease with the buyer thereby
transferring ownership and liabilities of the enterprise. From the time the
P.A. has been established, twenty to twenty-five enterprises will be
introduced publicly for privatization every three weeks. The Cabinet
adopted its first set of twenty enterprises on May 17, 1994. '03 As of July
20, 1994, more than 200 proposals have been received at the P.A. 10

XII. NEW PRIVATIZATION METHODOLOGY FOR THE PRIVATIZATION
AGENCY - THE SPECIFICS
With the creation of the non-profit joint stock company, the
Privatization Agency, privatization procedures have been modified based
upon the following procedures:
1) Approval Process - any individual or legal entity can submit a
proposal for privatization of all or part of an enterprise. The P.A.
registers submitted privatization projects and sends confirmations. The
P.A. examines all proposals and prepares a resolution for consideration by
the Cabinet of Ministers. If the Cabinet approves the resolution, the
enterprise can then be privatized. The Cabinet of Ministers may add
requirements to the privatization of these approved enterprises.
2) Preparation for Privatization - if approval is given, control over
the enterprise is transferred from the State Property Fund or Branch
Ministry to the P.A. This must occur within two weeks of the resolution
using official hand-over documentation.
These documents include a
balance sheet of the previous quarter, an inventory list, a list of the
liabilities and responsibilities of the enterprise, as well as information
concerning land and its utilization rights. While under the control of the
P.A., the managers of an enterprise are prohibited from taking certain
actions, such as disposing of assets or accepting large liabilities, without
the prior approval of the P.A.
Thereafter, the P.A. provides an
announcement to the mass media, known creditors, banks in which the

102.

LATVIAN BUSINESS GUIDE, LATVIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 58 (Apr. 1994).

103.

COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 96, at 1.

104. Kristians Mikelsons, Latvijas Privatizacjas agentura paatrinaprivatizacijas tempus
(LatvianPrivatizationAgency is Expediting the Privatization Process), DIENAS BIZNESS, July 20,
1994, at 6.
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enterprise has accounts, the Enterprise Register, and the municipality, on
whose territory the state enterprise is located, about the privatization of the
enterprise. The P.A. sets and publishes the deadline for receipt of
privatization projects and other documents. The P.A. is required to
provide potential investors with the information required to prepare a
privatization project for an enterprise. The P.A. is also required to settle
any restitution claims and determine whether any preemptive ownership
rights exist over the assets.
3) Privatization Projects - a privatization project must be prepared
for each enterprise by each potential investor and submitted to the P.A.
The project must include the name and address of the enterprise that is to
be privatized, the proposed method, means of payment and timetable for
privatization, an indication of the future operation of the enterprise after
privatization (or business plan if sold by tender or auction to selected
bidders), and information about the individual or legal entity submitting the
privatization project.
4) Valuation of Privatization Projects - the P.A. receives all the
privatization projects and determines the conditions pertaining to the
privatization. The preliminary sale price is determined by the P.A. with
reference to a valuation in accordance with the Law on Procedure of
Valuation of State and Municipal Enterprises passed February 26, 1994.
The preliminary valuation must, upon the request of the P.A., include a
valuation of all assets and liabilities, including off-balance sheet liabilities.
This valuation will determine the initial offering price. If an attempt at
privatization is considered unsuccessful based upon this valuation, the P.A.
may adjust this valuation without prior approval of the Cabinet of
Ministers.
Sale Procedure - if there is more than one acceptable
5)
privatization project, the enterprise is sold by tender, public auction or
auction to selected bidders. If the means of sale is auction with selected
participants, then the conditions of selection of participants must be
attached. In order to be considered in selected participant auctions,
applicants must submit a business plan to be evaluated by the P.A. and a
10% security deposit calculated on the initial offering price. If the means
of sale is tender bidding, then the terms of reference must be attached.
The bidder must submit a tender bid, including a business plan for the
enterprise along with a draft sales contract. The decision of a tender
commission is final and may not be altered or withdrawn. If there is only
one acceptable privatization project, the enterprise can be sold directly to
the applicant. The P.A. may set a minimum price under which the
enterprise will not be sold. Payment can only be made in lats or
privatization certificates. If privatization is not completed within the
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timetable specified in the privatization project, the P.A. may change the
conditions attached to the sale and/or extend the timetable for
privatization.
6) Monitor and Management - the P.A. has the right to purchase
back privatized companies in cases where the new owner does not operate
the enterprise according to the sales contract.
The P.A. also has
repurchase rights if the new owner resells the enterprise within three years
of privatization.
According to regulations defined by the Cabinet of
Ministers, unprivatized assets and enterprises are either managed by the
P.A. until privatized, handed over to the local municipality or institution,
or returned to the State Property Fund. 05 New enterprise owners, who are
citizens of Latvia, have first right-to-buy options on state or municipal
land. The new owners also have the right to lease land at rents determined
by agreement between the parties, on which the enterprise is located. The
owner has the obligation to sign a lease contract with rents not to exceed
those delineated by the Cabinet of Ministers. Disputes in regard to these
matters are settled judicially. If a land owner, who has signed a lease
contract with the owner of a privatized enterprise, sells the leased land,
then the enterprise owner has a pre-emptive right to buy the land.'"
XIII. NEW PRIVATIZATION METHODOLOGY FOR PRIVATIZATION
COMMITTEES - THE SPECIFICS
Based upon the February 26, 1994, "On State and Municipal
Privatization Committees," the Municipal Privatization Committees are the
highest ruling body for municipal enterprise privatization.
Separate
committees may be formed for individual enterprise privatization. This
executive committee, which must include at least one union representative,
decides which enterprises are to be privatized, adjusts enterprise valuation
as necessary to expedite privatization, and approves privatization
proposals. Any unresolved disputes at the committee level are decided by
the Ministry of Economics.
The function of a Privatization Committee is to manage the
privatization process, possibly with the assistance of experts. The division
of responsibilities among the members is collegial. Voting is open with
resolution adopted by simple majority. The Chairman of the Committee
105. This can include any person who is furthering a specific federal interest, which
includes but is not limited to defense, healthcare, culture, or education.
106.

See COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 37; see also BUSINESS WITH LATVIA, supra

note 39; Maris Kivsons, Vaists Mantas likvidesanas kartiba, DIENAS BIZNESS, July 15, 1994, at
4.
107. Latvijas Vestnesis, DIENAS BIZNESS, Mar. 3, 1994, at 2.
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has the right to delay the adoption of decisions and have them reexamined. The Cabinet of Ministers may halt any privatization process on
the request of the Ministry of Economics within a month of the resolution
by the individual privatization committee or the municipal executive
committee. 08
XIV. ANALYSIS OF NEW METHODOLOGY
Although the New Law on Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises allows for three methods of privatization: the sales method, the
private capital method, and the investment method, the Cabinet of
Ministers has only passed regulations for the sales method. As a result,
investors looking for creative alternative financing mechanisms have, up
until now, been barred from the privatization process. Furthermore, as
economist Karlis Briviba states, "Unresolved customs problems,
astronomical credit costs, high tax rates, high currency valuation and
energy prices are not allowing either local or foreign firms to expand
existing production or develop new production, and often interfering with
the privatization process."" Briviba predicts that even with the expedition
of the privatization process, Latvia is coming to an economic crisis level.
Janis Naglis, P.A.'s general director, further states that there are
other logistics problems that are currently facing the P.A. First, if
privatization had been started much sooner, the continued viability of
many state-owned enterprises would have been much higher. Second,
although many enterprises are required to be transferred to the SPF, many
have not been as of July 22, 1994. Third, for some enterprises, no one
Fourth, valuation of the
knows who is presently managing them."'
respective enterprises has been very tedious and time-consuming, because
finding a competent expert to do such a valuation has been very difficult." 2
Fifth, because of the relative ignorance of the populace in terms of
knowing what a stock or dividend is and their right to participate in the
privatization process, many individuals have not been involved in the
privatization process. The establishment of the P.A. was based upon the
premise that the economy can only recover with a private sector initiative
108.

COOPER & LYBRAND, PRIVATIZATION IN LATVIA 11 (1994).

109. Karlis Briviba, (Latvian Economist), Ekonomiskas krizes ietekme (Influence of the
Economic Crisis), DIENAS BIZNESS, July 8, 1994, at 8.
110.

Id.

111. Janis Naglis, General Director of the Latvian Privatization Agency, Privatizacijas
Krustceles (Privatizationat the Crossroad), DIENAS BIZNESS, July 22, 1994, at 8.
112. In the liquidation of one firm, Elsmira, the P.A. was able to find only one firm,
Invest Riga, who was able provide the expertise to valuate the radioelectronic firm. Id.
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which, in the past, had not proceeded as quickly as it should have.
Therefore, in order for the agency to meet its goal to privatize 75% of
state-owned enterprises by the end of year 1996, (which amounts to
approximately one privatization per working day for the next three years),
many of these problems will need to be resolved.
Foremost to this success will be the full utilization of certificates in
at least 100 privatization projects, where approximately 50% of their value
will be purchased with these securities. At present many individuals have
their certificates, but are not able to use them, except to sell them for
currency. Therefore, it will be critical to develop a mechanism for the
realization of this goal.
It is hoped that the formation of the Riga Stock Exchange, with the
help of France, will provide a network where these securities could be
exchanged. If things proceed as planned, the first securities transactions
will occur sometime in October." 3 With the development of a computer
network, it is hoped that each region will be able to follow such stock
activity daily."" The French Stock Exchange is currently working with the
Riga Stock Exchange to develop the structure and regulations for adopting
the continental model which is present in most European exchanges."'
Naglis, along with many others, believe it may be too late for this process
because companies such as Baltijas Vertspapiru Nams and Olevs - Investe
are speculatively purchasing certificates for 0.5 lats or even less in the
rural areas (even though nominal worth of the certificates is 28 lats) and
thereby shifting the concentration of enterprise ownership to only a select
few.
Privatization certificates will not be the entire solution to Latvia's
economic woes. Enticement of foreign investment into the privatization
process will be critical. Presently two firms Coopers & Lybrand (with
funding coming from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and EC-PHARE programs) and Roland Berger are trying to
entice foreign investment. In addition, it is hoped that with the aid of
experts, this new methodology will not only allow the government the
opportunity to sell the better enterprises, but those that are taxing the
government budget with large debts and ecological problems.
Furthermore, it is hoped that the politics of the different factions of the
coalition government will not interfere with the process." 6
113.

Mikelsons, supra note 104.

114.

Id.

115. Ralfs Vilands, Fondu birza izvelas Francijas piemeru (Riga Stock Exchange Selects
the French Model), DIENAS BIZNESS, July 22, 1994, at 4.
116.

Mikelsons, supra note 104.

1995]

Berzups

As a final note, one of the Privatization Agency's top priorities
will need to be the fair privatization of two entities: The Latvijas Nafta
(Latvian Petroleum), which is laden with an $18 million credit, and the
Latvian Universal Bank whose bad credit portfolio is currently being
guaranteed by the government." 7 Furthermore, to prevent losses for
seasonal enterprises, it will be critical to privatize such enterprises before
the harvest. In addition, the privatization agency must further promote the
use of local materials rather than imported goods in order to help the
current economy.
Priority should also go to partially completed
construction sites. " " Only the future will determine whether this new
privatization methodology will answer these problems.
XV. CONCLUSION
Despite these new laws, it remains to be seen whether the
privatization process will be accelerated and whether economic
development will be stimulated as a result. It is clear that Latvia has come
a long way in the three years since gaining independence. Latvians, as
well as the international community, have already recognized that their
country is a gateway to the markets of the Commonwealth of Independent
States countries. But Latvia's future will strongly depend on the continued
development of a strong and viable economy. Latvia could become the
"Hong Kong of Russia" or rather the "Switzerland of the Baltics." Like
Hong Kong, Latvia is attracting attention as a stable platform for business,
favorably situated next to an economically powerful, yet in many ways
troubled, neighbor. In contrast to Hong Kong, Latvia sees a European
future for itself, and it has taken the first step toward membership in the
European Union by initialling a Free Trade Agreement with the European
Union on June 20, 1994." 9 With Latvia's entry into the European Union
on the horizon, it will only be a matter of time before the completion of
successful economic reform which will attractively position Latvia to
become a successful competitor with respect to two major markets - Russia
to the east and Europe to the west.

117. Only Parex Bank has officially submitted a privatization proposal regarding the
Latvian Universal Bank. Other possible interested parties could be Latvijas kapitala banka,
Ogres and Liepaja commerce banks. Mikelsons, supra note 104.
118. Id.
119. Press Release by American Chamber of Commerce in Latvia, July 6, 1994, at 2.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

"Diplomatic immunity covers many things, but failing to pay
$400,000 rent is not one of them, a federal judge said as he ordered the
Zaire mission to the United Nations to be evicted from its offices."'
However, only a few months later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
overruled the judge by holding that diplomatic immunity does extend to
this case and that the mission cannot be evicted.' In other words, the
mission can lease another's land, continue its work, refuse to pay rent, and
not be evicted. What remedies does a landlord have? Does our
government have a remedy that would satisfy both the American citizen as
well as the well-established international law of diplomatic immunity?
This note will provide an overview of the development and changes in the
law of diplomatic immunity, discussing its problems and possible

solutions. Then, in light of this overview, a determination will be drawn
stating whether our government has taken the necessary steps to balance

* B.S., 1990, Indiana University; Candidate for Juris Doctor, 1995, Indiana University
School of Law.
1. Zaire'sMission to the U.N. To Be Evicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1992, at A2.
2. 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations, 988 F.2d
295 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993).
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the scale of diplomatic immunity that is heavily skewed in favor of the
diplomat.
The landlord's dilemma is one of many unresolved problems of
diplomatic immunity. Offenses by diplomatic personnel vary from parking
violations, to drug smuggling, and murder.' The most serious problems
Americans have encountered in this arena include rape by a foreign
attache's son, assault by the son of a foreign Ambassador to the United
States, child abuse, and sexual assault by an emissary." The United States
is host to some 37,000 diplomatic personnel who are immune to nearly all
civil and criminal liability.5 Although abuses are the exception rather than
the rule, the number of abuses is alarming and has constantly been an issue
of debate in Congress. With no clear guidance from Congress, the courts
are left to their own reasoning and interpretations of purposely ambiguous
treaties, and the considerations of foreign affairs policy.
As courts have encountered such problems previously, they have
created a limited number of precedents on certain aspects of diplomatic
immunity. For example, courts have unanimously upheld diplomatic
immunity in criminal prosecution and civil litigation resulting from
criminal behavior. In Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed an action for
lack of jurisdiction based on defendant's status as Ambassador to the
United States. 6 In this case, the grandson of a Brazilian Ambassador
assaulted and shot an American citizen without accountability for criminal
or civil liability.' The court hinted that it was the function of the other two
branches to provide a proper solution to such incidents."
Diplomats have also been able to invoke immunity to avoid service
of process. In a case representative of this precedent, a Circuit Court
upheld a United States Marshal's refusal to serve compulsory process on
the Ambassador of Tunisia, stating that such service would violate the
Ambassador's diplomatic immunity.9 The court relied on the State
Department's opinion that such service of process would "prejudice United
States foreign relations and impair the performance of diplomatic
3. Lori Shapiro, Foreign Relations Law: Modem Developments in Diplomatic Immunity,
1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 281 (1990).
4. Carol Wallace & Michael Weiss, The Untouchables: Diplomats in America, PEOPLE
WEEKLY, Jan. 17, 1983, at 18(4).
5.

Shapiro, supra note 3, at 281.

6.

Skeen v. Federative Republic of Braz., 566 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983).

7.

Id.

8. Id.
9.

Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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functions.'
After weighing foreign relations interests against the benefit
of such service, the court concluded that the former outweighed the latter
and upheld diplomatic immunity.II
Yet another precedent is the inability of courts to compel
diplomatic officials to testify at trials.'2 For example, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia sided with a Canadian
Ambassador to the United States who refused to testify at a perjury trial,
on grounds similar to service of process."' Courts generally dislike
limiting immunities that are provided by the Vienna Convention and
routinely side with the State Department.
These instances amply justify the Second Circuit's reasoning in
767 Third Avenue Associates v. PermanentMission of Zaire, " in which the
landlord could not evict his delinquent tenant. If such procedural matters
as service of process or a subpoena are prohibited by the notion of
diplomatic immunity, eviction would certainly not be allowed.
Nonetheless, although the trial court in this case probably went too far in
permitting the eviction of the mission, both the district and the appellate
courts were justified in directing attention to the government and voicing
their opinions that, without any revisions of diplomatic immunity law,
innocent victims would continue to bear the burden of delinquent
diplomats.
II.

BACKGROUND OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Acknowledged diplomatic immunity has existed since the sixteenth
century when it was established in Europe as a result of the common
exchange of permanent ambassadors,"
During this era, European
countries realized that in order to assure the safety and efficacy of their
work, ambassadors needed to be protected from criminal jurisdiction in the
hosting country.' 6 History provides three theories for the need of such
immunity. First, Hugo Grotius expressed the theory of "sacredness of

10. Id. at 980.
11. Id.
12. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 293.
13. Hellinic Lines Ltd., 345 F.2d at 980. The court held that service of a subpoena
threatens a diplomat's freedom of movement, impairs his or her ability to perform necessary
functions, and thus is a violation of diplomatic immunity. Id.
14. 988 F.2d at 295.
15. Leslie Farhangi, Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1517, 1519 (1986).
16. Id.
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Ambassadors."' 7 Grotius believed that ambassadors were protected by
both "divine and human law"' 8 and violation of such law would "not only
[be] unjust but also impious."' 9 Another theory was "exterritoriality",
which suggested that an ambassador, wherever he or she might be,
remains on the grounds of its sending state, and therefore is not subject to
another country's laws."0 A third theory, that of "functional necessity", is
the one most widely accepted. 2' Functional necessity is based on the
notion that diplomats cannot perform their duties and diplomatic functions
without the protection of such immunity."
Rules of diplomatic immunity have remained unaltered since the
time they were established. However, in time, the various and often
inconsistent practices required consolidation.23 This occurred at the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations of 1963.24 The Conventions codified most modern
diplomatic and consular practices2 5 and were signed and ratified by over
140 countries, including the United States.26 The 1961 Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (hereinafter Vienna Convention) provides for
immunity of diplomats and the diplomatic agent's family members. The
treaty addresses numerous aspects of diplomatic immunity including
approval of diplomats by the host country,2" appointment of mission staff, 9

17. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 282 [A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 664 (1980) (citing H. Grotius, De Jure Belli et
Pacis 201 (W. Whenwell trans. 1853) and 2 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 431 (F. Kelsey
trans. 1925))]. See also 767 ThirdAve. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 300.
18. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 282 [A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 664 (1980) (citing H. Grotius, De Jure Belli et
Pacis 201 (W. Whenwell trans. 1853) and 2 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 431 (F. Kelsey
trans. 1925))].
19. Id.
20. Farhangi, supra note 15, at 1520, 1521. The note also points out that this theory has
been rejected due to its dangerous consequences. Id.

21. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 282.
22. Id. See also Farhangi, supra note 15, at 1521.
23.

Farhangi, supra note 15, at 1521.

24. Diplomatic Immunity, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Oct. 22, 1990, v. 1 at 210(1).

25. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3230, 500
U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26. Id.
27. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 284. Limited diplomatic immunity also extends to the
administrative, technical, and service staff of the foreign mission. Id.
28.

Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 4.

29.

Id. art. 7.
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and exemption from local taxes." In addition, the Convention offers two
resolutions to problems of abuse of local laws. 3' The treaty also provides
for the inviolability of diplomatic missions in Article 22.32 However,
although many concerns seem to be directly addressed by the Convention,
inviolability of the mission, as it is described in the treaty, lends itself to
various interpretations,33 thus leaving room for assorted understandings.

III. THE LANDLORD'S DILEMMA
In May 1982, the Zaire Mission to the United Nations rented an
entire floor in a modern Manhattan high-rise at $19,350 per month.' Soon
after it occupied the premises, the mission encountered problems keeping
up with its rent payments.3" After two judgements in favor of the landlord
and the mission's repeated delinquency in the payment of its rent,36 the
landlord proceeded to reclaim what was his by evicting the mission, only
to discover that it could not be done.3 ' The mission, backed by the United
States government, invoked diplomatic immunity.3" Following a decision
in the landlord's favor and the mission's appeal, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the mission was inviolable and could not be evicted.3 9
The landlord learned that he had no remedy against this delinquent and
costly tenant other than to throw himself at the mercy of the United States
government and hope that it would persuade the mission to either pay its
debt or move out.'

30. Id. art. 33.
31. Id. art. 9 & 32.
32. Id. art. 22.
33. 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Permanent Mission of Zaire to the United Nations, 787 F.
Supp. 389, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The District Court interpreted the language of the Vienna
Convention not to include the situation at bar. Id. Cf. 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v. Permanent
Mission of Zaire to the United Nations, 988 F.2d at 298 (stating that language of the treaty is so
narrow that no other interpretations are possible).
34. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 296.
35. Id.
36. Id. After some pressure from the United States government, Zaire paid its debts to the
landlord, but thereafter failed to make rent payments as they became due.
37. Id.
38. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 295.
39. Id.
40. David Frum, Diplomatic Immunity, FORBES, Apr. 26, 1993, at 110. Zaire, whose
dictator is a billionaire, is notorious for nonpayment of international debts. As a result, the
United States cut its foreign aid to Zaire from $31 million in 1990 to $3.5 million in 1992.
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A. District Court'sReasoning
Upon review of relevant treaties and documents, the New York
District Court decided that provisions for inviolability of missions were not
prompted by concerns of eviction due to failure to pay rent."' Article 22 of
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, '2 which speaks of
inviolability of foreign missions, states that, with no exception, agents of
the receiving State may not enter the mission's premises unless they are
authorized by the head of the mission. 3 In addition, the Article states that
the receiving State has a special duty to protect the mission's premises
from "any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace
of the mission or impairment of its dignity."" Read together, the judge
interpreted this language to be based on two considerations: "first, a
perceived need to protect the sovereign from mob violence and other
harassment; and second, recognition that the premises of the sovereign are
entitled to protection from unannounced seizures or other invasions of
privacy. "' The court thought it unlikely that "the treaties intended to
protect diplomats from injuries sustained from a party's lawful efforts to
recover its own property."" In addition, the court stated that eviction
would not be an "unannounced . . . invasion", since the mission has
received ample notice.' 7
Moreover, in response to the mission's argument that eviction will
hinder its function, the court replied that the mission should have looked
for alternate housing if it was not able to meet its financial obligations;
further, the only hinderance to the mission's function was its own inability
to make the required rent payment." Finally, the court rejected the notion
proffered by the Department of State that a single landlord should carry
the burden of our nation's foreign policy,' 9 especially when there was no
proof that American diplomats abroad would feel the consequences of such
eviction." The court stated that if the State Department is concerned with

41. 767 ThirdAve. Assoc., 787 F. Supp. at 389.
42. Vienna Convention, supra note 25.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 787 F. Supp. at 394.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 395.
49. Id. at 396.
50. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 787 F. Supp. at 394.
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the consequences of such action, it should have insured the landlord's rent
payments, possibly by providing an escrow fund for the rent payments.5 '
Reviewing the history of wrongful possession of property by
diplomatic personnel and their missions, one realizes that Judge Sand,
from the Southern District of New York, took a new approach to this
problem. Up to this point, courts avoided speaking out on this issue and
dismissed suits without looking into the merits of their arguments. For
instance, in September of 1991, a Manhattan civil court dismissed an
action attempting to evict a Congo mission counselor for failing to pay
rent, declaring that it had no jurisdiction over diplomatic procbedings, and
therefore deferred to the federal judicial system.52 In light of the rise in
diplomatic personnel in this country such disputes may become more
common and serious. For example, in October of 1991, a landlord sought
a judgment from a federal court to evict a press attache of the Pakistani
mission from his penthouse apartment. 3 The court held that, although the
press attache himself was immune to the suit,' the mission was not.55 The
court cited a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provision which explains
that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction in cases where rights in
immovable property located in the United States are at issue.56
The District Court demonstrated a new approach and reasoning in
the Zaire case when it interpreted the treaty not to protect the mission from
a civil remedy which would secure a landlord's own property.57 There is
no precedence to the court's ruling, and the Vienna Convention does not
explicitly call for protection of a mission when wrongfully possessing
another's property." The court felt that the mission purposely invoked

51. Id. at 396.
52. Edward Adams, Diplomat Declared Immune from Eviction, Federal Court Suit
Required for Jurisdiction, 206 N.Y. L.J. 51 (1991) See also 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1993) (which
provides that only federal courts hold jurisdiction over members of a diplomatic mission).
53. Deborah Pines, Diplomatic Immunity No Bar to Eviction, 209 N.Y. L.J. 43 (1991).
54. York River House v. Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, 820 F. Supp. 760, 762
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that the press attache was dismissed from the suit by a lower court
on the grounds of diplomatic immunity under art. 31(a) of the Vienna Convention because he was
found to be "the mission's current diplomatic agent in residence").
55. Id. at 760 (stating that the lease to the apartment was in the name of the mission, not
the attache).
56. Pines, supra note 53 (citing Judge Leval of the New York Civil Court). This case
came to an end following the Second Circuit's announcement that foreign missions cannot be
evicted. Thus, the district court followed this rule expanding it to include private residences of
mission personnel. Id.
57. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 787 F. Supp. 389.
58. Id. at 394.
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diplomatic immunity while in the wrong, thus abusing its welcome and its
Consequently, the court resorted to equity
grant of immunity.59
considerations in an attempt to provide a remedy that would restore the
landlord to the same or similar condition he was in prior to the mission's
violations.' The only remedy under the existing circumstances seemed to
be eviction, as it was dictated by the District Court. Although the court's
interpretation may have stretched the meaning of the Vienna Convention
beyond the treaty's intent, the court did so in the name of equity, knowing
that if the mission is to stay, the landlord's right to its property would not
be upheld b' the government. 6'
B. Circuit Court's Reasoning
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Article 22 of the
Vienna Convention to include immunity from eviction. Article 22 states
that the premises of a mission are inviolable, and that receiving states
officials cannot enter the premises without explicit consent of the mission's
head. 62 The court held that this includes eviction. In its reasoning, the
court pointed to previous examples in which United States officials were
not permitted to enter foreign missions without explicit permission even
though its occupiers were endangered.63 The court feared that violation of
the Vienna Convention may have grave consequences for American
diplomats abroad. '
The Circuit Court correctly pointed out the treaty's statement of
the mission's inviolability, and the requirement of explicit consent before
entering the mission's premises.6' The Vienna Convention provides that
"[tihe premises of the mission . . . shall be immune from search,
Some commentators interpret
requisition, attachment, or execution." '
these provisions to unquestionably prescribe inviolability even when the

59.

Id. at 390.

60.

Id. at 391.

61.

Id. at 396.

62. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 22.
63. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 301 (referring to an incident in 1979 when the
Soviet mission to the United States was bombed and the FBI was not allowed entry until the
mission head consented).
64. Id. at 300.
65.

Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 1 (providing that regardless of ownership, all

ancillary land is to be part of the mission's premises).
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 22.
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mission is involved in an unlawful act.' Such contentions are based on the
explicit refusal of the treaty's drafters to include exceptions to inviolability
despite evident abuses of local laws.' Since the treaty lists no exceptions
to the consent requirement, the court interpreted the treaty to signify that
no exceptions were intended. Therefore, the United States Marshall could
not enter the premises to evict the mission.' In light of other opinions on
this issue, the court's rationale for such strict interpretation is not a blind
adherence to a rule of law in an international treaty uncaring of justice at
home, but that by upsetting existing treaty relationships, American
diplomats abroad may well be denied lawful protection of their lives and
property to which they would otherwise be entitled. That possibility
weighs so heavily on the scales of justice that it militates against
enforcement of the landlord's right to obtain possession of its property for
rental arrears.7 °
The court thus adopts from the State Department the argument that
eviction of the delinquent mission will expose diplomats abroad to harm:
The risk . . . is of course that American missions abroad
would be exposed to incursions that are legal under a
foreign state's law. Foreign law might be vastly different
from our own, and might provide few, if any, substantive
or procedural projections for American diplomatic
personnel. Were the United States to adopt exceptions to
the inviolability of foreign missions here, it would be
stripped of its most powerful defense, that is, that
international law precludes the nonconsensual entry of its
missions abroad.'
The judge explains that the only way to guarantee the protection of
American diplomats abroad "is through blanket immunities and privileges
without exceptions".' Finally, the court points out that in recent years,
many reforms to various diplomatic immunities have been suggested and

67. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent
United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 647 (1985).
68. Id.
69.

767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 301.

70. Id. at 296.
71. Id. at 300-01.
72.

Id. The judge also discussed the fact that even after an exception to the inviolability

provision was proposed, the drafters of the Vienna Convention declined to adopt it and the
exception never resurfaced. Id.
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implemented, but none concerning mission inviolability.73 The court
agrees that reform is in order and even suggests taking a second look at the
Vienna Convention, but the court is of the opinion that it is not the courts'
terrain to take a second look at the Convention.7" Instead, the court avidly
points to Congress for action. 5 Although the outcome of this case does not
incite any enthusiasm, one must agree with the court's position,
particularly after reviewing the government's foreign affairs policy on the
issue of diplomatic immunity.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY
In cases involving diplomatic immunity, judges inevitably turn to
the Department of State (Department) for clarification, opinion, or
solution. Whether directly or indirectly, the Department is invariably
involved in every action arising out of diplomatic immunity. In 1990, the
Department clarified the nature of diplomatic immunity, the Department's
In its
practices, and future trends and practices around the world.
opinion, "immunity protects the channels of diplomatic communication by
exempting diplomats from local jurisdiction so that they can perform their
duties with freedom, independence, and security." 76 Due to the large
number of American diplomatic and consular personnel stationed in
countries where individual rights do not enjoy the same protection as in the
United States, the United States considers the Vienna Conventions to be of
extraordinary importance." Therefore, the Department insists, a slight
variation from the treaties in dealing with diplomatic immunities could lead
to harsher treatment of our diplomats abroad."
In 1987, the Department promptly intervened in Congress' debate
on the passage of a bill that intended to limit diplomatic immunity. In light
of its policy, the Department of State's Chief of Protocol, Ambassador
Selwa Roosevelt, voiced concerns and represented the Department's
position and policy on this issue before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. 9 Ambassador Roosevelt noted that diplomatic immunity

73. Id. at 302.
74. 767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 302.
75. Id.
76. Diplomatic Immunity, supra note 24.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ambassador Selwa Roosevelt's statement, Dept. of St. Chief of Protocol, before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1987, v. 87 at 29 [hereinafter
Roosevelt].
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existed "to assure that diplomatic representatives are able to carry out the
official business of their governments without undue influence or
interference from the host country. [Immunity] enables them to work in
an environment of freedom, independence, and security. "" The Chief of
Protocol then stated that, in light of the function of diplomatic immunity,
the Department of State could not support a bill which would narrow
diplomatic immunity. 8' Such efforts would endanger American diplomats
abroad and greatly interfere with the United States foreign affairs. 2
However, Ambassador Roosevelt pointed out that steps have been taken to
curb abuses of diplomatic immunity, particularly criminal offenses.83 For
example, a system to bar reentry of serious offenders has been initiated.
The Department circulated written guidance to police on how to handle
incidents involving diplomatic and consular personnel and urged law
enforcement officers to pursue possible charges.' In addition, the Chief of
Protocol promised that in particularly outrageous incidents involving
juvenile offenders, the entire family would be expelled.85 The Department
of State also assured the Committee that traffic offenses were closely
monitored and driving while under the influence laws strictly enforced
with diplomatic and consular personnel.86 Moreover, failure to comply
with local firearm laws would expose a diplomat to expulsion. 7 Finally,
Ambassador Roosevelt announced that foreign personnel would be
required to carry identification cards which list types of immunities a
particular individual enjoys, and provide a 24-hour telephone number to
answer questions about the particular person or issue.8 The Department of
State vowed that it stands ready to take action in any situation in which a
person with immunity violates American law."
In addition to her address to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Ambassador Roosevelt circulated a note to the Chiefs of
Mission at Washington in which she reminded them of the "serious
concern of the United States Government at alleged criminal activity by

80. Id.

81.

Id.at 29.

82.

Id.

83. Id. at 30.
84.

Roosevelt, supra note 79, at 30-31.

85. Id. at 31. This should promote parents' accountability for their children's conduct.
86. Id.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89.

Roosevelt, supra note 79, at 32.
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certain members of diplomatic missions or members of their families. "
The note pointed out that neither the Department of State nor the
community tolerate criminal violations, and reminded the missions of the
corrective measures available under international law.9' The Ambassador
reiterated that the Department, in case of a criminal violation, requests
9
from the mission a waiver of immunity in order to prosecute the offender. 2
In case such waiver is not granted the Department requires expulsion of
the offender.' Further, the note stated that "in all cases involving injury
to persons or damage to property, the Department pursues vigorously the
interests of the aggrieved parties in obtaining prompt restitution by
individual offenders or by their governments.'"I
It appears that the Department of State is willing to address abuses
when they are particularly grave. However, abuses that do not involve a
threat to another's life or are equally damaging seem to attract less of the
Department's attention. There may be room for a bit of optimism; a
change in the State Department's approach to less severe abuses might be
occurring. In 1992, a French news agency reported the United States
government's direct involvement in rent disputes between two American
landlords and two foreign missions." The agency related that the State
Department threatened to expel two Zairian and two Congolese diplomats
if their delinquent rent was not paid within thirty days." The report also
stated that it was the first time in Department of State's history that it
threatened expulsion of diplomats due to an abuse of "privilege of
residence" in either New York City or Washington D.C.9' Although the
government later argued that eviction in this situation is not a valid
solution under applicable treaties," the government at least made an effort
to address the landlord's complaint - a step the government had not been
willing to take in the past. It remains to be seen whether this trend will
continue into the future. Moreover, would the Department be willing to
take the next step and expel the delinquent tenants upon non-payment? In
90. Marian N. Leich, Crimes by Foreign Mission Personnel: CorrectiveMeasures, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 106 (1988).
91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.. at 107.
95. Washington Threatens to Expel U.N. Diplomats over Back Rent, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 26, 1992, availablein LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
96.

Id.

97. Id.
98.

767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 295.
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other words, will our government flex its muscle at issues that concern the
economic well-being of our citizens?
V.

RELATED LEGISLATION

Each time a court delivers its opinion on the issue of diplomatic
immunity, it urges Congress to address the issue." In response, Congress
enacted several statutes.
In 1978, Congress passed the Diplomatic
Relations Act ("Act") to replace a 1790 statute which was inconsistent
with the diplomatic relations provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention."w
In addition to codifying the necessary provisions of the Vienna
Convention, Congress included in the Act, inter alia, a requirement that
diplomatic personnel carry automobile liability insurance.'"' This specific
provision came as a direct response to other countries' requirement that
American diplomats carry liability insurance."'°
In 1983 Congress
amended the Act to hold embassies responsible for full liability insurance
coverage for their diplomats.' 3 This provision provides a plaintiff with a
right to sue the insurer directly. The Act also confers power on the
President of the United States to specify greater or lesser immunity
protection for certain diplomats, based on reciprocity." °4 This accords the
President wide discretion for the grant of diplomatic immunity.
In 1982 Congress passed the Foreign Missions Act ("FMA"). °5
The FMA established a duty in the government to oversee the activities of
all foreign missions in the United States. 'I This act was passed largely in
response to reports that certain foreign countries placed restrictions on
American missions in connection with office space and/or housing
accommodations. 'I The intent of the FMA is to ensure that our diplomatic

99. The doctrine of non-justiciability, applicable in this area of law, does not permit courts
to meddle in foreign affairs. The doctrine addresses courts' authority to hear cases. Specifically,
the issue addressed is whether a case involves a political or legal question. Although it is not yet
completely clear what comprises a political question, most courts recognize the area of foreign
relations as a political question that is non-justiciable. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
100. David H. Goodman, The U.S. Needs To Play HardBall, 11 Hous. J.INT'L L. 395,
399-400 (1989).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 286.
105. Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301 (1993). See, e.g., Andrew Odell, Foreign
Governments as Tenants, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 29 (1984).
106. Odell, supra note 105, at 29.
107. Id.
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missions abroad are treated the same way as their counterparts in the
United States. Accordingly, the act established the Office of Foreign
Mission with the responsibility of approving foreign missions' transactions
involving real estate in the United States.'0 This creates a duty in the
foreign missions to report to the Office when such a transaction is
planned.'"9 Consequently, if a foreign mission fails to comply with this
requirement, the Secretary of State has the authority to dispossess the
mission of its premises in the United States.' 0 Although this act satisfies
informational needs, it provides little protection to Americans once its
requirements are met.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)"' vests
authority in the judiciary to decide when a foreign state is immune from a
lawsuit and when immunity does not apply." 2 However, the act also
provides that it operates "[s]ubject to existing international agreements to
which the United States is a party.""' 3 The FSIA grants immunity only to
public acts, but such immunity does not apply in commercial or private
transactions."" Thus, although the act seems to expand the basis of
liability for foreign states, it parallels directly the diplomatic immunity
provisions of the Vienna Convention since such immunity applies only
when a diplomat acts within the scope of his or her function.
Furthermore, since an act within the scope of a diplomat's function is also
a public/governmental act, it is excluded from FSIA's applicability.
Therefore, when a diplomat breaks the law and diplomatic immunity
applies, the FSIA will not be able to strip it away. Accordingly, the FSIA
applies mostly to private foreign undertakings, not to diplomatic personnel
and missions." 5
Another bit of legislation on the issue of immunity is the Alien
Tort Claims Act."16 This act provides a United States forum for civil
litigation against another country's national in cases of injury to American

108. Id.
109. Id.
110.

Id.

111. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
112. Id. In its definition of "foreign state", the FSIA includes a political subdivision or
agency or instrumentality of the state. Id. at §1603.
113.

Id. §1609.

114.

Id. §1603.

115.

767 Third Ave. Assoc., 988 F.2d at 297.

116.

Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§1350 (1993).

The act provides federal

jurisdiction in civil actions "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Id.

19951

Goldenberg

citizens. Although only a few courts have recognized such actions," 7 the
Alien Tort Claims Act could eventually open the door for cases against
persons with diplomatic immunity after their departure, which previously
could not be litigated in the United States.
Other acts concerning administration of and arrangements with
international entities have been passed, but very few apply directly to
abuses of diplomatic immunity. In 1987, Senator Helms introduced a bill
entitled the "Diplomatic Immunity Abuse Prevention Act" which would
vastly curb abuses by foreign diplomats." 8 This bill would subject "certain
members of foreign diplomatic missions and consular posts in the United
States . . . to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States with respect to
crimes of violence.""' 9 Upon consultation, the Department of State
announced that it could not support the proposed bill beeause it would be
detrimental to United States' interests abroad.2 0 The bill proposed
eliminating immunity for crimes of violence, a large category of crimes,
and the Department of State feared that other countries would eliminate
immunity on a broader scale and thus expose American diplomatic
personnel to arrest and detention without bail.'
Although the bill
proposed to cover only members of the administrative, technical, and
service staff, the Department explained that such team members must have
full criminal immunity in order to effectively perform their work.'
The
bill also proposed to lift immunity from family members of diplomats,
which provoked a negative response from the Department to this
provision, -because a diplomat could not properly perform his or her duty
knowing that a family member is being prosecuted.'
In addition, the
Department argued that lifting immunity from family members might
encourage false charges as a technique of intimidation.'
The bill was

117.

Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); see also Forti v. Suarez-

Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Most cases are usually dismissed on the basis of the
well recognized forum non-convenience doctrine.
118. S. Doc. No. 1437, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
119.

Leich, supra note 90, at 107.

120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 108.

122. Id. Such work includes transmitting encoded messages and preparing classified
documents. Id. Therefore, it would be unjust to afford immunity to the ambassador, the FBI or
military attache, or other personnel engaged in work such as fighting terrorism, and expose those
who do their clerical work and transmit classified communications to interrogation and jail by
hostile authorities. Id.
123. Id.
124. Leich, supra note 90, at 108.
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approved in the Senate but rejected in the House of Representatives.'25 A
revised version of the bill was introduced the following year.'26 The new
proposal called for stringent enforcement of available solutions,' 2 and for
mandatory liability insurance carried by foreign missions for compensation
of injuries to persons or property.'28
Other bills to curb diplomatic immunity have been and are still
introduced in Congress, but most do not pass. Such bills either demand
too much modification to existing treaties, which threatens our diplomats'
freedom abroad, or propose unreasonable solutions to existing problems.
One such bill proposed that the United States form a claims fund for
awarding full compensation to victims of diplomatic immunity abuses. 29'
This bill was rejected due to its high cost and lack of incentive to foreign
diplomats to abstain from abuses of immunity.'30 It is evident that
Congress has been struggling to pass legislation that will both
accommodate victims of diplomatic abuse and discourage foreign
diplomats from violating American laws. However, it seems almost
impossible to achieve both goals, especially if most legislation on the issue
is written in response to events in other States, not as a consequence to
occurrences in our own country.
VI.

THE CIRCUIT COURT'S REASONING JUSTIFIED BY OTHER
OCCURRENCES

The problem of diplomatic immunity abuses is common to other
countries of the world, as well. The unanticipated phenomena is that other
governments, like the United States at times, apply a "hands-off" policy,
shying away from retaliation of diplomatic immunity abuses.
This
practice, although unexpected at first glance, is quite understandable in
light of the policy previously voiced by the Department of State. Events in
England, for example, required the British government to take a close look
at the provisions of the Vienna Convention granting diplomatic immunity
to decide whether some amendments or local provisions limiting immunity
were necessary."'3 This scrutiny of international law stemmed from events
in 1984, when shots were fired from the Libyan Embassy, killing British
125. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 304.
126. 134 CONG. REC. S16,036, S16,045 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
127. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 306.
128. Id.
129. See Goodman, supra note 100, at 410.
130. Id.
131. Higgins, supra note 67, at 645.
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citizens demonstrating in front of it."' When the British government
petitioned Libya to vacate the premises so that police could search the
Embassy for weapons, the request was refused.'33 The United Kingdom
then proposed a safe exchange of Libyan diplomatic personnel for British
diplomatic personnel, and requested assurance that all weapons and
explosives be removed from the Libyan Embassy." These proposals were
similarly refused. 35 Finally, following a terrorist explosion in Heathrow
International airport which injured twenty five people, the United Kingdom
terminated diplomatic relations with Libya and, its Embassy in London
was evacuated.'36 In response to public outrage about such blunt abuse of
immunity, the British government formed a committee to look into
diplomatic immunity laws and suggest proposals for ensuing actions.'37
Specifically, it was felt that diplomats who act inconsistently with their
diplomatic status should not be immune from prosecution, that suspicious
diplomatic bags should be searched and that premises which are the site of
unlawful acts should not be afforded inviolability.'38
Following an
investigation, the committee pointed out that a serious consideration to any
amendments must be the safety of British diplomats in foreign countries - a
familiar concern. '" The committee then stated that, in all of the three
specific respects, existing remedies were sufficient, and did not
recommend further action.' ° The British government implemented the
committee's advice, leaving diplomatic immunity laws unchanged.'' The
United States Department of State pointed to the United Kingdom study
while debating the downside of S. 1437, Senator Helms' proposed bill to
curb diplomatic immunity.' 2 Similarly, when the Second Circuit Court
examined Department of State policy and saw that the government looked
to other countries for trends in coping with immunity problems, the court
was encouraged to rule in favor of our foreign affairs policy,
acknowledging it as a political problem common to countries with similar

132. Id. at 643.
133.

Id. at 644.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Higgins, supra note 67, at 647.
Id. at 645. See Leich, supra note 90, at 109.

138.

Higgins, supra note 67, at 644.

139. Id. at 645.
140.

Id.

141.

Id.

142. Leich, supra note 90, at 109.

214

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 1

political structure. Thus, the United States is not alone "putting down its
stubborn foot" in refusing to change the law of diplomatic immunity.
What, then, are the possible remedies for abuse of diplomatic
immunity? Solutions to the dilemma of diplomatic abuses are as frequently
discussed as the problem itself.
The Vienna Convention provides
guidelines for dealing with such abuses.'"3 Article 9 of the Convention
enables the receiving State to declare any member of the mission a persona
non grata, upon which the sending State must either recall that person or
terminate his or her function with the mission.'"
In addition, the
Convention provides in Article 32 that immunity of a diplomatic agent may
be waived by the sending state.' 5 Both provisions are rarely utilized.
Furthermore, the persona non grata provision does not compensate the
victim of abuse and does little to deter such abuse, since diplomats know
that their most threatening punishment could be expulsion. In theory, the
waiver provision serves the needs of the hosting governments; in practice
however, it is almost impossible to attain. It is neither required that a
sending state waive its diplomat's immunity, nor does the Convention
provide an enforcement mechanism to compel such waivers.'" Thus,
although, in theory, the waiver clause provides a perfect solution to the
problem of diplomatic abuses of local law, in practice it is merely another
remedy to which one cannot resort, particularly for offenses of smaller
magnitude, such as traffic violations or landlord-tenant disputes.
Other proposed solutions are numerous.
What follows is a
summary of the most prominent ones. One answer to abuse is to allow the
plaintiff to bring suit in the sending state."" This would provide a victim
with a chance for compensation when it is not possible to sue the party in
the United States. An attempt to bring suit in the sending state may appear
to be a good solution; nonetheless, it is very impractical. Such an attempt
would be hindered by the high costs of litigating in a foreign state, by the
difference in legal systems, and by the possibility of a hostile national
climate towards the United States.'" Another popular recommendation is
an amendment of the Vienna Convention. 9 However, the treaty does not

143. Vienna Convention, supra note 25.
144. Id. art. 9.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. art. 32.
Id.
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 297.
Id.
See Goodman, supra note 100, at 407.
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provide for a formal procedure to amend its provisions.1 0 In addition,
amending the Vienna Convention would require reaching an agreement
among 140 countries,"' a task easier said than done.
Some of the more viable solutions include creating a limited
federal claims fund enforced by the government.'5 The rationale for this
proposal is that it is "[t]he government and U.S. diplomats abroad [who]
reap the prime benefits of diplomatic immunity, not the average citizen.
Therefore . . . the burden of diplomatic immunity . . . 'should not be
borne by people who are really just innocent third parties."" 53 This
solution seems reasonable and might even be workable. In order to
facilitate this idea, a proposal has been made to establish an agency within
the Department of State for administering a limited fund for the
compensation of victims.' 5' Once the agency would make a decision to
compensate and awards the applicable amount to the victim, the agency
would be in the best position to pursue reimbursement of such an amount
from the offending diplomat's country.' 53 The key to this solution would
lie in the government's ability to compel reimbursement to the limited
fund. '" Although this solution would not provide complete compensation,
it is very workable and quite realistic.
The most popular solution to the problem is the implementation of
an insurance scheme.5 Such plan would require embassies and missions
to carry liability insurance coverage as a prerequisite to diplomatic
relations in the United States, ' augmenting the insurance provision of the
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978"" which requires foreign diplomats to
carry liability automobile insurance.' ° The beauty of this solution is that
the victim can sue the insurance carrier directly, without involving the
foreign party. The augmented version of the insurance scheme would
place a requirement on the foreign mission to carry liability insurance for

150. Id. at 408.
151.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.

Id. at 410.
Goodman, supra note 100, at 411 (quoting Senator Hathaway).
See Goodman, supra note 100, at 407.
Id.
Id.
Farhangi, supra note 15, at 1538.
Id.
Goodman, supra note 100, at 400.
160. Id.
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injury to persons or property. 6 The insurance would provide restitution to
the injured party and would not discourage private citizens from further
commercial transactions with foreign parties. The difficulty with such
provisions is the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Maintenance of such
an insurance requirement would necessitate enforcement on the level of
Vienna Convention provisions, i.e. declaring a noninsured or underinsured
diplomat as a persona non grata.'62 Until the Department of State finds an
efficient way to enforce the insurance requirement, such provisions and
unenforceable plans will remain useless.
Numerous other solutions have been avidly recommended, but
only a few were implemented by Congress. Should Congress ever decide
to reform the area of diplomatic immunity in the future, it will find a vast
pool of new suggestions, and even though any particular solution might not
be suitable, a combination of several might prove useful and effective.
Thus, it is not for the lack of ideas that the law has not been reformed.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although solutions to abuses of diplomatic immunity and their
effectiveness are controversial, one matter is clear: the government sees
the weaknesses of the current law, and has the ability, if not always the
will, to improve the situation. Unfortunately for the landlord, in this
instance, he/she is left without a remedy. The landlord can only hope that
the government will pursue his/her interests and will persuade the offender
to withdraw. Our government's policy is consistent with the purposes of
diplomatic immunity and the practices of other nations.
Therefore,
although it is now understandable why courts are reluctant to act against
foreign diplomats, the government should use all means in its power to
assure the United States citizen's rights and fully compensate him or her.
Anything short of that would only create more bad feelings towards our
"guests" from abroad, and inhibit any sort of transactions among United
States citizens and foreign diplomats. Since the government has once
before shown a hint of improvement in demanding due compensation from
delinquent diplomats, we can only hope that it will continue down this
path, and that it was not a mere exception to its usually disinterested
demeanor.

161. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 300.
162. Farhangi, supra note 15, at 1538.
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INTRODUCTION

There can be no peace without justice, no justice without
law, and no meaningful law without a court to decide what
is just and lawful under any given circumstance. The
process of codification, adjudication and enforcement is as
vital to a tranquil international community as it is to any
independent national state.
-Benjamin B. Ferencz'"
The success of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes
Tribunals will determine the future of international criminal law. Whether
the Tribunals are able to command the attention and respect of the world
remains to be seen.
The situation in the former Yugoslavia has deteriorated to the point
where it resembles Nazi-era Europe. The media has bombarded our living
rooms with reports of "ethnic cleansing,"' mass graves, torture, and
reports of concentration camps virtually identical to those of World War
I1. As we saw the destruction, the initial public outrage was strong.
However, as with most crises, the international community successfully
avoided taking affirmative action for three years while the atrocities
continued unhindered. When the international community finally took

**
BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS
WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 30, 31 (1980).

1. The idiom "ethnic cleansing" has been often used to analogize the Serbian's weapon of
mass rape. Feryal Gharahi related one story to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe in February of 1993. In Milivania, Serbian forces converted the local gymnasium to a
rape camp. There, the women were repeatedly gang-raped in order to assure impregnation, thus
ridding Bosnia of all non-Serbs.
If the women resisted, their throats were slit. After
impregnation, the women were kept in the camps until it was too late to terminate the pregnancy.

War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Hearings Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1993) (testimony of Feryal Gharani)
[hereinafter Security In Europe]; see generally Danise Aydelott, Comment, Mass Rape During
War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists Under InternationalLaw, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 585, 596
(1993). This ethnic cleansing policy, part of the Serbian war plan, did not end there. While

women were in the rape camps, men were sent to concentration camps. Several men died after
being castrated in the attempt to end all non-Serbian blood-lines. Catherine Toups, Atrocity
Probes Home in on Serbia; U.N. Requests Case For War Crime Trial, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1994, at A11.
2. Steve Coil, War Crimes and Punishment, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 25, 1994, at 25
(describing the similarities between Bosnia and Nazi Germany as chilling: ethnic hatred, the old
European setting, and specific acts of barbarity are indicative of the Nazi-era overtones).
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action, via the International Tribunal, the next human tragedy was already

underway.
The slaughter of the Tutsi minority orchestrated by the Hutus in

Rwanda occurred as the Yugoslavian Tribunal was gaining momentum.
The Tutsi genocide in Rwanda has been faster than any other episode in

the last fifty years. 3 In the first three months of 1994, one million Tutsis
were slaughtered, as compared to Bosnia where 200,000 were killed over
a period of two years.! Hutu militias have been savage and barbaric in
their pursuit of the Tutsi minority.5
As evidence of these atrocities mounts, there exists a desire to
punish those responsible.
However, this seemingly logical urge is
overshadowed by the practicalities of prosecuting criminals across borders.
This comment contends that the anticipated Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal
has been ill-conceived. With zeal that stems from the promulgation of
honor, morality, and good intentions, various segments of the international

community have laid the foundations for justice, while overlooking its
virtual impossibility in this situation.
Part I will list a brief chronology of the War Crimes Tribunal, the

United Nations' response to the Rwandan nightmare. Next, the Tribunal's
basis for authority will be examined. This is followed by an analysis of
the potential problems under the Tribunal's current structure.
Jurisdictionally, many argue that the tribunal will conflict with state
sovereignty, as well as interfere with the protection of individual liberties.'
Additionally, this section will discuss the administrative difficulties in
gathering evidence8 and procurring extradition.9

3. Tom Masland, Will It Be Peace or Punishment? NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1994, at 37.
4. Id.

5. Lindsey Hilsum, Settling Scores, AFR. REP., May-June, 1994, at 14 (Rwanda's radio
broadcasts prior to the massacres defining the Tutsis as "cockroaches" which need to be
exterminated).
6. Prior to the creation of the Tribunal, the Ambassadors representing Turkey, Denmark,
Austria, and the Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Community all testified
to the importance of forming an international tribunal, and urged the United States to support it.
European Perspective on Bosnian Conflict: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 8, 16, 20 (1993) [hereinafter European
Perspective].
7. Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal,
18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 91 (1994).
8. Francoise J. Hampson, War Crimes Fact-Findingin the Former Yugoslavia, 1 INT'L LAW
& ARMED CONFLICT COMMENTARY, 28, 29 (1994). Often there is a degree of political control
over the fact-finding activities of these tribunals.
9. Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: Problems
and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 12 (1994). The difficulty of extradition of a person
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Part II affirms the Rwandans' duty to prosecute these human rights
The model used by other emerging democracies for
violations.
punishment is applied to the Rwandan situation. Ultimately, this model's
utility is superseded by the need for an International Criminal Court.
Finally, Part III will show that the Tribunal's failures demonstrate
the need for a permanent International Criminal Court. Various proposals
for a permanent court have been recommended, but none have been
adopted due to problems that exist in each model. Nevertheless, this
comment concludes that the creation of a permanent criminal court, which
enforces a permanent code of crimes, would benefit the international
community overall. More specifically, an established court potentially
could have saved countless Rwandan lives.
II.

THE WESTERN IMPOSITION

A. HistoricalSummary
Without mechanisms for individual nations to control international
crime, the need for a tribunal to prosecute serious violations of
humanitarian law has emerged in various areas of the world.'" In response
to the Yugoslavian crisis, the United Nations has created the "International
Tribunal for the sole purpose of Prosecuting Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Since the organization of the
Territory of Former Yugoslavia.""
Yugoslavian Tribunal, Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor for the
Tribunal, has sought concurrent jurisdiction for the prosecution of crimes
2
committed in Rwanda.'
On June 28, 1994, the Commission on Human Rights of the
United Nations reported on the gravity of the Rwandan situation.' 3 Two
days later, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 935
requesting the establishment of. an impartial Commission of Experts to
further examine and analyze evidence of grave violations of humanitarian
law in Rwanda. 4 By the end of July, the Secretary-General issued a report
indicted for war crimes is well recognized. In fact, sanctions against parties who refuse to cooperate
with the tribunal have been proposed.
10. Thomas R. Kleinberger, Note, The Iraqi Conflict: An Assessment of Possible War Crimes
and the Callfor Adoption of an InternationalCriminal Code and Permanent International Criminal
Tribunal, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 70 (1993).

11. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
12. John Shattuck, War Crimes First, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at A19.
13. See U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., at 5-8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/' (1994) [hereinafter
Escor], for a detailed accounting of the Hutu militia slaughter of the Tutsi minority.
14. S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
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stressing that the Commission of Experts was actively gathering and
documenting evidence of these violations, especially acts of genocide, in
the hopes of pursuing prosecution. 5
The Commission's preliminary report 6 suggested either the
creation of a new international criminal tribunal 7 or that the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia be expanded
to cover Rwandan crimes. 8 This suggestion was heeded, but without the
support of Rwanda, whose government voted against the resolution.'
On November 8, 1994, the Security Council established the
International Tribunal for Rwanda through Resolution 955.1' With
Rwanda as the sole dissenting vote, the Security Council established an
independent tribunal whose sole objective is to "prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states .... ",1
The final vote on the establishment of the tribunal had thirteen votes in
favor, one vote against the tribunal from Rwanda and an abstention from
China." Although Rwanda initially urged the United Nations to take
action against the Hutus who had organized this genocide, they had several
reasons for rejecting the United Nations' plan. First, the tribunal only has
jurisdiction over crimes committed after January 1, 1994.23 Secondly, the
15. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Commission of Experts
Pursuantto ParagraphI of Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) of I July 1994, 49th Sess., at 23, U.N. Doc. S/1994/879 (1994).
16. PreliminaryReport of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance
with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), Commission of Experts on Rwanda, 49th Sess., Annex
to the Letter, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994).
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwandan War Crimes; Kigali Votes No on U.N.
Resolution, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at A44.
20. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
21. Id.
22. Preston, supra note 19, at A44. But cf U.N. Genocide Tribunal Wins Rwanda's Support,
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 10, 1994, at A22. (Rwanda's U.N. Ambassador Manzi Bakurmuta stated

that while Rwanda is not in complete agreement with the United Nations' Tribunal, they will
nonetheless cooperate with all United Nations efforts.)
23.

Raymond Bonner, Top Rwandan Criticizes U.S. Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at

All (noting that the crimes occurred long before January 1, 1994, therefore many of the worst
perpetrators will be overlooked with the proposed time limitation). See William Schabas, Atrocities
and the Law, CANADIAN LAW., Aug./Sept. 1993, at 33-36. The dispute in Rwanda is not new.
Rwanda has been a battlefield for two major ethnic groups, the Tutsi's and Hutu's for centuries. Id.
at 34. In January of 1993, a Canadian-based organization, International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development, sent a 10-member fact-finding commission to Rwanda. Id. This
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government strongly opposed the United Nation's Tribunal because the
procedural rules do not include the death penalty.24 To a lesser degree, the
Rwandan government is also dissatisfied with the slow pace of the United
Nations bureaucratic method 5 and the Tribunal's decisions not to use
Rwandan judges26 nor to hold the trials in Rwanda. 7

B. The Tribunal'sAuthority?
Noting the Rwandan opposition to the Tribunal, it is important to
examine the justification for the United Nations' authority to act in this
First,
Two ground-breaking determinations were made.
situation.
pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 8 the United
Nations Security Council defined the humanitarian violations in Rwanda as
a threat to international peace.29 Together Articles 39 and 41 of the
Charter provide the Security Council with the power to decide which
enforcement measures to take to maintain international peace.3" Using this
discretion, the Security Council concluded the tribunal was the appropriate
response to the Rwandan threat.3'
group was one of many over the years who experienced the genocide and crimes against humanity.
Because there has been documentation of the horror in Rwanda over the past several years, the Tutsi
government had lobbied unsuccessfully to extend the Tribunal's jurisdiction to the time prior to
January, 1994.
24. Preston, supra note 19, at A44. Rwanda has repeatedly complained about the double
standard which it sees developing. The more minor criminals in the Rwandan conflict will be
prosecuted under Rwandan law; therefore, they will be subject to the death penalty. However,
the major offenders will be subjected to the punishment of the Tribunal. Thus, those guilty of
planning and organizing this mass genocide will be condemned only to life sentences.
25. Keith B. Richburg & Stephen L. Buckley, Rwandan PremierBitter Over Delay of U.N.
Crimes Trials, Foreign Aid, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at A30. Senior officials within the
Rwandan government are becoming increasingly impatient. The Rwandan Patriotic Front has
already surrendered enough documents to bring some cases to trial. Unless the United Nations acts
quickly, many leaders are promising to create their own courts to try various Hutu leaders.
26. Toups, supra note 1.
27. Bonner, supra note 23. Criminals are actually benefitted by Rwandan prosecution. If the
criminals are imprisoned in Europe, their standard of living would be significantly higher than if
they were in Rwanda. Id. Innocent people would be willing to live in European prisons rather than
in Rwanda. Id.
28. Chapter 7 is titled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
andActs ofAggression." U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
29. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 2.
30.

U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41.

31. Id. See Monroe Leigh, et al., Report on the InternationalTribunal to Adjudicate War
Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. 10 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A.
Report]. The ABA report noted that although Article 41 of the United Nations Charter does not
specify a Tribunal as one of the measures to deal with a threat to international peace, it is certainly
within their discretion to use this means.

1995

Gordon

The conflict in Rwanda has both internal and international
elements. Although a civil conflict originally, the flight of the Rwandans
into Zaire and other neighboring countries has caused the conflict to
escalate beyond Rwanda's borders. Thus, able to define this human
tragedy as international, the Security Council is free to apply the entirety
of the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Protocol I, which
provides remedies only to international conflicts.32 The importance of this
decision must not be underestimated. The ethnic tensions in Rwanda have
manifested themselves primarily in the form of an internal civil conflict, as
opposed to Yugoslavia which has developed into an international civil
war.33 The United Nations Security Council has made a monumental leap
reshaping future international law by defining Rwandan violations of
humanitarian law as factors in determining a threat to international peace. 4
Secondly, if the United Nations had deemed the Rwandan conflict
to be internal or civil, Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions would apply,
but generally would not give rise to universal criminal jurisdiction.35
Recently, there has been a trend toward the international criminalization of
common Article 3 offenses of the Geneva Conventions during noninternational armed conflicts.' For example, the 1991 Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind expressly recognizes
that penal sanctions may reach the non-international armed conflicts
contemplated by Article 3.37 However, the Draft Code has not yet been
adopted, and it is still a matter of debate whether common Article 3
violations give rise to individual penal responsibility.38 Therefore, the

32. Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of InternationalLaw, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 80 (1994).

33. Id. Cf. Winston P. Nagan, Yugoslavia: A Case Study of International Consequences of
Independence Movements, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 205, 218-19 (1993) [hereinafter Case Study].
In Yugoslavia, even after the United Nations Commission of Experts had recognized the crisis was
of an international character, reasonable minds differed on the nature of the conflict. Id. at 218.
Many Slavs such as Nebojsa Vujovic, of the United States Embassy of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, claimed this was a religious, ethnic, and civil war. Id.

This distinction between

international and civil conflicts was essential to determining what body of law to apply to these

criminals and was the subject of much debate. Id.
34.

Meron, supra note 32, at 79-80.

35.

Id. at 80.

36.

Id. at 82.

37. Jordan J. Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Law to Events in the Former
Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499, 512 (1994).
38. Meron, supra note 31, at 82. Although common Article 3 does not follow the letter of
the Hague Regulations or the Geneva Conventions, common Article 3 is part of the body of law

which is identified as humanitarian law. Therefore, it is arguably covered under statute 3 of the
Tribunal's statute.
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Security Council's decision to define these conflicts as international was a
deliberate attempt to expand the likelihood for an international response to
non-international violations of humanitarian law in order to avoid any
questions of international jurisdiction over the Rwandan criminals. 3
Thus, through the creation of the Rwandan Tribunal, the United
Nations has established two precedents of law. First, it defined violations
of humanitarian law in a civil, ethnic conflict as threats to international
peace, thus granting the Tribunal the ability to prosecute those violations.
Second, the United Nations established the possibility of the international
criminalization of violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions in non-international armed conflicts. Unfortunately, unless
the Tribunal is able to overcome the vast number of obstacles which
currently impede its success, these precedents may be quickly forgotten.
C. Problems of the Tribunal
1. First Problem: A Lack of Precedent
In the absence of an established international criminal court, or
even an international criminal code, the international community has
accorded little credence to the proposed prosecutions. ' Referring to both
Nuremberg and the Far East Trials for guidance, the United Nations has
attempted to fashion an international tribunal in their likeness."' However,
neither Nuremberg nor the Far East Tribunal provide the proper
precedent.
Nuremberg itself was ultimately a facade of authority
stemming from the victor's right to justice42 and in reality lacked the
necessary precedent to withstand serious scrutiny. Even assuming that the
deficiencies of the World War II tribunals could be resolved, the situations

39.

Id. at 81.

40. Security In Europe, supra note 1, at 15.

At the CSCE hearings on war crimes in

February of 1993, Representative Frank McCloskey stated that the top echelon of military leaders
who have been accused of committing war crimes, had already been assured amnesty. Id. He
credited "high ranking military sources in Croatia and our own State Department" as relaying that
information. Id. Belief in the integrity of the Tribunal is not high.
41. See Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.CAL. L.
REV. 833, 834, 836 (1990). Despite Nuremberg's shortcomings, it is generally considered a
landmark in international law.

See generally Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg:

Forty Five Years

Later, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) (justifying the legitimacy of the trials with a complete legal and
moral arguments).
42. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80. The victor's justice is often criticized for making biased
decisions. Id. But see Elizabeth Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of
Yugoslavia Provide an End to Victors'Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1373, 1399 (1993) (arguing
that prosecution by the victors is standard because only the victors can project the moral superiority
required for a war crime tribunal).
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vary too dramatically for Nuremberg to be the proper legal basis for
today's tribunal.
Initially legal experts waivered in classifying Nuremberg as legal
precedent for the present Tribunals, a clear sign of its lacking authority. '
First, the timing is different. Unlike Nuremberg, the United Nations has
decided not to wait until the end of the conflict before attempting to
prosecute." Indeed, the victors of the conflict may be indicted while the
conflict rages."5 This will not only complicate the outcome of the war, but
also the stability of the nation after the conflict.'
Secondly, the Yugoslavian and Rwandan situations are
fundamentally different from that of Nazi Germany or Japan. The
Germans proudly kept meticulous records of their crimes."' After the
war, each captured Nazi soldier and liberated building provided the
evidence necessary to complete the trials. 8 In Yugoslavia, soldiers move
constantly between units 9 and there are no simple means to gather
evidence.50 In Rwanda, the criminals have long since fled.5' There is a
tremendous degree of variance between the circumstances of the two
situations.
Nuremberg and Tokyo are of poor precedential value not only
because of the differences between World War II and today's situations,
but also because Nuremberg and Tokyo were preceded by several failures.
The Nuremberg Trials took place in the wake of a failed attempt to convict
German officials of war crimes following World War I.11 International law
43.

Coil, supra note 2, at 23. Lawrence Eagleburger, former Acting Secretary of State,

recalled that State Department attorneys were constantly admonishing him to be cautious about
Bosnia. Id. "The lawyers would say, as Eagleburger remembers, 'For God's sake, don't do it. We
don't have the right legal background. Nuremberg isn't quite the right thing, as legal precedent."'

Id. (The situation in Rwanda and Yugoslavia is easily distinguishable from that following World
War II.)
44. Pearl, supra note 42, at 1402.
45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 1413.

47.

Case Study, supra note 33, at 21.

48.

Coil, supra note 2, at 14. The surrender of the German buildings which housed the

records of their plan of destruction was direct evidence of the atrocities committed. In many
instances, the Germans had authored the evidence which was subsequently used against them.
49.

Case Study, supra note 33, at 21.

50.

Coil, supra note 2, at 14.

51. Dilip Ganguly, Tanzania Sees More Refugees; Zaire Tells Them To Go Home, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A14.
52. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS
WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 30-33 (1980). The Allied powers
were forced to compromise Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles which conceded that the
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never addressed issues such as a nation's treatment of its citizens prior to
World War L.3 Previously, human abuse was only prosecutable in the
state in which the abuse took place. Furthermore, states themselves were
rarely reviewed.' Thus, the Allies quest for retribution, rather than legal
precedent, provided the basis for the Nuremberg Trials.
Furthermore, both the Nuremberg, and especially the Tokyo trials,
have been sternly criticized for violations of due process, judicial bias, and
unconventional procedural mechanisms." For example, the defendants at
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were often found guilty of committing
"crimes against the peace" and "crimes against humanity." However,
these crimes were not part of international law prior to the trials.' Thus,
the Nuremberg trial's use of ex post facto laws violated the defendant's
due process. 7
Finally, at Nuremberg and Tokyo only the victorious nations took
part in assigning the punishments. Neither Germany nor Japanf5 were
permitted to participate in the activities of the Tribunals. 9 The potential
for abuse is obvious where the victor is trying the defeated enemy.'
Citing this potential, the United Nations has chosen not to allow Rwandan
judges on the Tribunal.' Thus the United Nations' Tribunal will have the
benefit of being adjudicated by impartial parties, and the decision will not
be plagued by accusations of bias. However, there remains the problem of
the hypocrisy associated with the Nuremberg Trials.

Kaiser would be charged with merely a political crime, thereby indirectly preserving his
immunity. Id. at 30. In return, the rest of the accused were to be brought before military
tribunals. Id. However, the Germans refused to recognize the provisions of the Treaty which
involved foreign adjudication, and the war crimes trials were conducted in Leipzig after
continuous German opposition to the Versailles mandates. Id. at 32. Not surprisingly, the
German courts exonerated or minimized the defendants' liabilities, and reduced the number of
cases from over 900 to less than 50, with only a handful being convicted. d. at 33.
53. Diane F. Ortenlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To ProsecuteHuman Rights Violations
of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991).
54. Id.
55. Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an InternationalCriminal Court,
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, 138 (1991).
56.

Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 13.

57.

Id.

58. Ann M. Prevost, Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trialof GeneralTomoyuki
Yamashita, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 304, 328 (1992). Not only has the Yamashita case been characterized
as a case of victors' justice but also of racial prejudice. The command responsibility theory
employed against Yamashita was not applied at Nuremberg against the Germans. Id. at 305.
59.

Scharf, supra note 55, at 138.

60.

Pearl, supra note 42, at 1399.

61.

Toups, supra note 1, at All.
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Following World War II, allied actions such as the bombings of
Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki went unreviewed.Y If the
victor's actions are dismissed, then justice is being distributed arbitrarily.63
To avoid this hypocrisy, every attempt must be made to prosecute all
violations of humanitarian law in this conflict. The situation in Rwanda is
complicated further because many organizations, such as Amnesty
International," and even the United Nations, are beginning to collect
evidence of the reprisal killings by the Tutsis against the Hutus. 6 In fact,
the conditions in which the Hutu prisoners are currently being detained
have been likened to concentration camps themselves, and possibly are in
violation of humanitarian laws.' To protect the credibility of the Tribunal,
individuals on both sides of the conflict must be prosecuted.67
The United Nations must remember that "the law must apply to
leaders of every nation."" Furthermore, the importance of universal
enforcement cannot be underestimated. In order to avoid the taint of
hypocrisy associated with Nuremberg and Tokyo, justice must not be
distributed arbitrarily.' In other words, the law must be enforced agaist
the Rwanda Patriotic Front as well as the Hutu extremists, and Bosnians as
well as Serbians." Thus, the initial hurdle for the Tribunal will be to
overcome any questions of propriety to which it is subjected by virtue of
its basis in Nuremberg.

62.

Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80.

63.

Id.

64. Bonner, supra note 23, at All.
65. Keith B. Richburg, New Accusations of Rwandan Reprisals, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 26, 1994, at A2.
66. Robert Press, In Rwanda's 'Slave Ship' Prisons, Life Is Grim for Suspected Killers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1994 at 1. (Currently 15,000 to 20,000 Hutu prisoners,
including children, are packed into tightly cramped prisons.)
67. General Kagame has assured the Tribunal authorities that it will assist the Tribunal in the
prosecution of Rwandan Patriotic Front soldiers accused of breaking humanitarian laws. Bonner,
supra note 23.
68. TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 641 (1992). Telford
Taylor, who took part in the Nuremberg prosecutions, is of the opinion that international criminal
law will have no justification until the victorious nations' behavior is examined as well. Unlike
what the proponents of victor's justice would argue, winning the battle does not place the
conqueror above reproach.
69. Blakesley, supra note 7, at 80.
70. Robert F. Drinan, Is a PermanentNuremberg on the Horizon?, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 103, 107 (1994).
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2. Second Problem: Jurisdictional Difficulties
a. State Sovereignty
Article 8 of the Rwandan Tribunal statute establishes the
concurrent jurisdiction of the International Tribunal with the national
courts in Rwanda.7 ' However, this is limited by Article 8(2) which gives
the Tribunal primacy over the national courts. These provisions, which
are corollaries to Articles 9 and 10 of the Yugoslavian Tribunal Statute,
have been questioned for their infringement of national sovereignty.' In
response, countries such as the United States have asked the United
Nations and the Security Council to recognize the domestic action needed
before complying with the International Tribunal, and to allow extra time
before compliance. 3
In Rwanda, the primacy of this Tribunal may cause conflict with
the domestic courts anxious to prosecute all the culprits. Furthermore, the
government already objects to the Tribunal's limited jurisdiction of 1994,
and its prohibition of the death penalty." The Western Tribunal has not
been openly accepted by the Rwandans, and the ultimate control resting
with the Tribunal will not ease the strain between the competing interests.
b. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Article 1 of the statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda
gives the tribunal jurisdiction over "serious violations of international
humanitarian law." 75 These serious violations are described in Article 2 as
genocide,76 in Article 3 as crimes against humanity," and in Article 4 as
violations of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol
11.78 While the subject matter is relatively straight-forward, defendants still
may be able to challenge this jurisdiction.

71.

Despite UN Tribunal, Rwanda Plans To Try Suspects for War Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Nov.

10, 1994, at A6. Ambassador Manzi Bakuramuta estimated the number of Rwandans to be
prosecuted in national courts at 30,000.
72.

Blakesley, supra note 7, at 79.

73. Case Study, supra note 33, at 165. The United States, for example, has several due
process procedures which must be implemented before turning a person over to the Tribunal. Id.
There remains a significant concern on the part of several nations that national laws will be ceded to
international laws. Id.
74.

Bonner, supra note 23, at A 1.

75. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 1.
76.

Id.at 3.

77.

Id. at 4.

78.

Id.at 5.
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The Statute for the Rwandan Tribunal does not preclude
defendants from challenging the Tribunal's authority. 9 Defendants may
successfully argue that they were involved in a civil war, and thus are not
subject to the Geneva or Hague Conventions.' The Tribunal possesses the
authority to judge these potential challenges of jurisdiction.' How the
judges may rule remains to be determined, but the potential for problems

exists.
c. Limited Temporal Jurisdiction
Article 7 of the Rwandan Statute limits temporal jurisdiction to
crimes committed between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.5
This is problematic because limiting the jurisdiction could protect those
who planned the genocide. 3 The Rwandan national courts may
successfully prosecute those who carried out the genocide. However, the
Tribunal's time limit does not reach those who gave the orders which
would cause the Tribunal to lose credibility.

3. Administrative Problems
a. GatheringEvidence
The Commission of Experts for Rwanda and the Special
Rapporteur for Rwanda have found significant violations of human rights.?
Still, the thorough process of gathering evidence for trial will be long and
arduous.85 According to Article 14 of the Rwandan Tribunal Statute, the

rules governing evidence and procedure are the same as those for the
Yugoslavian Tribunal.'
79.
80.
81.
82.

Meron, supra note 32, at 82.
Id.
Id.
S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 6.

83. Bonner, supra note 23.
84. Escor, supra note 13, at 11-13.
85. Hampson, supra note 8, at 29. The crimes fact-finding will be especially complicated
because of the co-mingling of war-crimes fact-finding and humanitarian fact-finding. There has been
a great deal of political control over some of the formal investigations. Id. There is a strong
likelihood that some of the information is likely to remain within foreign ministries. Id. It is even
possible that the limited resources of the Tribunal may prevent a full investigation. Id. at 30.
Although the non-governmental organizations such as Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International are
depended upon by the international community, problems may exist with admitting their information
into any kind of formal evidence. Id. at 28. The same principle can be extended to the Rwandan
crisis.
86. International Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. IT/32
(1994).
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Lacking any enforcement mechanisms, the collection of evidence
in Yugoslavia has been blocked several times by Serbian forces.87 If the

Serbs continue to be uncooperative, it may be impossible to obtain
sufficient evidence to indict or prosecute certain suspects." This may
foreshadow a similar problem in Rwanda. Unless the Tribunal is able to
convince the Hum forces to cooperate, the prosecutors may not be able to
89
gather enough evidence for prosecution.
b. Extradition
Most of the criminals in Rwanda have fled the country. The
Tribunal currently lacks an enforcement mechanism to extradite persons to
the Hague Tribunal.'
Rule 56 of Evidence and Procedure for the
Tribunal9' requires all states to comply with an extradition order, but lacks
a corresponding mechanism to enforce the rule.'
Furthermore, the
tribunal does not allow for trials in abstentia. 93 Accordingly, sanctions
have been suggested as the method through which states should be forced
to comply. ' However, as of yet, no sanctions have been imposed to bring
about compliance."
Unfortunately, extradition problems for the Yugoslavian Tribunal
have already developed. Currently, the only two cases upon which the

87. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
88. Id.
89. Andrew Purvis, Collusion with Killers, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 52. The massacres in
Rwanda have been more of a random nature. Although evidence of a planned genocide exists, the
attacks have not been planned in an attempt to gather more territory. Often the attacks are retaliatory
murders, committed in the night. Id. When morning light comes, entire families are found slain in
the middle of the camps. Id. There has not been a highly systematic level of record-keeping;
therefore, collecting evidence will already be complicated.
90. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
91. International TribunalRules of Procedureand Evidence, supra note 86, at 30. Rule 56
states that "[t]he state to which a warrant of arrest is transmitted shall act promptly and with all
due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof in accordance with Article 29 of
the statute."
92. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
93. Tribunal Charges Camp Commander, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 8, 1994,
at A10.
94. Laber & Nizich, supra note 9, at 12.
95. But see U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (1994). The
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, argued that sanctions may in
fact be unnecessary. Because those extradited will be outlaws in their home nations, that itself is a
significant punishment. Id. For the rest of their lives, their mobility will be hampered because
travel would increase the risk of discovery. Id. Albright predicts that this will be sufficient
deterrent to ignoring extradition orders. Id.
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United Nations Tribunal has taken action have both been hampered by
extradition problems with Germany and the Serbian held portion of
Bosnia.' In an attempt to prevent the same problem from occurring,
Rwanda itself has asked Belgium to extradite about ten Rwandans
Provided
suspected of orchestrating the genocide earlier this year.'
Belgium does not forestall extradition of the Rwandan criminals for lack of
an extradition agreement with the Tribunal, these ten may be brought
before the Tribunal shortly.
c. Superior Orders
The Tribunal has not recognized the defense of superior orders.98
This omission is present in the Yugoslavian Tribunal, and has been
criticized for excluding good faith situations where the actor did not know
the deed was wrong." Whether the Court will allow such a defense should
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, rather than precluding
its use completely." In both Rwanda and Yugoslavia, several defendants
may be able to prove that they did know their actions were wrong.
Therefore, the superior orders argument may provide these defendants
with a viable defense resulting in a lighter sentence.
4. The Last Problem: Peace Over Punishment
Lastly, the success of this Tribunal is important not only for its
goals of deterrence and punishment, but also for its effect on the future of
international criminal law. 10' An unsuccessful tribunal may have a long-

96. Toups, supra note 1. Dusan Tadic, a Bosnian Serb held by Germany since February,
may not be turned over to the Tribunal. Extradition treaties exist between countries, but not between
the countries and international organizations. Id. Tribunal Charges Camp Commander, supra note
93. Dragan Nikolic has been formally indicted by the Tribunal, but will not be handed over by the
Bosnian Serbs with whom he is currently hiding. The Tribunal has no power to order his
extradition. Id.
97. Exiled Dictatoron Genocide Charges, GLASGOW HERALD, Nov. 14, 1994, at 7.
98. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 6. Statute Article 6(4) - Individual Criminal
Responsibility states: "The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a
Government [sic] or a superior shall not relieve his or her criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that
justice so requires."
99. A.B.A. Report, supra note 30, at 38.
100. Id. at 40.
101. Meron, supra note 32, at 78. Scholars in the sphere of international criminal law such
as Theodor Meron hope that the Tribunal's creation "gives a new lease on life to that part of
international criminal law which applies to violations of humanitarian law."
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term deleterious effect on the development of international criminal law. °
If the use of tribunals is threatened but never successfully implemented,
the credibility of future attempts at an international criminal court could be
jeopardized. °3 The United Nations officially established that the first and
foremost goals of the Tribunal are "deterence, justice, and peace."'
However, several times during the peace negotiations the parties have
suggested foregoing the Tribunals for Rwanda, and especially
Yugoslavia,"°s in the interest of a peace settlement."° Gary Bass noted that
the reason the Tribunal is lacking in strength in that it has not been
sufficiently extricated from the peace process: "when a Balkan peace
settlement is on the table, the war crimes tribunal tends to be shunted

102.

Joel Cavicchia, The Prospectsfor an International Criminal Court in the 1990s, 10

DICK. J. INT'L L. 223, 243 (1992).
103.

Id.

104. See A "Terrible War" Rages On, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1994, at 65.
105. European Perspective, supra note 6, at 25. The situation is particularly precarious in the
former Yugoslavia where the military leaders participating in the peace negotiations are also some of
the Tribunal's future indictees. Representative Steny Hoyer, acting Co-Chairman of the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has voiced concerns over the appointment of Milosevic to
the peace negotiations. Id. After having been formally termed a war criminal by the United States
government, Milosevic now is in a position to decide whether the Tribunal will be established. Id.
Congressman Hoyer is not confidant that Milosevic will act impartially. Id.
See also Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability In Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
500, 501 (1994). Professor D'Amato alleges that currently these military leaders are being offered
amnesty in exchange for peace in the former Yugoslavia. Id. In essence, the threat of a Tribunal is
being used as a "bargaining chip" over the peace negotiators to come to a quicker resolution. Id. at
504. In return, the leaders are promised that the Tribunal will never happen. Id.
Although Professor D'Amato cites no authority for his allegations, it is not totally
incredible. It is highly unlikely that those Yugoslavian leaders are going to reach a peace settlement
soon, since in doing so they would be availing themselves to prosecutions. It is plausible that the
United Nations officials would offer the criminals a deal in the interest of bringing peace to the area
more quickly. Of course, the obvious secrecy of this bargaining makes proving it a virtual
impossibility, but it remains an interesting factor to consider in the weighing of the Tribunal's future.
106. Linda Maguire, An Interview with Telford Taylor, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1, 2
(1994). Telford Taylor, a prosecutor at Nuremberg, tells his views of the international tribunal:
TIr: The Serbs have gone a long way toward getting what they want and they are not going to
want to pull back and make things better for the Bosnians, so the war could drag on and make things
that much worse. But at the moment, both sides seem to be endeavoring to find some solutions to
these problems.

LM: So in the interest of a lasting political settlement, the idea of the former Yugoslavian
Tribunal might be scuttled altogether, just so the parties can move on?
T-l: I should think that it would be very difficult to come to a conclusion with the Serbs
without some agreement between the parties allowing for a general amnesty, or some other solution
that the Serbs would be willing to swallow.
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aside; Britain and other European Community countries worry that threats
of prosecution might derail a settlement." 7
The same is true of Rwanda. Experts such as Frank Cringler, a
former United States Ambassador to Rwanda, have even warned against
using the tribunal at all.'01 Cringler claims that reuniting this society is
more important than singling out one group. He asserts it may be
necessary to welcome war criminals back, or at least defer prosecution, to
promote the end of hostilities.'" When dealing with ethnic conflicts, there
is a strong likelihood that one group could create further animosity,
thereby preventing reconciliation." ' As in Yugoslavia, there is a strong
contingent in Rwanda that wishes to sacrifice justice in order to reestablish peace.
Bringing an end to the hostilities in these countries is laudable.
However, hopes of deterring future atrocities in Rwanda can only occur if
justice is served quickly. Even now with the Tribunal looming in the near
future, there is no evidence of restraint by the Rwandan criminals."' If the
Tribunal chooses to replace punishment with a settlement of hostilities, the
set-back to international criminal law could be enormous.
The preceding criticisms of the Tribunal are by no means an
exhaustive list. Only a few of the most obviously troublesome have been
mentioned in order to illustrate the immense problems which face the
current Tribunal structure.
5. The Outlook for the Tribunal
To a certain degree it is true that a successful tribunal would
increase the legitimacy of international criminal law."I Increased stability
of international law would probably accompany this revitalization." 3 In
fact, the mere formation of the Tribunal is indicative of the international

107. Gary J. Bass, Courting Disaster: The U.N. Goes Soft on Bosnia. Again., NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 12.
108.

Masland, supra note 3, at 37.

109.

Id. at 37.

110.

Id.

111. Purvis, supra note 89, at 52. Hutu militias, who fled following the Tutsi coup this
summer, are now terrorizing the refugee camps established throughout neighboring Zaire. They
are robbing the supplies and food which arrive daily, after being donated by the international
community.

Id. The supplies are then sold to raise money to buy weapons and munitions in an

elaborate effort to retake Rwanda from the Patriotic Front. Id. These acts themselves are also
criminal:

the potential starvation of millions of refugees will not be taken lightly by the

Tribunal.
112.

Kleinberger, supra note 10, at 106.

113.

Id.
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community's desire to end the blatant violations of humanitarian law in
these situations."1 4 However, the sincerity of the community's intentions is
not in question; the ability to do something about it is. The immensity of
the problems facing the, Tribunal make success unlikely. This is
unfortunate not only for the international community, but more
importantly, for the Yugoslavian and Rwandan victims.
Thus an
alternative forum may provide the proper method for adjudication.
III. ALTERNATIVE FORUMS
A. The State's Duty To Prosecute PriorHuman Rights Violations
International criminal law does require states to punish certain
human rights abuses." ' Some international treaties explicitly provide for
this duty." 6 Most treaties, such as the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, do not expressly mention a duty to punish when these

114. See Meron, supra note 32, at 78. Theodor Meron has stated that the creation of the
Yugoslavian Tribunal has already made seven institutional and normative improvements to
international law. First, by defining the Yugoslavian crisis as a threat to international peace, the
United Nations has created a strong precedent that the violation of humanitarian laws is a threat
to peace. Id. at 79. Second, the Tribunal's statute also legitimizes various areas of humanitarian
law as customary law. Id. Next, the tribunal successfully treated the Yugoslavian crisis as an
international arms conflict, thus securing the application of the entirety of international
humanitarian law. Id. at 80. Fourth, although not firmly established, the Tribunal's actions will
further the movement for international criminality of offenses under common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention. Id. at 82. Also, the due process guarantees in the Tribunal's statute are
extended in relation to those of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. Id. at 83. Sixth, rape is
recognized as a crime against humanity. Id. at 84. Finally, by discarding the requirement for a
nexus of the crime to the war, the definition of "crimes against humanity" has been broadened.

Thus, the prosecution of crimes related to the conflict, but not in the course of armed conflict,
will be far easier. Id. at 87.
115. Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at 2551.
116. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan.
12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. This convention explicitly
expresses the state's duty to prosecute violations of their respective treaties. Ironically, the
Genocide Convention itself offers little aid to the Rwandan genocide. The Convention ensures
punishment of the crime in national courts. Id. art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280-82, but the lack of a
universal jurisdiction is particularly problematic because the Rwandans are unlikely to obtain
relief from the previous regime through the Convention's mechanism. See generally Lori L.
Brunn, Note and Comment, Beyond the 1948 Convention-Emerging Principles of Genocide in
Customary International Law, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 193 (1993) (Lack of universal
jurisdiction is the greatest problem with this convention.). Contra Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at
2565. As a matter of customary international law, there is universal jurisdiction over genocide,
although it is not specifically mentioned within the Genocide Convention itself.
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rights are violated, ' 7 but have been interpreted to mean that a state must
investigate and punish violations of these rights." 8
In the Rwanda case, the international community was concerned
over the newly-established government's ability to fulfill its international
obligations, and granted Rwanda's request for an international tribunal.'
Before losing its sole jurisdiction, Rwanda did have the duty to prosecute
these violations. It is useful to examine the methods that other burgeoning
democracies are using to deal with the human rights violations of previous
regimes. Perhaps the Rwandan tragedy would have been better mitigated
under such a domestic option.
1. The Chilean Model
Recently Chile and several other newly democratized nations have
decided to sacrifice justice for reconciliation.'20 Since 1990, Chile has
offered blanket amnesty to the prior repressive regime while still instituting
an investigation into the crimes of that regime. ' The reasons for this
approach are basically political. Initially, seeking criminal convictions
may have caused unrest, and possibly another coup.' Furthermore, many
of those who stood to benefit from the amnesty had already been murdered
or had disappeared.'23 Therefore Chile chose to ignore its internationally
imposed obligation to prosecute the subjects of its investigation'24 and freed
itself to concentrate on reuniting the nation.
Chile's decision to breach its international duty to prosecute should
not be advocated for Rwanda. However, the more basic and practical
aspects of the Chilean model of reconstruction, with a limited degree of

117. Ortenlicher, supra note 53, at 2551. See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment,
State Responsibility To Investigate and Prosecute Grave Hwnan Rights Violations in International
Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 449, 479, 482-83 (1990) (stating that the scope of remedy required by
Human Rights violations is specifically outlined for each International Convention).
118.

Id. at 2552.

119.

S.C. Res. 955, supra note 20, at 2.

120.

Charles Krauthanmer, Truth, Not Trials; A Way for the Newly Liberated To Deal with

the Crimes of the Past, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at A27.
121. Robert J. Quinn, Note, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for
the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905,
907 (1994).

122.
123.

Krauthammer, supra note 120.
Quinn, supra note 121, at 918.

124.

Id.
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amnesty, may be fruitful for Rwanda.2' If Rawanda follows Chile's
emphasis on investigations'26 and reparations,'" perhaps it might have had
the opportunity to reconcile while maintaining stability.'28 If Chile had not
granted a blanket amnesty, but merely punished the most severe human
rights violations, they would have been complying with their international
obligation to prosecute.' 29
Admittedly, the situation in Rwanda differs from Chile. In Chile, a
single repressive regime perpetrated the human rights violations, while in
Rwanda, an entire ethnic group violated human rights during a civil war
for generations. Considering the magnitude of the Rwandan genocide, it is
unlikely that amnesty would even be considered by the Rwandan
government. However, this approach is proving successful for other
emerging African democracies like South Africa' 3 and should be
considered by the Rwandan authorities.
IV. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Punishment of the massacres, "mindless violence and carnage," 3'
and genocide of Rwanda would have been most sensible in a permanently
established International Criminal Court.'
However, despite the
drawbacks of a tribunal, the United Nations has decided to prosecute
criminals through an ad hoc method."' This decision is indicative of not
only the international community's desire for a permanent court, but also
its reluctance to commit the necessary resources."
125. Id. at 960. The international community should recognize that a modification of the
Chilean model would be acceptable for other transitional governments. The Chilean model provides
stability, while satisfying those injured with lengthy investigations.
126. Id. at 954. President Aylwin created the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation in order to fulfill the state's responsibility to acknowledge previous violations.
127. Id. at 955. Chilean Law No. 19,123 created the National Corporation for Reparation
and Reconciliation which provides medical, educational, and monetary assistance to victims and their
families.
128. Quinn, supra note 121, at 960.
129. Id.
130. Krauthammer, supra note 120.
131. Massacres, 'Mindless Violence and Carnage' Rage in Rwanda, U.N. CHRON., Sept.
1994, at 15.
132. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 271, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
According to article 22 of The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, the court
would have jurisdiction over the crimes defined in various treaties such as The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions, and the proposed
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.
133. SCOR Res. 955, supra note 20, at 1.
134. Maguire, supra note 106, at 4.
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A. What Law Would Be Applied?
Undoubtedly, the need for an international criminal code and court
exists.'" A draft code of punishable crimes has been a thorn in the side of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations since
Nuremberg.' 3 The inability to reach a consensus on the definition of
aggression stalled the adoption of any code for virtually forty years.'37
Fortunately, the end of the Cold War not only thawed East-West cooperation, but also revived the criminal code debate. In 1987, President
Gorbachev's Perestroika policy included recognition of the jurisdiction of
international courts and was a major impetus for the drafting of a new
criminal code.'38 It was this new political climate, coupled with Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which propelled the need for a criminal code
and court to the forefront of international criminal law.'39

135. Nagan, supra note 33, at 24. The sudden surge to create a permanent court has also
been attributed to administrative and bureaucratic causes. The International Law Commission has
been forced to seek extra resources from the United Nations budget in order to fulfill the
investigatory duties with which it was charged in the former yugoslavia. Id. Thus, there has
been a strong pressure from within the United Nations bureaucracy to create a separate tribunal
with its own prosecutorial and investigatory capabilities, in the hopes of relieving the burden on
the International Law Commission. Id.
136. Lieutenant Commander Rolph, Perfecting an International Code of Crimes, ARMY
LAW, June 1992, 42, 47.
137. Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand
and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 378 (1992).
138. Id. at 379.
139. Louis R. Beres, After the Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 13, 14 (1991). The U.N. Security Council repeatedly condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, without a code or court to punish Iraqi aggressions, crimes
were "carried out with essential impunity." Id. at 13. These crimes should have been addressed
by international law, but politics have interfered with any real punishment. Id. at 14. See
Kleinberger, supra note 10, at 72. Kleinberger effectively uses Iraq's behavior during the
Persian Gulf War as evidence of the need for an international criminal court. Nevertheless, even
if an adjudicative response had materialized, the lack of available adjudicative mechanisms would
render such a response useless. Id. First, the doctrines upon which international criminal law
exists are vague and generalized. Id. at 86. Neither the Nuremberg Charter, nor the U.N.
charter, nor the Geneva Conventions have successfully defined the war crimes or provided a legal
basis for punishment. Id. at 87. Although Iraq would have few viable defenses in the light of
the tremendous atrocities which violated portions of all of these statutes, the lack of one cohesive
code would make adjudication very difficult. Id. at 106. Under each statute, only a few of the
atrocities would be crimes.
Second, the lack of a suitable forum for hearing this case is indicative of the need for a
Court. Id. at 103. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over disputes between
states to enforce international conventions, customs, and recognized principles of law. Id. at
104. However, municipal courts in Kuwait or the United States could have provided a viable
forum. Id. at 103. Even an ad hoc tribunal could have tried crimes of particular individuals. Id.
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The most recent and inclusive attempt at developing an
international code of crimes was made by the International Law
Commission in 1991.' The "Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind" 4 was particularly noteworthy for categorizing
colonialism, apartheid, serious injury to the environment, terrorism, and
drug trafficking as crimes. 42 This draft successfully highlighted the
problems which needed to be addressed before any code could be
adopted.' 3 However, its imperfections were too large to withstand
scrutiny,'" and it has not been brought to a vote.
First, the Draft Code failed to specify punishments for the crimes
it listed.' 5 Also, many of the provisions were vague. ' "6 The terminology
was ambiguously defined by attempting to create a consensus from
wording which was extracted from previous international conventions.'
Such terminology did not achieve the specificity and legal precision
required by a penal code for the fair distribution of justice."' Often there
But without a single court enforcing a single code, adjudication would only be as binding as Iraq
would allow it to be.
Kleinberger theorizes that it is the fundamental hiearchical differences between international
and criminal law which prevents the development of an international criminal court when the
need for their merger is so apparent. Id. at 104. Criminal law relies on a vertical power
structure where the enforcer of law is superior to the violator of law. Id. at 105. However,
international law is based on a horizontal power structure whereby all nations are equal and
accession to the law is virtually voluntary. Id. at 104. International criminal law will be
virtually stagnant until the two systems can be reconciled.
140. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session,
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238-344, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991).
141. The original draft code was presented to the General Assembly in 1954 as The Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 9 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 11,
U.N. Doc. A.2693 (1954). It has yet to be adopted.
142. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381. See generally William N. Gianaris, The New World
Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88 (1992)
(explaining that the increasing scope and diversity of international crime created the need for an
I
international criminalm court as no other time in history).
143. Rolph, supra note 136, at 47.
144. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381.
145. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 205-06, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991). The drafters were
unable to reach a conclusion as to which kind of penal system to institute: one group sought to
establish separate penalties depending on the crime; the other group desired a single penalty, with
a minimum and maximum sentence depending on the circumstances of each case. The death
penalty and life imprisonment were also hotly debated by the Commission. Id. at 206. Many
members argued from the position that the death penalty was immoral and unnecessary, while
nations who used the death penalty, lobbied for its establishment. Id. at 208-09.
146. Ferencz, supra note 137, at 381.
147.

Id.

148. Id. See, e.g,. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a
Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 486-87 (1994). Professor Bassiouni
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was no adequate description of the legal elements which constitute a
particular crime.' 9 The delegates of the various nations were quick to
point out the failures of the Draft. 50 Unable to produce a penal code to
satisfy all nations, the Draft Code remains in limbo. 5 '
The current stalemate of the Draft Code has directly affected the
development of the International Criminal Court.'52 The United Nations'
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction has deferred action on
the International Criminal Court until an agreement is reached as to the
code of crimes.' 3 Thus, the need for a criminal code is self-evident: until
a code is adopted, the Court will never be established.
B. The Future of the Court
If the International Criminal Court is to be created, now is the
time. First, there is a positive aura of cooperation as evidenced by the ad
hoc tribunals, and the Security Council's resohite intent to end conflicts in
various areas of the world." Second, nations' increasing fears of drug
trafficking and terrorism in the modern world have increased interest in an
international court.'55 Third, nations are becoming weary of expending
lives and money on other nations' conflicts. Using military force against
other nations in order to enforce international law is becoming
burdensome.'56

outlines several particular problems with the portion of the draft which deals with crimes against

humanity. First, there are fewer crimes listed as crimes against humanity than in the Nuremberg
Charter. Id. Furthermore, many crimes which are carried over from Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter do not correspond to the definitions of the crimes in the Draft. Id. at 457. In his legal
expertise, Professor Bassiouni fails to see the nexus between some of the newly-listed crimes to the
original crimes against humanity. Id. at 486-87.
149.

Id.

150.

U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 46th Sess., 29th-37th mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.29-37

(1991).
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The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind was debated again

in 1993. After the member nations had a chance to review the Draft Code, its main failures were
analyzed and various portions of the original were changed. See Report of the InternationalLaw
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 2125, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993).
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Despite the lack of a recognized code of crimes, or a court, many

scholars have kept the goal of an International Criminal Court alive.' 7
Some of these scholars have proposed permanent methods of adjudication
which, had they been created, would have provided very viable
alternatives for trying the instigators of the Rwandan genocide.'"8

1. The Current Draft
Today, in 1994, the International Law Commission (ILC) of the

United Nations remains hopeful that the current draft presented to the
United Nations General Assembly will be adopted.' 59 The most recent
proposal has been created in accordance with several principles. First, the
Court would be established by statute to which the states would sign in the
form of a treaty."w The Court would exercise jurisdiction over private
persons, not states. 6 ' Also, the Court's jurisdiction would not be limited
to the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, but
would extend over specified international treaties.' 62 Additionally, the

157. M. Cherif Bassiouni has been a recognized authority on international criminal law, and a
proponent of an International Criminal Court for decades. At the request of the United Nations, M.
Cherif Bassiouni prepared the draft statute of an international criminal jurisdiction to implement the
Apartheid Convention in 1980. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for
an InternationalCriminal Court in the New InternationalWorld Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L.
L. 151, 158 (1992). The plan was submitted but lay dormant until 1990, when a revision of
Bassiouni's draft was sent to the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders.
158. Because the Rwandan crimes are being tried as violations of human rights, the laws of
war are beyond the scope of this article. However it is interesting to note the possibility of a war
crimes tribunal in an American military forum. In particular, it has been suggested that an American
court-martial or military commission would provide a stable forum for adjudication of international
violations of the laws of war. See Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forumsfor Punishing
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 510 (1994). Proponents of
this approach argue that there is sufficient precedent in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to
support this method. Id. at 511. According to article I, section 8, clause 10 of the United States
Constitution, Congress has the power to punish offenses against the law of nations. Id. at 512. This
clause does not specify nationalities. By stretching this constitutional clause to include offenders of
other nations, Congress may be able to punish foreign nationals who violate the recognized law of
nations both against the United States and third parties. Id. at 514. Whether the United States
would want to take on this obligation and increase its perception as the "watchdog of the world" is
another question. Nevertheless, this is a seemingly viable option to consider.
159. Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Fifth Session of the International Law Commission, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (1994). The previous draft has been revised and is being prepared for
examination by the General Assembly.
160. James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 140, 142 (1994).
161.

Id.
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Court would basically have consensual, rather than compulsory,
jurisdiction.'63 Finally, the Court would stand only when required.,"
2. Refutable Objections to the International Criminal Court
The objections to the International Criminal Court are easily
refuted. Undoubtedly the main reason that the International Criminal
Court does not exist is because nations fear losing their sovereignty. 65
States are concerned that either their citizens will not be awarded fair
adjudication, or alternatively, that they will not receive just compensation
in a foreign court.'" However, nations must fulfill their international
obligation of obedience to international law that transcends national
duties. 67 Initial concerns of sovereignty must be suppressed in order to
create the International Criminal Court which will enforce human rights
and other international duties.'"
A second major objection to the International Criminal Court is
that nations foresee conflicts between their domestic courts and the
international court. ' Admittedly, concurrent jurisdiction may cause bitter
conflicts.'70 No system is perfect, but the expected positive results of the
International Criminal Court, such as improved extradition and
prosecution, will greatly outweigh those instances of inconvenience when

those conflicts occur. '7'
Some critics cite the dangers in disrupting the existing system as
the reason to postpone creating the Court."
They claim that needed
resources may be diverted from the more mundane concerns such as
efforts to combat crime.'
However, if the Court is standing only when
problems arise, there would be virtually no cost between sessions.7 The
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method of mutual assistance would be no more costly than the mutual
assistance currently employed by the United Nations."
3. Conclusion
The obstacles posed by critics of the International Criminal Court,
if not easily overcome, are certainly manageable. Had the International
Criminal Court been established, Rwanda's adjudication may have had a
higher likelihood for success. A permanent court would have had the
stability which the ad hoc tribunal lacks. 76 Secondly, the administrative
problems which plague the ad hoc tribunal would have been minimized by
the Court's growth and success.'" Finally, a permanent tribunal would not
be involved in the political questions surrounding the peace process.
Therefore, justice would not be sacrificed in the interest of reaching a
settlement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent tragedy in Rwanda is only one example of many human
Unfortunately, there is no
rights violations throughout the world.
Therefore, the
permanent forum for adjudication of these crimes.
international community has responded arbitrarily to some of these
situations with ad hoc tribunals. Yet it seems inherently unfair for some of
these violations to be singled out for punishment while others are not.
Furthermore, the current Tribunal imposed upon Rwanda has
several short-comings. These short-comings will have an effect not only
upon the outcome of the Rwandan adjudication, but upon the future of
international criminal law. For this reason it is becoming increasingly
imperative for the United Nations General Assembly to create an
International Criminal Court. A permanently established international
tribunal with a clarified code of crimes is needed to handle the human
rights violations throughout the world. The exaggerated fears and apathy
of many nations have prevented the adoption of this permanent tribunal.
Consequently, they have prohibited Rwanda, and other nations with
similar human rights problems, from having the fair adjudication which
they deserve. In 1995, the Nuremberg Trials will celebrate their 50th
anniversary. This is the appropriate time to re-evaluate the ideals of
Nuremberg and expand upon them with a permanent Tribunal.
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